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Preface
For a quarter century, federally funded employment and training programs
have proven their worth in helping the unemployed, unskilled and deficiently
educated to compete in the labor market. Job training programs complement
a host of federal efforts including education, housing, food assistance,
economic development and income support programs to ameliorate the lives
of the poor.
This book scrutinizes the activities funded under the Job Training Partner
ship Act, which encompasses a variety of employment and training programs
carried over from its predecessor, the Comprehensive Employment and Train
ing Act. Complementary federal social programs are discussed only insofar
as they relate to JTPA.
Threatened for a time in the early 1980s, employment and training programs
had gained renewed support but not greater funding by 1987. Five years
after the law's passage, it is timely to examine whether the experience of JTPA
supports the congressional decision to overhaul GETA. The answer is an un
equivocal maybe. JTPA is a resounding political and public relations success,
in marked contrast to the unfairly maligned GET A. Business representatives
and conservatives including President Reagan who castigated CETA now
sing JTPA's praises. Though the president was initially a most reluctant sup
porter of JTPA, his subsequent endorsement of the law has undermined the
efforts of his subordinates and other conservatives who oppose the program.
A careful assessment of JTPA, however, reveals that its performance falls
far short of the claims made by administration officials and many program
managers. The Labor Department's reported results indicate performance
superior to CETA, but the improvement may be illusory. Local administrators
and training contractors select a more qualified clientele than CETA served,
and are tempted to exaggerate results with impunity because federal and state
monitoring of JTPA operations is at best cursory. Moreover, by offering briefer
and less intensive training courses, JTPA does too little to improve the saleable
labor market skills of enrollees.
Opening with a brief review of past federal training and employment
assistance for the poor and unemployed, the authors analyze each major com
ponent of JTPA, including year-round programs for adults and youth, sum
mer jobs for youth, assistance for dislocated workers, the Job Crops for severely
disadvantaged youth, and training programs for Indians and farmworkers.
vn

Inaugurated by the Kennedy administration, federal job training programs
expanded dramatically during the succeeding two decades. Reversing this trend,
President Reagan, upon assuming office, gained congressional approval for
eliminating CETA's multibillion dollar public jobs program. In 1982, follow
ing a protracted debate, Congress enacted the Job Training Partnership Act
with sharply reduced appropriations. The law also strictly limited stipends for
trainees, and transferred substantial administrative authority from the federal
government to states and local business representatives. By 1987, the $3.7
billion appropriation for JTPA was less than a fourth of inflation-adjusted CETA
spending during the peak year under President Carter.
While JTPA greatly expanded the administrative authority of states and the
business community, Congress clearly expected the federal government to guide
and monitor the program. However, except for meager federal appropriations,
the Reagan administration treats JTPA as a state responsibility, and the failure
of states to fill the leadership vacuum hinders the program's effectiveness.
Local programs have increased business involvement in management, but there
is no persuasive evidence that employer participation has improved perfor
mance. JTPA has made little progress in achieving better coordination with
related social programs, dashing exaggerated congressional expectations that
efficient interprogram cooperation could compensate for radical budget cuts.
The 620 local training agencies rely primarily upon classroom, on-the-job,
and job search training. The limited evidence suggests that JTPA improves
the employability of participants. However, pressures caused by the law's strict
limitation on providing stipends to trainees, and stress on business rather than
client needs, have impaired JTPA's effectiveness. The introduction of perfor
mance standards was a positive step, but the Labor Department has inadequately
supervised the system and placed too much emphasis on the standards, to the
exclusion of other means of improving JTPA. Two-week job search courses,
unlikely to effect more than fleeting improvement in the employability of par
ticipants, have become increasingly common. The duration of classroom and
on-the-job training is even shorter than the abbreviated CETA courses. Legal
limitations on stipends and support services reinforce the inclination of local
administrators to avoid serving individuals most in need. Finally, in the absence
of adequate monitoring, local administrators and training contractors may suc
cumb to the temptation to doctor results to report success.
Reacting to massive layoffs and plant closings in the 1980s, JTPA initiated
a program for workers displaced through rapid economic change fostered by
foreign economic competition. Federal assistance to dislocated workers is an
important advance, but to date the program has been poorly managed. Because
of federal and state negligence, dislocated worker projects have spent only
viii

two-thirds of the appropriated funds, leaving thousands who could have been
helped without assistance. Administrators tend to exclude the least educated
and older displaced workers who need help the most. Those who do enroll
and require intensive training rarely receive it.
In contrast to other JTPA programs, the Job Corps a federally-administered
residential training program for severely disadvantaged youth has remained
relatively unchanged since JTPA's passage. Despite its high costs of nearly
$16,000 per training year, observers across the political spectrum have
acknowledged the program's achievements. Efforts are now underway to
replicate the Job Corps model, which combines remedial education with voca
tional training in a nonresidential program to reduce costs.
Two training programs designed specifically for disadvantaged farmworkers
and Indians have been particularly neglected under JTPA. Budget cuts and
inadequate technical assistance have limited the ability of local projects to ad
dress the needs of these severely disadvantaged populations.
The concluding chapter discusses the reforms necessary to make JTPA a
more effective program. The two top priorities are increased funding and more
vigorous federal leadership. Present appropriations allow assistance to only
about one in twenty eligible individuals. The Job Corps' outstanding record
is attributable to and not in spite of federal administration and a generous
but prudent investment. Following the Job Corps' practice, JTPA should em
phasize assistance to individuals most in need, providing them with the basic
education and quality training they require to compete in the labor market.
Improving JTPA's operations does not require altering its administrative struc
ture, and in fact such a realignment would impede necesary reforms. Con
gress has historically devoted too much attention to the division of administrative
responsibility, at the expense of emphasizing and overseeing program quality.
A Second Chance is the first comprehensive assessment of all of JTPA's
components. The study draws on the work of various researchers who have
examined different facets of the program, published and unpublished U.S.
Labor Department and General Accounting Office reports, responses to the
authors' questionnaires, and interviews with scores of program managers. The
usual lament of researchers about the lack of data has substantial credence in
the case of JTPA. Belying its professed dedication to eliminating governmen
tal inefficiency, the Reagan administration drastically reduced the collection
of information necessary to evaluate JTPA and thus help local managers im
prove services to their clients.

IX

CONTENTS
1. A Continued Federal Commitment ......................
Those in Need .....................................
The Expanding Federal Role .........................
The Job Training Partnership Act .....................

1
1
4
9

2. The Reluctant Partners: Program Management.............
Federal Administration ..............................
State Governments ..................................
The Local Partnership ...............................
Coordination.......................................

17
17
30
37
45

3. Training Adults and Youth .............................
Enrollees..........................................
Administrative Limitations and Support Services .........
Training ..........................................
Service Providers...................................

57
57
62
65
81

4. Performance Standards and Results ......................
JTPA's Requirements ...............................
Federal Implementation ..............................
State Direction .....................................
Standards and Reality ...............................
Does Training Work? ...............................

85
86
87
95
97
103

5. Aiding Dislocated Workers.............................
Programs Antedating JTPA...........................
JTPA Operations ...................................
Trade Politics and Pending Legislation .................

105
107
108
121

6. The Job Corps: Investing Pays Off ......................
Administration and Financing .........................
Job Corps Enrollees.................................
Education .........................................
Vocational Training .................................
The Residential Living Program.......................

123
124
130
134
139
141

xi

The Dropout Problem ...............................
Postprogram Experiences ............................
A Quarter Century of Progress .......................

145
149
158

7. Farmworker and Indian Programs .......................
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers....................
Native Americans...................................

159
159
166

8. Taking Stock ........................................
The Last Should Be First ............................
Minding the Store ..................................
Knowledge is Valuable ..............................
It Can't Be Done With Mirrors .......................

173
173
176
178
179

Appendices .............................................
Employment and Training ABCs ......................
Questionnaire for State Administrators .................
Questionnaire for SDAs .............................

183
183
184
185

Notes ..................................................

189

Index ..................................................

211

xn

1
A Continued
Federal Commitment

On October 13, 1982 President Reagan signed into law the Job
Training Partnership Act to help unskilled and deficiently educated
poor individuals to compete in the labor market. The law replaced
the much maligned Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(GETA) and continued
albeit with substantially less funding
federal efforts to provide training for the poor which began in 1961.
Federally financed training assistance reflects a national consensus
that many people fail in or are being failed by the labor market not
only in recessions, but even in prosperous times. In mid-1987,
during the fifth year of the recovery from the 1981-2 recession, over
7 million Americans were unemployed. This represents the highest
level of joblessness in a sustained recovery period since the end of
the Great Depression a half century ago.
Those in Need
Thirty-three million people experienced labor market problems at
some time during 1985. Some had multiple difficulties: 21 million
suffered unemployment, 14 million worked part time because they
could not find full-time jobs, and 4 million full-time workers earned
less than $6700 minimum wage earnings for a full year of work.
Preliminary 1986 data indicate little change. Of those unemployed
at some time during the prior year, 21.4 percent had family incomes
below the poverty line. In contrast, the poverty rate for those
without any unemployment was 5.4 percent. 1 Even those who work
full time year-round are not assured a minimally acceptable living
1
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standard, as nearly two million such individuals were impoverished
in 1985, up 44 percent from 1979.
The unemployment rate has crept upward over the past two
decades, and economic and productivity growth has been sluggish
since the 1973 OPEC oil embargo precipitated a major recession.
The changing structure of American families has also augmented
labor market hardships. While the entrance of more wives into the
workforce has clearly benefited some families, increasing numbers
of divorces and out-of-wedlock births have had a negative impact
on family incomes. Single mothers and households of single persons
and unrelated individuals tend to have significantly greater unem
ployment and poverty problems than two-parent families.
as
A large proportion of unemployment and low earnings
much as half or more over a decade-long period is accounted for
by a small proportion of individuals with lengthy unemployment
spells or chronically low wages.2 Deficient educational attainment is
a major factor associated with employment problems. The mini
mum education necessary to compete in the labor market has
greatly increased in this century. However, according to a survey by
the U.S. Department of Education, nearly 13 percent of adults in
this country are functionally illiterate. 3 In 1984, adults with less
than a high school education experienced over four times as much
unemployment as those with four or more years of college, and the
latter earned 2.5 times as much as the less educated group.4
Economic difficulties are also particularly concentrated among
minorities, youth, and women who maintain families. The incidence
of black unemployment and poverty is more than twice that of the
rest of the population. While not quite as bleak, Hispanic unem
ployment and poverty also far exceed that of the total population.
Of all age groups, youth are most vulnerable to unemployment.
The level of teenage joblessness is about three times that of adults,
and that of the 20-24 age group is 75 percent higher. Black youth
joblessness is especially severe: only four of ten black teenagers are
in the workforce, and of the remainder two of five are unemployed.
Unemployment in female-headed families is 70 percent higher
than in married couple families, and the poverty rate is five times
higher. More than half of the black and Hispanic women who
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maintain their families are poor. Almost one of every six families,
and more than two of five black families, are headed by women.
The foregoing groups have traditionally experienced employment
problems, but in recent years the problems of dislocated workers
have also gained increasing attention. Increased foreign competi
tion and a severe recession during the early 1980s eliminated large
numbers of jobs in the goods-producing sector, especially in
manufacturing. It is difficult to determine the exact causes of
dislocation, but its unemployment impact is not in doubt. Between
1981 and 1985, 10.8 million workers 20 years old and over lost their
jobs due to layoffs from which they had not been recalled or to plant
closings. A Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis of displaced workers
who had three or more years job tenure found that only two-thirds
were reemployed in January 1986. Eighteen percent were unem
ployed, and the remaining 15 percent had dropped out of the labor
force. As in the case of other jobless workers, the unskilled and
deficiently educated displaced workers tended to fare worst. 5
The number of persons in need of job-related assistance repre
sents a substantial proportion of the working age population. The
following figures are not additive because of overlapping categories,
but provide an idea of the dimensions of the problem:6
Characteristics
Total poor (16-64 years old)
Blacks (16-64)
Hispanics (16-64)
15-24 year olds
Single mothers (15-64)

Number
(millions)
17.8
4.4
2.7
6.6
3.3

High school dropouts (25-64)

23.6

Dislocated workers (20-64)

3.1

Each of these groups may require different strategies to improve
their employability. Young people, who tend to have little labor
market experience, may benefit from learning basic job search skills.
Disadvantaged youth without adequate skills can profit from
programs providing high school equivalency or vocational training.
The discrimination often faced by minorities may be overcome by
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partially subsidizing employers for on-the-job training costs and by
government enforcement of equal opportunity laws. Women who
maintain families frequently require child care assistance to success
fully complete a training course. Displaced and older workers
usually possess substantial work experience, and may only need job
placement assistance. However, displaced employees who have
worked for years in a now obsolete occupation may need to be
retrained for an entirely new career.
The Expanding Federal Role

Although the federal government has promoted the welfare of the
citizenry since the earliest years of the republic, sustained employ
ment and training efforts focused on the disadvantaged emerged
only a quarter century ago. Starting with a modest appropriation of
$10 million under the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961, annual
appropriations increased a thousandfold within two decades before
declining during the 1980s (figure l.l). 7
Figure 1.1
Federal employment and training financing and services have
fluctuated drastically over the past two decades (1986 dollars).
Outlays
(billions)
$20 ••
$18 ••
$16
$14
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4
$2
$0

•
•
•
•
••
••
•
•

Work incentive program
$18.1

Public service jobs
Employment service
Training
$4.9

1967

1970

1975

1978

Source: U.S. Office of Management and Budget

1981

1986

Persistent unemployment in the early 1960s resulted in the
enactment of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
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1962, the first major expansion of federal training efforts. MDTA
initially provided retraining for experienced workers dislocated by
automation, but was later redirected toward the poor.
In 1963, congressional attention turned toward youth as the first
baby boomers reached age 16 and began entering the labor force.
Congress expanded support for a federal vocational education
program that dated back to 1917.
The Great Society
In 1964 the nation's attention focused on the plight of the poor in
response to President Lyndon Johnson's declared "war on pov
erty." Economists were predicting that projected federal budget
surpluses would impede economic growth. What better way to
spend the surpluses than to help build a better society? As part of its
antipoverty efforts, the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act created
two new youth employment programs: the Job Corps, a residential
training program; and the Neighborhood Youth Corps, providing
work experience. Work experience was also used to help needy
adults, including public assistance recipients. Adopting the notion
that the wearer, not the cobbler, knows where the shoe pinches, the
legislation favored "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in
setting program policy. The institutional result was the emergence
of community action agencies and community-based organizations
as advocates for the poor and deliverers of services, including
employment and training assistance.
Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remained stuck between 5
and 6 percent throughout 1963 and the first half of 1964 — a rate
considered high at that time. Post World War II economic text
books had preached that a tax cut — without an offsetting
reduction in government expenditures — would help reduce unem
ployment by stimulating demand for the purchase of goods and
services. In 1964, Congress tested this theory, cutting federal
personal and corporate income taxes by approximately $14 billion
while moderately increasing expenditures. The action was strikingly
successful. Unemployment declined to 5 percent by the end of the
year, and further dropped to 4.5 percent by the summer of 1965 on
the heels of a $5 billion excise tax cut, when deficit spending to
finance the Vietnam War took over as the engine for job creation.
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By 1965, America's reemergent social conscience addressed the
needs of the physically and mentally handicapped, millions of
whom were unable to effectively compete in the labor market. The
federal government had previously enacted a comprehensive reha
bilitation program for World War II and Korean War veterans;
new legislation expanded federal vocational rehabilitation efforts
for other disabled persons.
In 1966, Congress experimented with small public jobs programs
for adults not on welfare, the first such efforts since the Great
Depression. New Careers trained the poor and undereducated for
paraprofessional jobs, and Operation Mainstream employed older
rural residents at conservation tasks. New Careers failed partly
because the training required a long-term commitment and because
of resistance by professionals protective of their jobs and status.
Operation Mainstream limped along with limited funding until it
mushroomed into a more comprehensive, multibillion dollar public
service employment program five years later. Also in 1966, the
Adult Education Act initiated federal educational assistance for
high school dropouts and illiterate adults.
Attention turned in 1967 to welfare recipients. Despite strong
economic growth since the early 1960s, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program recipients had almost doubled since
the beginning of the decade. The cry was raised that if the program
continued to grow at this rate, we would all be driven into the
poorhouse. Congress responded with the Work Incentive Program,
called WIN for short (the acronym WIP was shunned). Work
experience and supportive services would enable welfare recipients
to secure jobs, economic independence and — as some members of
Congress hoped — "get 'em off our backs."
Government efforts notwithstanding, unemployment in many
inner cities remained a serious problem. Dozens of riots broke out
in the mid-1960s, from Watts to Detroit to the nation's capital. One
result was the Concentrated Employment Program of 1967, which
put antipoverty and training funds in the hands of mayors, county
officials, and community-based organizations to boost job oppor
tunities in poor neighborhoods.
Until 1968, the Great Society's employment and training initia
tives had been designed almost entirely by federal agencies. With
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rising social unrest, the private sector began to pay increasing
attention to inner city conditions. President Johnson, seizing upon
this concern, created the National Alliance of Businessmen — the
"men" was later dropped — to encourage employers to accept
direct responsibility for combating discrimination and poverty.
However, by the last year of the Johnson administration, the
political pressure to ameliorate the lot the of poor had crested.
Economic growth and new government initiatives helped reduce
poverty substantially in the 1960s, but dreams of total victory had
proven illusory.
Nixon and the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act
The Nixon administration came to power with only one positive
commitment in the employment and training field: to consolidate
and at the same time decentralize the diverse programs which had
emerged during the 1960s. Congress was prepared to accept this
approach only if it was accompanied by a public sector job creation
program. The administration, however, strongly opposed what it
considered "make work" jobs.
The recession of 1970-1 and the approaching presidential elec
tions generated sufficient political pressure to induce President
Nixon to sign the 1971 Emergency Employment Act authorizing a
public employment program. A $2.25 billion appropriation allowed
state and local governments and nonprofit organizations to hire
some 150,000 unemployed persons.
Nixon's support of public employment was short-lived. Follow
ing his 1972 landslide reelection, Nixon attempted to dismantle the
Great Society. Watergate intervened, however, and amid a period
of disarray in the executive branch the Labor Department negoti
ated directly with Congress to create the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (GETA). Enacted in December 1973, the CETA
compromise called for locally-managed but federally-funded train
ing and public sector job creation programs. After years of debate
over the appropriate scope and locus of service delivery, Congress
gave local governments broad discretion to tailor job training
programs to community needs. CETA also authorized a standby
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public service employment program, to be implemented whenever
national and local unemployment rates rose too high. Although
most programs were to be managed at the local or state level, the
federal government continued to operate the Job Corps for youth
and programs for Indians and farmworkers.
CETA began under the least propitious circumstances, arriving
simultaneously with the OPEC oil embargo which quadrupled
crude oil prices and induced a recession. The new employment and
training program was overwhelmed by unemployment, which
climbed from a 5 percent rate at the beginning of 1974 to over 7
percent by December. President Gerald Ford reluctantly agreed to
a new public service employment program, shifting CETA's focus
toward job creation rather than training. Unemployment peaked at
9 percent in the spring of 1975 and averaged 7.7 percent in the 1976
election year. Ford acquiesced to a congressional extension of the
public service employment program shortly before the election, but
vetoed Democratic efforts to further increase funds for job creation.
A Major Expansion Under Carter
In 1977, the executive reins returned to the Democrats, who after
eight years out of power vigorously promoted new employment and
training initiatives. The Youth Employment and Demonstration
Projects Act of 1977 (YEDPA), expanded funding for public service
jobs, and employment tax credits were quickly enacted. Together
these programs constituted a major if short-lived commitment of
resources to combat unemployment.
The New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977 offered employers incentives
for expanding their workforce. In its brief two-year lifespan, over
$4 billion in tax expenditures boosted overall employment. The
program was not restricted to the disadvantaged.
The highest priority, however, was to ameliorate unemployment
among poor youths. YEDPA was a combination of traditional
work experience and skill training programs with experimental
research projects. Another innovation directed primarily toward
youths was the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit of 1978 (TJTC). Similar to
the expiring New Jobs Tax Credit, TJTC offered employers a
substantial tax credit for employing poor youths and other impov
erished individuals.
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Another major employment initiative of the Carter administra
tion was an expansion of public service employment under CETA
from 300,000 to 750,000 job slots in nine months. The pressure to
quickly fill these jobs resulted in isolated, though highly publicized,
cases of careless management and enrollment of ineligible appli
cants that were to haunt CETA for the rest of its limited life.
The last major employment and training development during the
Carter administration was a 1978 revision of CETA. Amendments
reduced the discretionary authority of state and local governments,
confined eligibility for public service employment to the poor, and
initiated a new training program which involved private sector
representatives in program planning and implementation. The
changes improved the operations of CETA and addressed concerns
of financial mismanagement, but did little to boost the program's
image.
The Job Training Partnership Act
In a clear break with past federal policy, President Reagan
mounted a concerted effort to sharply cut employment and training
spending along with other antipoverty programs. CETA public
service jobs were eliminated in 1981 with little dissent, as exagger
ated and highly publicized abuses had undermined the program's
support. Negative images of public employment as "make-work,
dead-end" jobs had triumphed. Reagan administration appointees
ignored evidence that supported the program, and confidently
predicted that the private sector would reabsorb displaced public
service employees. However, later studies showed that these indi
viduals experienced severe reemployment problems.8
CETA's scheduled September 1982 expiration prompted a
lengthy debate over the act's remaining job training sections.9 By
early 1982, three major proposals emerged. House Democrats
favored a program similar to CETA, but with increased business
involvement. The Reagan administration favored terminating the
program and shifting the responsibility to states and localities. As
an interim step, however, the administration supported a block
grant arrangement with federal financing but state control over

10
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program operations. The Senate Republicans' compromise solution
favored continued federal oversight with a substantial delegation of
authority to states and business officials.
As the recession deepened and unemployment rose, Congress
balked at the administration's proposal to end federal support of
job training assistance. The debate then shifted to the design of a
new program, centering on four contentious issues: how much
should be spent; whether enrollees should be given cash assistance
as well as training; the proper division of authority among federal,
state and local government; and the degree of business involvement.
Although the jobless rate was approaching 9 percent, President
Reagan's budget, introduced in January 1982, recommended $2.4
billion for job training, only a fourth of the amount appropriated
prior to his election. Senators Dan Quayle and Edward Kennedy
proposed a bipartisan bill carrying a price tag of $3.8 billion.
Representative Augustus Hawkins offered a $5.4 billion proposal,
but a cost conscious House reserved only $3 billion for job training.
In the final legislation, Congress evaded the funding issue by
allocating "such sums as may be necessary" for JTPA. The only
exception was the widely praised Job Corps program, budgeted at
$618 million for fiscal 1983. Subsequently, Congress appropriated
$3.7 billion for JTPA's first full year.
The House Democratic bill initially proposed reviving public
service employment. Because of adamant administration opposi
tion, the Democrats decided to strike the job creation proposal to
facilitate passage of the training bill. Once this concession was made
the issue of income support payments to trainees became para
mount. The Democrats considered stipends to trainees and other
support services, such as child care for mothers with young
children, essential to sustain trainees with little or no outside
income. But the administration countered that by devoting over
half of its training budget to cash payments and support services,
CETA became a disguised welfare program, and the president
insisted on limiting outlays exclusively to training and administra
tive expenditures. The bitter controversy peaked when the House
threatened to enact a simple extension of CETA if the administra
tion refused to compromise. Faced with nearly 10 percent unem
ployment and congressional elections a month away, the adminis-
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tration relented. The compromise required that local job training
sponsors spend at least 70 percent of their allocation for training.
No more than 15 percent could be devoted to administration. A
limit of 30 percent was applied to support services and administra
tion combined. The limitations could be waived if a locality suffered
high unemployment, faced unusually high child care or transporta
tion costs, or offered lengthy training courses.
The appropriate division of responsibility between federal, state
and local government has been debated since the federal govern
ment first enacted job training legislation. Under the initial CETA
legislation, local elected officials were largely responsible for pro
gram administration. Rising unemployment and program abuses —
greatly exaggerated by the media — stimulated greater federal
intervention, but by the early 1980s the administration sought to
eliminate federal responsibility entirely, prompting an ideological
debate between advocates of sustained federal involvement and
those who favored a passive federal role. The administration and
Senate Republicans proposed to delegate most of the federal
government's administrative authority to state governors. House
Democrats favored continuing the CETA model, which divided
administrative responsibility between federal and local authorities.
Although the state role under CETA was minor, inexperience was
not necessarily a drawback because governors were not stigmatized
by CETA's widely publicized abuses. The National Governors'
Association lobbied hard for expanded state responsibility. In
response the local governments which had administered CETA —
represented by the National Association of Counties, the U.S.
Conference of Mayors, and the National League of Cities — argued
that President Reagan's federalist principles should naturally cause
him to favor administration by the government closest to the
people. Out of this struggle emerged a somewhat ambiguous
compromise which ensured that the question of program authority
would not be settled until JTPA got underway. Although significant
responsibilities were retained at the federal level, the law delegated
most oversight duties to state governors. To facilitate state author
ity, 22 percent of the funds for JTPA's largest training program and
all dislocated worker financing were allocated directly to the
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governors. Decisions on who should be served and how to serve
them were left to local administrators, within the limits of the law.
Another thorny administrative issue concerned the role of busi
ness representatives. Apart from offering on-the-job training, busi
ness was hardly involved in federal employment and training
programs until CETA's 1978 reauthorization created a Private
Sector Initiative Program (PSIP) and established private industry
councils (PICs) to advise local programs. Job placement rates were
higher under PSIP than CETA programs administered by local
governments, probably because PSIP served a more qualified
clientele. However, the National Alliance of Business and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce argued that the PSIP experience proved the
importance of business leadership in building a successful job
training program. The idea found ready acceptance in an adminis
tration which fervently believed that business was inherently more
efficient than the government. However, the claims made on behalf
of business involvement were not universally shared. Arguing that
employers were primarily interested in maximizing profits and
largely disinterested in hiring the poor, opponents contended that
the potential benefits of business involvement were greatly exagger
ated. Expanded business authority was also contested by the
various interest groups representing local elected officials.
Each of the three major job training bills offered as a substitute
for CETA in 1982 envisioned an enlarged employer role. However,
the administration and Senate proposals went much further than
the House Democratic bill, which would have largely retained the
authority of local elected officials. The final JTPA compromise gave
business greatly increased power at the local level, but attempted to
ensure that employer representatives and elected officials would be
equal partners in designing and administering local programs. The
PICs were transformed from an advisory to a policymaking council
with a required majority of business representatives. Local training
plans had to be jointly approved by the PICs and local elected
officials, with disputes resolved by the governor.
Despite the general emphasis on reduced spending, the addition
of a new program for retraining dislocated workers was not
controversial. The problem of dislocated workers was viewed as
increasingly acute during the early 1980s because of increased
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foreign economic competition, the continued relative decline in
manufacturing employment, and the deepening recession. Although
many dislocated workers had previously possessed good jobs, the
difficulty they experienced in regaining employment was thought to
justify federal intervention.
Several other new features in JTPA were also added with
relatively little controversy. The most important of these concerned
performance standards, or numerical criteria used to assess local
program success by gauging job placement rates, participants'
earnings and training costs, among other factors. Performance
standards had evolved under CETA, but JTPA instituted manda
tory national targets. The law established monetary awards for
successful programs and sanctions against localities which per
formed poorly.
Congress also supported increased coordination between job
training and related social programs. This objective was not new,
but it did receive increased attention during the 1982 debate. JTPA
incorporated amendments promoting coordination between JTPA
and public employment offices and welfare programs. The law
vested principal responsibility for coordination with the governor's
office and allocated funds directly to governors for coordination
activities under JTPA's principal training program.
Congress adopted two other significant administrative provisions
designed to avoid problems which had plagued CETA. JTPA was
authorized as a permanent program to eliminate wrenching qua
drennial reauthorization debates. Second, to provide localities with
adequate lead time to plan the coming year's expenditures, JTPA's
operating year was scheduled to begin in the July following the start
of the federal government's fiscal year in October. For example,
JTPA program year 1988 begins July 1, 1988 and ends June 30,
1989; the federal fiscal year 1988 begins on October 1,1987.* CETA
local planners often were not informed of their allocation until the
fiscal year was underway because Congress made belated decisions
on appropriations.
Although JTPA's passage was marked by extended and heated
debate, the political and economic climate during 1982 made it
*Following JTPA's practice, references to years in this study denote program years.
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reasonably certain that a federal job training program would be
enacted. Rising unemployment and the approaching 1982 mid-term
election placed enormous pressure on the nation's leaders. From a
trough of 7 percent in mid-1981, the unemployment rate exceeded
10 percent by the fall of 1982. Once Congress approved JTPA,
President Reagan's initial opposition to continued federal support
of training did not prevent him from claiming credit for a program
he had long opposed.
Like GETA, JTPA encompasses a number of separate programs.
The centerpiece of the law is Title II, which provides training grants
to states, a summer jobs program for youth, and set-aside funds for
education and older worker programs. Title III addresses the needs
of workers dislocated due to foreign competition or technological
change. Title IV continues a variety of GET A programs whose
administration remains the direct responsibility of the federal
government. These include the Job Corps as well as programs
designed for migrant and seasonal farmworkers, Indians, and
veterans (table 1.1).
Table 1.1
JTPA Program Components
Program

1987 appropriation
(millions)
$3,656
1,840

Total
Title IIA Adult and youth programs
State education coordination
147
and grants
Training programs for older
55
individuals
750
Title IIB Summer youth programs (1988)
200
Title III Dislocated worker programs
866
Title IV Federally administered programs
656
Job Corps
62
Native American programs
Migrant and seasonal
60
farmworker programs
10
Veterans' employment programs
Technical assistance, research,
______and pilot projects______________________79
Source: Congressional appropriations
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JTPA's character was more strongly influenced by the political
and economic climate of the early 1980s than by drawing on the
experience of two decades of federal employment and training
programs. Studies of GETA demonstrated that the program was
generally a success and not a debacle. 10 Rather than reforming
CETA, however, Congress chose to overhaul the system. Most of
JTPA's new elements — state and business leadership, the prohibi
tion of public service jobs, and radically reduced income support
payments — were inspired more by faith than evidence. The heart
of the program, the type of training which enrollees receive, was
virtually ignored during the legislative debate. Whatever the merits
of the law that emerged, the torch was passed to the new publicprivate partnership.

2
The Reluctant Partners
Program Management

As its title connotes, the Job Training Partnership Act is designed
to create a working partnership among the three levels of govern
ment and the private sector. This approach is embodied in Title II
programs, constituting about three-fourths of JTPA expenditures.
The law provides different administrative arrangements for the
dislocated worker program and, following CETA's practice, retains
federal responsibility for directing the Job Corps and programs
serving farmworkers, Indians and veterans.

Federal Administration
In comparison with earlier employment and training programs,
the federal role in JTPA is circumscribed: principal administrative
responsibility rests with the states. Nevertheless, despite Reagan
administration efforts to completely turn over job training pro
grams to the states and the business community, Congress clearly
assigned the federal government a major role in JTPA. The primary
federal responsibilities include financing, monitoring state and local
compliance with the law, supplying technical assistance, assessing
the program, and ensuring fiscal accountability.
JTPA was implemented under circumstances strikingly different
from CETA. GETA had barely begun when it was faced with a
major recession, while JTPA's implementation largely coincided
with a lengthy economic recovery. Congress altered CETA exten
sively during its early years, most notably by adding a major job
creation program, while Congress did not amend JTPA until four
17
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years after its enactment — and then only in a minor fashion.
Federal JTPA administrators have promulgated few rules, in
contrast to the numerous regulations affecting CETA operations
which reflected multiple and often transitory goals. As House
Education and Labor Committee Chairman Augustus Hawkins,
one of JTPA's principal architects, noted, "The federal government
put the money on a stump and ran away." 1
Virtually all observers of JTPA agree that the Labor Department
abjured leadership of the program. The department itself would not
quarrel with this assessment, but regards its "hands-off" policy as a
virtue. Since the Reagan administration believes that the intrusion
of the federal government is counterproductive, limiting federal
authority is a deliberately pursued end. This rigid ideological
posture has demonstrably hampered program efficiency.
Misguided personnel actions compounded the department's pol
icy of distancing itself from the administration of JTPA. When the
program began operations in October 1983, the staff of the Labor
Department's Employment and Training Administration consisted
of 2000 persons, down from over 3300 in 1981. By mid-1984, the
agency had only 1700 positions, 300 below the level authorized by
Congress. The staff directly involved in JTPA operations declined
from 1000 at the end of 1983 to 700 in 1987. Although Congress has
periodically established higher limits on staff levels, insufficient
oversight allowed the Labor Department to evade congressional
strictures.
Serious congressional concerns about staff cutbacks prompted a
U.S. General Accounting Office investigation which found that the
reductions adversely affected departmental morale and efficiency.
Lost expertise left ETA in a poor position to manage JTPA.
Repeated reorganizations resulted in over 200 demotions, and when
staff exercised their seniority rights, unqualified persons frequently
ended up in technical positions. For example, the head of an ETA
administrative office noted that about 80 percent of the staff
members in one office had no prior training or experience for their
jobs.2
JTPA's lackluster leadership was largely attributable to the
Reagan administration's first Secretary of Labor, Raymond Donovan, and his Assistant Secretary for Employment and Training,

Federal Administration

19

Albert Angrisani. Donovan's four-year tenure was marred by
allegations of improper conduct prior to his assumption of office,
although he was later cleared of the charges. Donovan retained little
influence in his last two years after then-White House chief-of-staff
James Baker publicly advocated his resignation in early 1983.
Federal oversight of JTPA improved somewhat when Labor Sec
retary William Brock and Assistant Secretary Roger Semerad
assumed office in 1985. As an indication of their efforts, the Labor
Department's 1987 budget request proposed doubling research and
pilot project funding (Congress approved most of the request). The
department also initiated steps to enhance policy guidance and the
quality of JTPA evaluations.
However, federal technical assistance, data collection and re
search, and monitoring of states and localities remain inadequate.
The Labor Department continues to treat JTPA as a block grant
program, neglecting its responsibilities under the act. Compliance
reviews designed to monitor state and local conformity with JTPA
provisions and regulations are superficial, focusing only on techni
cal compliance with the law.3
Financing Job Training
JTPA is a much more modest program than CETA. Adjusting for
inflation, JTPA's 1987 budget is only a third of CETA's $8.1 billion
1980 appropriation. Even excluding CETA public service employ
ment, the JTPA appropriation is only half as large as CETA in real
terms. Budget cuts in the early Reagan years hit employment and
training programs harder than any other social program. JTPA
funding declined by another 15 percent in real terms during it's first
three years, primarily due to cuts in the summer youth jobs and
dislocated worker programs and the initial impact of the GrammRudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act of 1985 (table 2.1). How
ever, Congress increased JTPA's 1987 budget by nearly $350
million. Over the entire 1983-1987 period, inflation-adjusted JTPA
funding has dropped by about 7 percent. The inability of the JTPA
community to develop an efficient lobbying network is one reason
behind inadequate funding. For example, only one of 650 witnesses
before the relevant congressional appropriations committees advo
cated increases in JTPA funding. The administration proposed to

Table 2.1
JTPA appropriations have declined by 7 percent in constant dollars since the start of the program (millions).
Program

Oct. 1983June 1984

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988
(President's
proposal)

TOTAL
(current dollars)
TOTAL
(1986 dollars)
TITLE IIA
Training adults and youth
TITLE IIB
Summer youth employment
TITLE III
Dislocated workers
TITLE IV
Job Corps

$2893.9

$3732.0

$3643.6

$3311.4

$3656.0

3184.8

3939.5

3713.7

3311.4

_

1414.6

1886.2

1886.2

1783.1

1840.0

1783.0

824.5

824.5

724.5

636.0

750.0

800.0

94.3

223.0

222.5

95.7

200.0

980.0

414.9

599.2

617.0

612.5

656.4

651.7

Indians

46.7

62.2

62.2

59.6

61.5

58.8

Migrants

45.3

65.5

60.4

57.8

59.6

57.1

Veterans

7.3

9.7

9.7

9.3

10.1

10.0

46.3

61.7

61.1

59.6

78.5

74.9

Research and demonstration projects
Source: Congressional appropriations

$4415.5
.
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increase JTPA appropriations by nearly $800 million for 1988,
primarily for assistance to dislocated workers.
Appropriations for employment and training would have been
reduced even more drastically had Congress fully accepted budget
proposals introduced during the first term of the Reagan adminis
tration. As is true for other social programs, the administration has
not moved as aggressively against job training assistance in its
second term. However, until 1987 the administration continually
pressed for large reductions in the Job Corps and the summer youth
employment program.
Charges that JTPA administrators have failed to spend funds
appropriated by Congress are valid for the dislocated worker program,
although the states have begun to address the problem. Laggard
spending for dislocated workers led Congress to acquiesce to Reagan
administration budget cuts of more than 50 percent for 1986. However,
the proportion of other appropriated funds spent during JTPA's first
three years is not much different from CETA's initial experience, as
follows:
Program

Proportion of appropriated funds spent
CETA
JTPA
Training adults and youth
94%
88%
Summer youth employment
86
95
Dislocated workers
NA
66

A closer examination of the Title IIA program shows that state
spending difficulties are not confined to the dislocated worker
program. While overall Title IIA spending accounts for 88 percent
of the appropriated funds, the states only spent 61 percent of their
IIA allocations (the localities spent 95 percent). JTPA's record on
spending summer youth program funds is better than CETA's,
primarily because localities now have more advance notice on the
amount of funding they will receive.
Although greater advance notice has promoted program stabil
ity, the criteria chosen by Congress to distribute JTPA funds to
states and localities has caused serious operational problems. The
Labor Department allocates two-thirds of state and local funds
based on the distribution of unemployment, and the remainder
according to the distribution of the low income population. Two
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unemployment-based indices count equally in the formula. The first
is the relative number of unemployed individuals living in areas
with over 6.5 percent unemployment. Governors and local service
delivery areas (SDAs) have considerable discretion in defining the
boundaries of these areas, allowing them to engage in gerryman
dering to maximize their allocation. The second unemployment
factor in the formula is the relative number of individuals in the
state or service delivery area in excess of a 4.5 percent unemploy
ment rate. To prevent large year-to-year funding reductions due to
fluctuations in unemployment rates, the states — but initially not
the local service delivery areas — were guaranteed 90 percent of
their allotment percentage from the previous year.
The JTPA distribution formula is flawed in several respects, but
some of the deficiencies cannot be remedied without costly revisions
to the Census Bureau's data collection system. JTPA eligibility is
largely restricted to the poor, but the allocation method is heavily
influenced by unemployment, which is not a prerequisite for
program assistance. In fact, the overlap between these two groups is
limited. In 1980, only a fifth of the unemployed were poor, and a
similarly small proportion of the poor were unemployed. A major
ity of the working-age poor were classified as outside the labor
force. Consequently, regions with relatively high unemployment
rates receive disproportionately greater JTPA funding, even if their
share of the poverty population is relatively low (table 2.2).
Table 2.2
The Midwest receives more than its fair share of JTPA funds,
while the South and West are underfunded.
TITLE DA
Training disadvantaged
adults and youth

TITLE rm

Summer Youth Program

1985
funding

Low income
(16-65)

1985
funding

Low income
(16-21)

South

33%

36%

32%

37%

Midwest

28

23

28

23

Northeast

19

21

22

20

West

19

21

18

21

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and Abt Associates Inc.
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For the same reason, urban areas (over 200,000 persons) receive
much less than their fair share of Title II funds, rural locales receive
proportionate assistance, while the suburbs are overfunded.4
The volatility of unemployment rates introduced much instability
in year-to-year funding levels. The greatest fluctuations occurred
during the transition from GET A to JTPA. Despite JTPA's muchreduced financing, the formula provided some states with more
money than they received under CETA. The Midwest region
improved its position relative to the rest of the country, while
eastern states suffered the largest proportional reductions.5 Large
year-to-year changes continued under JTPA. Although overall Title
IIA funding remained fairly constant from 1986 to 1987, 10 states
received increases of over 10 percent due to the formula, and 15
states lost the maximum of 10 percent permitted by law. Localities
faced even larger yearly allocation fluctuations, ranging from a 52 percent
loss to an 85 percent gain across service delivery areas in 1986.6 To
limit reductions, Congress, in 1986, applied the 90 percent holdharmless rule used for the states to the SDAs, starting with 1987.
The data used to determine the distribution of funds are flawed or
dated. The Current Population Survey sample is adequate to yield
reasonable unemployment estimates for the most populous states,
but too small to reliably indicate unemployment at the SDA level.
The 1980 census is used to determine the distribution of the
economically disadvantaged population. While the census provides
considerably more reliable estimates of the distribution of poverty
than sample surveys, new data will not become available until 1992.
To promote geographical equity and year-to-year program sta
bility, Congress could change the allocation formula by giving less
weight to unemployment due to its volatility and the unreliability of
the data, and by replacing the 4.5 and 6.5 percent thresholds in the
current law with the total unemployment count. The distribution of
poor persons, representing JTPA's clientele, should be accorded
greater weight in the formula. While census poverty data tend to
become dated as the decade progresses, they are a far more reliable
measure of the distribution of poverty than the Current Population
Survey data.
Governors are required to allocate 78 percent of their state Title
IIA grant to the SDAs according to the formula; Congress allotted
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the remaining 22 percent to governors to promote both state
leadership and coordination between JTPA and other social pro
grams. The state share is divided into four "set-asides," as follows:
• 8 percent for coordination of education programs with JTPA;
• 6 percent for performance awards, technical assistance, and
incentive awards to encourage assistance to individuals most in
need;
• 5 percent for state administration; and
• 3 percent for older worker programs (figure 2.1).
Another critical federal responsibility is ensuring that JTPA
funds are properly spent. The Single Audit Act of 1984 permitted
local governments to submit a single audit of expenditures of all
federal program funds. Under the new law, JTPA grants receive
much less intense scrutiny than did CETA funds. While auditors
reviewed all CETA finances, accountants operating under the Single
Audit Act only investigate a sample of transactions involving
federal funds. Because JTPA funds account for a fraction of total
federal grants to localities, SDA transactions may not even be
examined by auditors.
Figure 2.1
Allocation of Title IIA funds to states and service
delivery areas (1987).
Administration ($92 million) —^-^—Older workers ($55 million)
Incentive awards and technical
assistance ($110 million)
Education programs
($147 million)

SDA allocation
($1435 million)

Source: 1987 JTPA appropriation
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Although auditors have questioned or disallowed few JTPA
expenditures, states and localities have expressed concern over
audits and liability for disallowed costs. The Labor Department's
refusal to issue JTPA audit guidelines has made states and localities
apprehensive that they will be judged by ex post facto standards.
The Employment and Training Administration contends that audit
guidelines would amount to excessive "back door" regulation of
JTPA, thereby inhibiting local autonomy. Ironically, ETA's deci
sion has increased paperwork and discouraged local innovation in
providing services. To protect themselves against possible disal
lowed costs, states and SDAs compile extensive documentation
justifying outlays. The Labor Department acknowledges these
negative results but has not taken corrective action, despite the fact
that state and local governments have urged the department to
reverse its policies.7
The General Accounting Office has also criticized the depart
ment's failure to establish accounting and internal controls which
ensure that funds are properly spent. GAO concluded that the
Labor Department's exclusive reliance on state and local fiscal
oversight does not meet the requirements of the Financial Integrity
Act, an interpretation rejected by the department.8

Technical Assistance
The Labor Department abandoned attempts to improve federal
technical assistance undertaken during CETA's last years, and
reduced funding from $15 million in 1980 to $5.9 million for 1987.
At a time when states and localities critically needed and sought
help in implementing the new program, the Labor Department
absolved itself of responsibility, impairing JTPA's effectiveness. The
department regarded two decades of federal experience administer
ing employment programs as irrelevant to JTPA, and responded to
requests for even minimal information with a repeated refrain:
"Read the law, ask the governor." Inadequate technical assistance
was a serious problem during CETA, but the degree of federal
neglect in the early years of JTPA was unprecedented. Despite some
improvements, laissez-faire policies have continued under Secretary
Brock, who told a group of local business leaders in 1985, "We can't
tell you [how to improve JTPA]. You have to tell us."9
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Almost all technical assistance is provided through subcontrac
tors (nearly two-fifths of the funds have been allocated to the
National Alliance of Business alone) rather than directly by the
department. This policy is deficient in several important respects.
Subcontractors can offer advice but not definitive policy guidance.
SDAs seeking assistance must contact a variety of organizations,
and are typically charged a fee. Finally, the department's policy
prevents the establishment of a permanent federal staff of technical
assistance experts.
Data Collection and Analysis
To determine JTPA's effectiveness and improve performance, it is
necessary to collect and analyze reliable program information.
Federal performance on data collection has been severely deficient,
impeding the implementation of viable performance standards and
making objective assessments of JTPA difficult.
SDAs are required to complete a semiannual report on Title II
expenditures and an annual report on participant characteristics
and outcomes. The administrative data provide an overview of
JTPA, but do not permit a detailed analysis of services and
outcomes for various enrollees. For example, the data do not
disaggregate the length of training received by dropouts and those
with some college education. To provide more detailed information
on JTPA operations, the Labor Department's job training longitu
dinal survey collects more extensive data on over 12,000 partici
pants from 141 of the 620 SDAs.
In 1986, the Labor Department improved the data collection
system. During the first three years, the administrative surveys
required no information on the postprogram experiences of JTPA's
participants. In direct violation of the law (Section 106), the Office
of Management and Budget prevented the Labor Department from
collecting information on the posttraining experiences of enrollees
until 1986. While augmenting the administrative surveys, the Labor
Department scaled back the job training longitudinal survey. In
1986 the department reduced the survey sample from 24,000 to
12,000 participants, and eliminated a longitudinal survey of a
10,000 person subsample.
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The overall data collection system has improved, but remains
seriously deficient. As a General Accounting Office representative
observed during a 1986 congressional hearing, "We have never been
able to get adequate information at the local level to answer this key
question: 'What kind of people get what kind of training and what
kind of outcome do they have in the labor market?'" 10 One
fundamental problem is that in the absence of standardized termi
nology, meaningful comparisons among localities are impossible.
The definitions of job placement and training duration are espe
cially deficient, making it difficult to assess the quality or intensity
of the services participants receive. The Labor Department draws
no distinction between full or part-tune, or temporary or permanent
jobs, and thus an SDA may report a trainee placed for one day as
a successful termination. The length of training is determined by
counting the number of calendar days between entering and leaving
the program. Localities commonly retain individuals on the rolls for
90 days after completion of training in a "holding status" in order
to maximize the SDA's job placement rate. Until 1986 the SDAs
were allowed to count the holding period as part of the training.
Another important drawback is the failure of SDAs to record cost
information which would permit cost-benefit analysis of various
forms of assistance.' l
The halving of the job training longitudinal survey's sample size
will render the survey less useful than previously, according to the
GAO, precluding analysis for such important groups as high school
dropouts. 12 Discarding the Census Bureau's longitudinal survey
means abandoning the only source of information on the long-term
experiences of JTPA participants. Moreover, despite a significant
investment, the Labor Department has yet to release any informa
tion from the survey, partly because the Census Bureau did not
provide the department with the data until confidentiality concerns
were resolved in 1987. The department expects to publish the initial
findings from the survey in 1988.
On the positive side, the addition of a postprogram administra
tive survey will improve JTPA's data collection somewhat. Three
months after leaving the program, a sample of participants will be
questioned about their employment status, weekly earnings, and
number of weeks worked in the three-month period. However, three
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months is an insufficient period to gauge JTPA's impact, and the
survey's reliability is diminished because the Labor Department
does not plan to institute quality control reviews. Nor has the
department allocated additional funds to SDAs to conduct the
assessments. After a two-year grace period during which 6 percent
set-aside funds (for performance awards and technical assistance)
may be tapped for postprogram follow-ups, the SDAs will be
required to utilize their limited administrative funds to cover the
cost of the surveys.
Research and Evaluation
The Labor Department is required to submit to Congress an
annual assessment of JTPA which incorporates research and eval
uation findings. Until 1987, the department ignored this statutory
requirement, and there is no record that Congress ever prompted
the department to fulfill its responsibility. Adjusted for inflation, the
employment and training research budget declined by threequarters between 1980 and 1987 (figure 2.2). Responding to Secre
tary Brock's recommendation, Congress boosted ETA's research
support by 50 percent to $54 million for 1987. Brock proposed to
further increase the research budget to $62 million for 1988.
Figure 2.2
Funding of R&D dropped sharply under JTPA.

Research and evaluation
Pilot and demonstration

1980

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988
(proposed)

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Less than half of ETA's research and evaluation financing has
been devoted to analyses of JTPA. Pilot and demonstration funding
serves a variety of purposes in addition to research, including
employment assistance for the handicapped and technical assistance
for organizations which assist minority groups. During JTPA's first
three years, most pilot and demonstration funds were provided to
the following entities:
Groups serving the handicapped
National Alliance of Business
AFL-CIO Human Resources
Development Institute
70001 Training and Employment Institute
Opportunities Industrialization Centers
of America, Inc.
National Tooling and Machining
SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc.
U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services
National Urban League
National Puerto Rican Forum

$12.0 million
10.2
5.6
4.5
3.6
3.5
2.6
2.4
1.5
1.4

Because of inadequate funding as well as an inefficient allocation
of the available research money, major gaps exist in our knowledge
of JTPA operations. ETA only recently issued minimal information
about the Title IIB summer youth employment program. Two
major field studies examined Title IIA, but covered similar ground
and left important aspects of the program unstudied. Both scruti
nized JTPA's state and local administrative agencies, but neither
directly examined the role and activities of subcontractors who
provide the training, or the individuals who receive it. 13 Since the
administrative agencies infrequently provide services directly to
enrollees, the failure to examine service providers is a glaring
deficiency in the Labor Department's assessment of JTPA. Conse
quently, little is known about the providers of training, their
quality, the criteria used to accept or reject applicants, and the
factors responsible for success or failure. Absent such knowledge, it
is difficult to gauge JTPA's success or improve the program.
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To fill the informational gaps, the Labor Department opted in
1986 for randomly assigning a sample of individuals eligible for
JTPA to either a treatment group or a control group receiving no
services. This approach has conceptual appeal, but the department
has had considerable difficulty in implementing the project, and the
SDAs could not be chosen by a random selection process as
originally intended. The experimental sites should begin enrolling
participants in 1988, but the results will not be available for several
years.
The Absence of Leadership

Despite improvements under Secretary Brock, federal adminis
tration of JTPA continues to be dominated by the idea that states
and localities know best, and that Washington can contribute most
by staying out of the way. As an Ohio JTPA administrator
observed, "The Feds are determined to push decisions to the state
level, even when a national policy guideline would eliminate
confusion." 14 The administration has paid insufficient attention to
local requests for audit guidance and improved technical assistance
and data collection. As subsequently demonstrated, the vacuum
created by federal negligence has not been filled by JTPA's remain
ing partners.
State Governments
JTPA relies heavily upon the states to exercise administrative
authority over job training. The governor is responsible for desig
nating local service delivery areas (SDAs), reviewing local training
plans, enforcing performance standards, allocating the portion of
Title II funds which are not distributed on a formula basis to SDAs,
auditing SDA expenditures, providing technical assistance, and
coordinating JTPA operations with the activities of other social
programs in the state.
Labor Department or gubernatorial rhetoric notwithstanding,
there is little evidence that states have rushed in to exercise their
statutory responsibilities, or that state leadership has produced
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significant results. One easily quantifiable indicator of interest is
state cash contributions to JTPA operations. On that score state
involvement has been generally negligible or nonexistent. More
over, the average state has spent less than two-thirds of its
federally-provided set-aside funds (for administration, education,
performance awards, and older workers). The inability of states to
fully spend federally-provided funds has been observed in other
programs besides JTPA. On the whole, state policy is limited largely
to fulfilling the minimum requirements of the law, although states
such as California and Massachusetts have taken a considerably
more active stance. An SDA official from Baltimore, Maryland
echoed the views of many local officials across the country in
observing, "The state has not established any program priorities." 15
The partnership which Congress envisioned between the governor,
the newly-created state advisory council, the legislature, business,
labor, and other state governmental agencies has emerged only in
isolated cases. With few exceptions, state legislatures have demon
strated little interest in JTPA. State agencies, public interest groups
and unions play a barely noticeable role in fashioning state policy,
and business involvement at the state level has been exercised
through the statutorily-required councils which have displayed little
initiative.
Governors and State Agencies
The law leaves governors considerable freedom in directing
JTPA. Because JTPA state councils are advisory bodies and are
barred by law from operating training programs, governors had to
designate administrative agencies to manage JTPA at the state level.
State JTPA administration is largely an extension of previous
CETA arrangements. In four of five states, the former CETA
balance-of-state agency (which administered programs not under
local control, normally political jurisdictions with less than 100,000
persons) continued to administer JTPA. Only eight states selected
new administrative agencies. A majority of governors designated
either their labor departments or employment and training agencies
to administer all JTPA funds, while about a dozen governors
housed JTPA in economic, community affairs or human resource
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agencies, and even a private corporation. The average state admin
istrative agency employs 33 professional JTPA staff (full-time
equivalent positions), ranging from 1 to 157.
The highest initial gubernatorial priority was to disassociate
JTPA from CETA's negative image. Following JTPA's implemen
tation, direct gubernatorial involvement became sporadic and ad
ministrative authority shifted to the governors' appointees. Given
the divergent interests of other actors on the state stage — the
legislature, state JTPA councils, other state agencies, business and
labor, and community-based organizations — some conflict was
natural, but fairly stable relationships ensued following the initial
turf battles. 16
State Councils
Congress charged the job training coordinating councils with
advising the governor on the designation of service delivery areas,
planning the distribution of funds not allocated by formula to
SDAs, monitoring the consistency of local training plans with the
state plan, reviewing state employment service and vocational
education plans, and preparing an annual report. The councils are
also responsible for preparing the required biennial governor's state
job training plan, which establishes criteria for coordinating JTPA
programs with other state and local education and training efforts,
including vocational education, economic development, rehabilita
tion, and employment service activities. The federal Labor Depart
ment can reject the state plan only if it conflicts with the law.
JTPA requires that the following groups be represented on the
council:
• one-third from the business community;
• one-fifth from the state legislature and state agencies;
• one-fifth from local governments, including service delivery
areas; and
• one-fifth from organized labor, community-based organiza
tions, local educational agencies, and the general public.
Since the quotas do not total 100 percent, governors possess some
leeway to favor the representation of particular groups. Guberna-
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torial appointments to the councils, which average 32 members,
have generally met JTPA's requirements.
Constituencies
Business
Local governments
State agencies
State legislatures
Local education agencies
Community-based organizations
Labor unions
General public

Proportion
37%
19
15
6
6
5
5
6

Despite their authorized wide-ranging responsibilities, the coun
cils generally exercise little influence over state JTPA policy. As a
rule, councils reinforce state JTPA agency policy rather than acting
as an independent force. Analysts examining 20 state councils found
that only four councils played a primary role in determining state
JTPA policy. 17 One of four SDA administrators and PIC chairper
sons believes that the councils have no impact on the program. 18
Few states provide adequate support for their councils. In 1985
the average council budget was about $275,000, ranging from
$50,000 to over $1 million. Only eight councils select their own staff
director; the other directors are appointed by the governor or the
state administrative agency. The average council has only 3.5
full-time employees, ranging from zero (in eight states) to 12
positions. Only 15 councils have permanent staffs; the others
borrow staff from the state JTPA administrative agency.
Legislatures
State legislators have also played a minor role in JTPA, and the
few instances where legislators showed an interest in the program
were as likely as not to result in unproductive turf battles. Total
state appropriations for employment and training programs have
accounted for a minute fraction of the federal contribution. The
Congressional Budget Office noted that the states spent only $122
million for job training in 1984, less than 5 percent of the federal
funds. 19 Incomplete evidence indicates that state contributions have
not significantly increased since 1984.

34

CHAPTER 2

The law requires SDAs to submit local job training plans to state
legislatures, but many SDAs fail to do so. Just as Congress failed
for years to note that the Labor Department did not submit
required annual reports, the state solons have apparently not missed
the local plans, according to the National Conference of State
Legislatures.
One analyst concluded that only one of five state legislatures
demonstrates more than minimal interest in JTPA. The most
prominent example is California, which set aside $6 million of its
federal social services block grant to match SDA child care
assistance, and enacted a new state welfare initiative emphasizing
legislative oversight of JTPA services.20 In addition, California's
Employment and Training Panel, with an annual $50 million
budget, administers a retraining program for individuals eligible for
unemployment insurance. Delaware enacted a similar program on a
smaller scale. State commitment even in these cases, however,
involves little or no direct appropriation. Both the California and
Delaware training programs were financed by reallocating state
unemployment insurance funds, and represent no additional finan
cial commitment.
The State-Local Partnership
Conflicts between the federal government and local training
administrators were common during CETA. In contrast, analysts
have observed little discord between state and SDA officials.
However, this relative amity has not markedly improved program
management relative to CETA. The states are generally more
interested in protecting themselves from audit disallowances than in
improving the quality of training.
Following JTPA's enactment in October 1982, governors moved
slowly to implement the new law. Understandably not convinced
that the Labor Department would relinquish its regulatory role,
governors delayed involvement in JTPA administration until the
Labor Department issued regulations confirming the federal gov
ernment's abdication of authority.
State-local JTPA relations have been influenced by the statutorilydefined role of each partner, the federal government's neglect of
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its responsibilities, and the degree of state activism and SDA
sophistication. The law clearly reserves most training decisions to
the SDAs, but Congress empowered the states to influence local
program operations by other means. The states may establish
educational requirements for local programs, add to or modify
federal performance standards, and define key terms such as what
constitutes a job placement. In addition, JTPA discretionary setaside funds can be used as a carrot to encourage desirable SDA
behavior. The federal noninterventionist posture further expanded
state authority by default.
Most states did not choose to exercise their full authority. State
review of local training plans was characterized as "a paper policy
process devoid of any real policy oversight" by a Lexington,
Kentucky SDA administrator, a view endorsed by many local
officials. Although the Labor Department delegated the interpreta
tion of the law to the states, these often behaved as if they had been
passed a hot potato. A Des Moines, Iowa SDA official noted
critically, "The state has been reluctant to provide necessary
interpretation of the act and in many cases has allowed localities to
struggle through court proceedings and binding arbitration."21
Prior job training experience was another important factor in the
evolution of state-local relations. The geographic boundaries of half
the SDAs are virtually identical to the CETA prime sponsors, and
because these SDAs had considerably more familiarity with job
training programs than the states, they were often able to limit state
intervention. SDA officials further expanded their influence through
statewide associations. By mid-1985 virtually all states with more
than two SDAs had SDA directors' organizations, and several had
associations of PIC officials.
Both the degree of state activism, and the problems between
states and SDAs, can be gleaned by examining the SDA designation
process and state technical assistance policies. Congress authorized
governors to set the geographical boundaries of local program
areas. Since it was widely believed that 470 CETA prime sponsors
was an excessive number, the designers of JTPA anticipated that
governors would consolidate local operations. Instead, the number
of SDAs ballooned to 620. Several factors caused the proliferation
of SDAs. Gubernatorial authority in creating SDAs is somewhat
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limited. Jurisdictions with over 200,000 people and consortia of
local governments serving a substantial portion of a labor market
area with more than 200,000 persons have the right to form an
SDA. Another factor was that local governments were often able to
pressure governors into designating them as separate SDAs and
avoid consolidation with other areas. Since governors had little to
gain politically from opposing local interests, they often acquiesced
to lobbying pressures. In fact, most of the increase in SDAs was
attributable to the subdivision of former CETA balance-of-state
areas. 99
The proliferation of SDAs resulted in programs of less than
optimal size and the wasteful duplication of administrative re
sources. JTPA's significantly lower budget exacerbates this prob
lem. Over a quarter of the SDAs receive less than $1 million,
considered minimal to administer a job training program. Based on
average outlays per enrollee and the duration of training provided
by SDAs, a $1 million annual allocation permits services to only
about 550 participants, with only slightly more than 100 individuals
enrolled at any given time. Since about a third of these participants
enroll in classroom training, providing cost-effective training for
more than one or two occupations is difficult at best.
State technical assistance is most commonly directed toward
management information, performance standards, youth employ
ment programs, and the analysis of labor market information to
identify growth occupations. SDAs commonly complain about
inadequate state technical assistance. Despite inadequate technical
assistance at the federal level, a Toledo, Ohio PIC representative
observed, "The state does not have the same quality of staff that the
federal government has available to it. Often the SDA ends up
providing on-the-job training to the state."23 State administrative
agencies, which provide most technical assistance, on average assign
only three staff members to this task. In fact, 11 administrative
staffs surveyed did not have a single technical assistance specialist.24
Most assistance is funded by the JTPA set-aside which provides 6
percent of Title IIA funds (a little over $100 million annually) to
governors for technical assistance and performance awards. How
ever, in JTPA's first three years, the states spent only a third of the
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available 6 percent funds, and only a little over a third of the
expenditures were devoted to technical assistance.25
Little Ventured, Little Gained
Driven by ideology rather than the knowledge gained from
research or experience, policymakers during the early 1980s acted as
if all wisdom resided in state houses and the federal government
could do little right. But since JTPA's enactment, most states have
passively waited for federal instruction rather than forging ahead on
their own.
Before JTPA, job training expertise was concentrated at the
federal and local levels. The states, relatively inexperienced, would
have had to invest substantial resources to design and improve
training programs for the poor. Instead, most states believe that
local administrators know best, and are content to leave well
enough alone. Moreover, as the designation of SDAs demonstrated,
the states have far less leverage over localities than the drafters of
JTPA assumed. The states seem far more interested in boosting
local programs than in critically examining them. Ironically, a
program which was designed to demonstrate the potential of state
leadership instead suggests that a strong federal presence is neces
sary to administer effective training programs for the unskilled and
deficiently educated. While a genuine federal-state partnership
would be more desirable, the JTPA experience casts doubt on
whether this arrangement can be achieved.
The Local Partnership
Congress expressly delegated training authority to JTPA local
service delivery agencies. To promote leadership, cooperation and
accountability, Congress instituted a complex administrative frame
work. Local elected officials, preeminent under CETA, share au
thority with newly empowered private industry councils, which are
dominated by business representatives. They jointly select a pro
gram administrator to supervise day-to-day operations and service
providers to train enrollees.
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Political factors took precedence in the administrative redesign of
local training programs. As a Rockford, Illinois SDA official
summed up the changes, "I do not feel that the PIC/elected official
concept is administratively preferable to the CETA system, but
under the circumstances a drastic change was necessary because
CETA suffered from a — mostly unwarranted — negative image.
The new partnership has allowed the image of employment and
training to become more positive."26 There is little indication that a
different administrative framework has significantly improved JTPA's operations, but the public relations impact has clearly been
salutary.
By 1987 the JTPA system was made up of 620 local SDAs, each
with an average of about 8-10 staff members. Six governors of states
with populations below a million opted for statewide SDAs. At the
other extreme, 9 states have over 20 SDAs, topped by California
with 51, as follows:
SDAs
One each
2-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
Over 20

States
6
13
9
6
7
9

One of every four SDAs is an intact political entity — a state, city,
or, most commonly, a county; the rest are multiple local political
jurisdictions.27
The average JTPA Title II grant in 1987 amounted to $3.5
million, ranging for Title IIA operations alone from $67,000 for an
Arizona SDA to $56 million for New York City. Two-thirds of the
SDAs received less than $2 million for Title IIA operations (figure
2.3). SDAs also receive additional money, mostly from the Title IIA
state set-asides and the Title III dislocated worker program, totaling
about a tenth of the average SDA's budget according to a 1985
survey.28
Private Industry Councils

Employer representatives, who by law must constitute a majority
of private industry council members, are appointed by the chief
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elected officials of the SDA from a list of nominees presented by
local business organizations, primarily chambers of commerce.
Figure 2.3
The Title IIA budget of some 400 SDAs was below $2 million (1986).
40%

Under $1

$1-2

$2-3

$4-5

Over $5

Title IIA budget (millions)
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Other PIC members represent local education agencies, the public
employment service, labor unions, rehabilitation agencies, communitybased organizations, and economic development agencies. The
chairperson must be chosen from the business members. The size of
the PIC was initially determined by elected officials, but subse
quently PIC members determined the council's size. However, the
authority to fill vacancies remains with elected officials. The average
PIC of 25 members has representatives from the following
constituencies:
Business
Education institutions
Labor unions
Community-based organizations
Employment service
Vocational rehabilitation agencies
Economic development agencies
Other

14
3
2
2
1
1
1
1

Initially, few PIC members possessed experience with federal
employment and training programs: only a quarter had served on a
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CETA council. Although direct information is available only for
PIC chairpersons, probably many PIC members had garnered
considerable experience with JTPA by 1987. Over 90 percent of the
chairpersons have served more than two years on a council. Overall
PIC turnover is low, averaging about five members per year. SDA
administrative personnel supply the staff for 70 percent of PICs.29
PICs focus their attention on the selection and review of service
providers. Since business representatives constitute a majority of
PIC members, it is not surprising that PICs tend to favor on-the-job
training and to frown upon services which increase costs, such as
child care assistance or stipends. Curriculum reviews and on-site
inspections usually play no part in PIC judgments. 30 Emphasis on
performance standards reflects both the Labor Department's prior
ities and a business predilection for bottom-line judgments.
Congress expected increased employer participation in JTPA to
reap a rich harvest of benefits, and the Labor Department as well as
many SDAs regard business involvement as the key to the pro
gram's claimed success. The Reagan administration views business
as inherently more efficient than government, but support for
employer participation in JTPA has extended beyond those who
promote it as a matter of faith. Since most jobs are generated in the
private sector, it seems only reasonable that businesses have a voice
in employment and training efforts. Business leadership is not
considered as susceptible to constituent pressures as elected officials,
and hence freer to make program decisions on professional
grounds. Finally, JTPA's designers hoped that greater business
involvement would expand training opportunities and boost job
placements.
The expansion of the employer role in job training programs was
implemented largely without controversy. As Congress intended,
business members dominate most PICs, and they share the direction of
SDAs with elected officials. While business participation is not as critical
to JTPA's workings as the Reagan administration contends, increased
employer involvement remains a notable political achievement.
One area where business has clearly made a difference is in
JTPA's image. To some extent business had no choice but to
promote JTPA. The Reagan administration and business organiza
tions sold JTPA as a training program run by employers dedicated
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to the "bottom line," rather than by "do gooders." This character
ization of the program is vastly exaggerated, but it effectively
co-opted the most vocal former critics of employment and training
programs. PIC public relations activities also undoubtedly contrib
ute to JTPA's positive image.
About half of PIC leaders either train or hire JTPA participants;
the others who do not cite an absence of openings or a need for
more skilled workers than the program can provide. Some observ
ers argue that conflict of interest laws deter PIC representatives
from training or hiring JTPA participants in their own firms, but
less than one of seven PIC chairpersons offered this explanation for
not training JTPA enrollees.
To date, employers have maintained a strong interest in JTPA.
Of the average 14 PIC business members, about four leave per year.
The primary reasons offered by a sample of PIC chairpersons were
personal factors and the amount of time required. Most PICs have
no problems recruiting new business members, and the time com
mitment is the major difficulty for PICs which have such problems.
Surveys of PIC chairpersons and SDA administrators also show
that almost all PIC employer representatives are satisfied with their
role and influence in JTPA.31
One analysis concluded that no significant operational differences
distinguish PIC versus government-dominated SDAs. The move
ment toward increased utilization of on-the-job training under
JTPA was not more pronounced in PIC-dominated SDAs, and
where the public sector was preeminent there was no greater
tendency to serve a more severely disadvantaged clientele. The
analysts also found no consistent differences in performance
outcomes.32 Surveys of SDA officials also indicate that the views of
PIC employer representatives and their fellow council members are
not markedly different. Only slightly more than half of PIC
chairpersons and SDA administrators thought the attitudes of the
two groups diverged, and no more than a fifth pointed to any single
issue differentiating business and nonbusiness PIC members. Sur
prisingly, only a fifth of the SDA administrators thought employer
members were more responsive to business needs than other PIC
representatives. JTPA's meager resources and the Labor Depart-
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ment's emphasis on performance standards may more significantly
influence program operations than the enhanced business role.
Apart from PIC involvement, local businesses also contribute
modest financial and other support to SDA programs. Two-thirds
of the SDAs receive some form of material assistance from local
businesses, most commonly training or office equipment. Assistance
in developing training curricula, office or classroom space, and
training personnel are donated to about 30 percent of the SDAs.
One in five SDAs is aided by nontraining personnel (e.g., computer
programmers or accountants) from local firms. One in six SDAs
receives business cash contributions, averaging $17,000 (ranging
from $1000 to $1 million), but this represents less than 0.1 percent
of federal expenditures. 33
The Partnership in Action

To ensure that employers would be equal partners in formulating
SDA policy, Congress divided authority between PICs and local
officials. The local partnership jointly selects an administrative
agency to run the program. Government bodies, primarily local
governments, account for nearly two-thirds of program administra
tors. Most of the remaining SDAs are administered by PICs or
private nonprofit groups (figure 2.4). Administrative changes since
Figure 2.4
Local governments administered half of SDAs (1985).
Economic development (1.5%)
\

f^RQQ /4*y \

States (8.5%)
Education (4.9%)

Local governments (50.2%)

Private non-profit (12.8%)

Other (3.6%)

PICs (14.6%)

Source: National Alliance of Business
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1983 show a decreasing use of local governments and an increased
utilization of nonprofit organizations. From 1983 to 1985 the
proportion of local governments selected as administrative agencies
declined from 57.1 to 50.2 percent, while the proportion of non
profit administrative agencies nearly tripled, rising from 4.5 to 12.8
percent.34
The local biennial training plan requires the approval of PICs and
elected officials, and subsequent substantial deviations from the
plan also require joint approval. The plan must include a detailed
presentation of the type, duration and cost of the training; the
performance goals; the means of selecting service providers; finan
cial accountability safeguards; and the means of coordinating JTPA
with other employment-related programs. The governor may reject
or amend the plan for the following reasons:
• the plan does not comply with JTPA's provisions or
regulations;
• inadequate safeguards exist to protect funds;
• the administrative agency does not have the capacity to
operate the program;
• the local plan does not comply with the coordination criteria
enumerated in the governor's plan; or
• measures to correct audit or performance standards prob
lems are inadequate.
Disputes between the governor and the SDA are resolved by the
federal Secretary of Labor. Whether the plans represent a serious
effort to achieve local goals, or are prepared merely to conform with
the law, is a matter of speculation. State reviews of local plans are
generally pro forma; rejection of local plans is apparently rare, since
no cases have been reported.35
Observers do not agree on the general balance of authority which
evolved during the program's first four years. Although the con
sensus is that the PICs play an important policymaking role, the
extent of PIC dominance varies. JTPA's provisions made it inevi
table that the role of elected officials and job training staff would
significantly diminish under JTPA compared with CETA. In addi
tion, many local officials lost interest in employment and training
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programs after funding declined and public service jobs were
eliminated. The money and extra staff associated with CETA had
enabled elected officials to expand public services and thus enhance
their political prestige. Another factor which facilitates PIC author
ity is a belief among many elected officials that the councils will
shield them from blame in the event of fraud or abuse.
Few instances of confrontation have surfaced between PICs and
elected officials. In many cases where the PICs determine local
policy, elected officials either voluntarily acquiesce to PIC domi
nance or actively promote PIC authority. Only in isolated cases has
business hostility toward former CETA administrative holdovers
been a problem. Conflict between elected officials of multijurisdictional SDAs occurs about as often as PIC/elected officials
disputes.36 Despite their diminished authority, three of five city
officials surveyed by the National League of Cities said they were
satisfied with their role in JTPA (the remainder felt they had too
little voice in the program).37
Elected officials are better able to dominate SDAs in highly rural
and major urban areas. In the former, geographically dispersed
council membership makes active PIC participation difficult to
achieve. In major urban areas, mayors generally tend to wield much
greater local authority than elected officials in less populous juris
dictions, and administrative sponsorship of long-standing programs
is difficult to overturn. Interestingly, the elected officials of singlejurisdiction SDAs are not necessarily better able than leaders of
multiple jurisdictions to set JTPA policy. In fact, in some cases
competition for JTPA funds in multijurisdictional SDAs produces
agreements between public officials that effectively preclude PIC
control. This occurred even in one SDA composed of 86 political
jurisdictions. 38
Congress obviously intended the JTPA administrative structure
to improve employment and training performance. Although it is
difficult to isolate the impact of a different administrative system
from other program changes, several tentative conclusions emerge
from JTPA's first four years. Whether or not the system is superior
to CETA's prime sponsor network, the JTPA structure clearly
represents a viable administrative framework. PIC relations with

Coordination

45

elected officials are generally harmonious. However, budget reduc
tions, limitations on stipends for trainees, and the introduction of
performance standards (especially job placement and cost-perplacement criteria) probably exercise greater influence on JTPA
operations than the new local administrative arrangement. Business
participation has significantly enhanced JTPA's image, but there is
no definitive evidence that employer involvement has improved
program operations.
Coordination
Convinced that divided authority and rivalry among government
agencies impeded cost-effective assistance to the poor, JTPA's
authors required governors to integrate JTPA with local education
and training, public assistance, employment service, rehabilitation,
and economic development agencies. Such efforts were not new, but
Congress made coordination an integral part of JTPA and allocated
funds to achieve this goal.
Better-integrated programs provide obvious benefits. The sense
of futility and powerlessness which often accompanies poverty is
reinforced when applicants are shuffled amongst various agencies.
Increased coordination offers job training administrators operating
with reduced federal funding a potentially important means to tap
into other federally- and state-funded programs to enhance training
and employment opportunities for JTPA clients.
Effective coordination requires diverse strategies. Referring
AFDC applicants to JTPA may facilitate coordination, but more
complicated financial agreements are required when local SDAs
contract with public employment service offices and vocational
education agencies to provide placement assistance and classroom
training. However, in these examples SDAs would still be using
established institutions in a traditional manner. It is more difficult
to persuade established institutions to alter their operations to serve
JTPA's aims. For example, state economic development programs
often entice businesses to relocate by offering generous tax and
other incentives. Asking firms to hire poor, unemployed job seekers
is hardly an inducement, making coordination between JTPA and
conventional economic development programs difficult.

46

CHAPTER 2

Prior to JTPA, ad hoc efforts to integrate employment and
training services with other social programs had produced few
notable results. JTPA attempted to improve this record by making
state councils responsible for developing coordination initiatives
and subsequently monitoring progress. Governors may reject SDA
plans which do not conform with state coordination goals, and also
control discretionary coordination funds. A portion of the funds
from three of the state set-asides can be used to bolster coordination
efforts.
State set-asides

Education (8 percent)
Incentive awards and
technical assistance (6 percent)
Older worker training programs (3 percent)

1987 allocation
(millions)
$147

110
55

JTPA also amended the Wagner-Peyser and Social Security Acts to
promote coordination of job training with the employment service
and the Work Incentive program for AFDC recipients. In addition,
governors may allocate 10 percent of employment service funds —
nearly $80 million in 1987 — to operate joint employment service/
JTPA projects.
Employment Service

Established in 1933, the federal-state employment service system
attempts to match employers with job seekers — many of them
disadvantaged — through a nationwide network of over 2000
public employment offices with a $778 million budget for 1987. The
expansion of public service employment during the Carter admin
istration encouraged coordination between the employment service
and employment and training programs. As long as local CETA
administrators were not held accountable for ineligible public
workers recruited through public employment offices, and the latter
received credit for placing CETA enrollees, both agencies profited
by cooperating. However, publicized charges that ineligible persons
were hired to fill public service employment slots caused Congress
to tighten monitoring. Local programs were held strictly account-
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able for ineligible enrollees, and consequently reduced subcontract
ing to employment offices and handled eligibility determinations
internally. Two-thirds of CETA programs in 1980 also utilized
public employment offices to help CETA trainees find jobs, but
three-fifths of local CETA administrators thought public employ
ment offices performed this task poorly, and some stopped referring
enrollees to the employment service. 39
Because of the close connection between the employment service
and JTPA's job placement mission, Congress required local public
employment offices to develop their program plans in conjunction
with PICs and elected officials. The three local partners as well as
the state council must approve the plans.
The Reagan administration's decision — going well beyond the
intent of the law — to virtually abandon the employment service to
the states further facilitated gubernatorial authority to coordinate
JTPA and the employment service. While Congress rejected admin
istration proposals to turn over the employment service to the
states, the Secretary of Labor cut federal staff assigned to employ
ment service activities to a score of employees, rendering effective
national oversight impossible. Because local employment offices
have no independent authority, federal nonintervention effectively
gave governors even more control over the employment service than
they have over JTPA.
Despite this expanded authority, governors have generally done
little to reshape the public employment service, and have displayed
little interest in doing so. Several states have placed the service in the
same agency as JTPA, aligned the local geographical boundaries of
the two programs, or used employment service 10 percent set-aside
funds for coordinated projects.40 However, a study of 16 states
concluded that governors have little impact on employment service
policy. In fact, analysts considered the state employment service
plans less structured than pre-JTPA plans. State JTPA plans
typically contain only general references to the employment service.
Even merging JTPA and the employment service into the same state
agency does not ensure coordination, because in most cases the
separate programs continue business as usual. For example, Flor
ida, which merged the two organizations at the local level, only
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partially improved coordination because the governor exercised
little control over local JTPA operations.41
At the local level, one study found that only 6 of 31 SDAs
examined used the employment service to provide most eligibility
determinations. The service is rarely used as the main source for job
placements, although this is the agency's primary function. The
study also concluded that the PICs had no real impact on local
employment office policy in any of the 31 SDAs studied, and
remained largely uninterested in improving coordination with pub
lic employment offices. In fact, PIC involvement in employment
service planning has progressively declined.42 Two other surveys
found that almost all SDAs have written agreements with local
employment offices involving applicant intake and job referrals, but
these probably represent a continuation of activities initiated during
GETA, which required agreements between the two agencies.43
Several factors partially explain the lack of interest by most states
and localities in coordinating the two programs. State and local
employment service offices represent a stable bureaucracy not
readily amenable to change, and since the staff are state employees
their loyalty lies with state rather than local interests. Second, many
administrators believe that the programs serve different ends —
training versus direct job placement. Third, the states cannot
compel SDAs to utilize the employment service. The 6 percent
set-aside can encourage this practice, but these funds are spread thin
in attempting to achieve multiple objectives. Finally, JTPA's em
phasis on performance standards and performance-based contract
ing impedes local coordination. Under performance-based con
tracts, the SDAs withhold full payment until the trainee is placed in
a job, and contractors tend to place clients themselves — or claim
to have placed them — rather than risk financial losses by relying on
public employment offices in which they have little confidence.
Education
A clear dividing line cannot be drawn between education and job
training programs; in fact, the latter are often called "second
chance" education programs. If U.S. education and economic
systems functioned effectively, there would be little need for JTPA,
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but the persistence of inadequate literacy and vocational skills
among millions of adults demonstrates the need for cooperation
between the two systems. However, the task is extraordinarily
difficult. Americans are educated by a multiplicity of diverse
institutions administered by all three levels of government as well as
the private sector. Curriculum decisions are made by state agencies
as well as 15,000 local school districts. The federal government has
expanded its role in education since World War II, but has limited
leverage because federal money accounts for less than 9 percent of
total spending and Americans have traditionally resisted federal
involvement in education.
Prior to JTPA, the most important effort to promote coordina
tion between education and employment and training programs
was undertaken through one of the 1977 Youth Employment and
Demonstration Projects Act (YEDPA) programs. The youth em
ployment and training program, financed at nearly $600 million
annually between 1978 and 1981, required that 22 percent of the
funding be spent on joint projects with schools. Evaluations of the
effort concluded that cooperation between education and training
institutions improved, but this yielded only limited changes in
school services to dropouts or approaches toward disadvantaged
students. Without direct authority to influence school program
ming, YEDPA grants offered too little financial clout to effect
changes.44
The 1917 Vocational Education Act marked the first federal
involvement in job training, and today represents an important
federal educational investment directly related to JTPA. The pro
gram serves primarily noncollege bound students. The fiscal 1987
budget provides $875 million for vocational education, and states
and localities spend an additional $7 billion. In 1987 the Reagan
administration proposed to eliminate federal support for the
program. Approximately 17 million students are enrolled in
vocational education programs, although less than 6 million receive
occupationally-specific training. Altogether, an estimated 1.3 mil
lion disadvantaged youth received at least some assistance from the
program.
When federal training programs were inaugurated in the early
1960s, most classroom training was offered in public vocational
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education facilities. After GETA expanded the range of service
providers, the federal government attempted to maintain coopera
tion between job training and vocational education activities, but
with limited success.45 Tight school budgets impeded coordination
efforts, and the back to basics movement deemphasized vocational
training.
The 1966 Adult Education Act established the major federal basic
education program for disadvantaged adults. It finances literacy
training, secondary education, and English as a second language
courses with $106 million in fiscal 1987 federal funds and another
$175 million from states and localities. Approximately 2.5 million
people enroll annually in federally-funded adult education pro
grams, which spend an average of only $112 per participant.
Most of the statutory requirements utilized by JTPA and the 1984
Carl Perkins Vocational Education Act to improve the coordina
tion of job training with education programs were carried over from
previous legislation. The JTPA 8 percent set-aside is to be spent
through cooperative agreements among state education agencies,
SDAs, and local education agencies. At least 80 percent of the grant
must be allocated for educational services, and these funds must be
matched by the state or locality. Three-quarters of the service funds
must be spent on the disadvantaged, with the remainder to be used
for other individuals facing barriers to employment. The balance of
the education grant is intended to facilitate coordination with job
training programs. Another JTPA provision requires SDAs to give
education agencies the opportunity to provide training services
unless it is demonstrated that other service providers would be more
effective.
To date, however, there is little evidence that these statutory
requirements have had a measurable impact on program opera
tions. State council administrators surveyed saw few signs of
coordination at either the state or the local level. Despite the law's
requirement that SDAs be party to the disposition of 8 percent
funds, half the states bypass the SDAs.46 A National Governors'
Association survey of 37 states found that only 3 states had
appropriated funds for the 8 percent matching requirement (the
others presumably made in-kind contributions), and the states have
spent only a little over three-fourths of the federal set-aside funds.
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Programs financed through the 8 percent education set-aside pro
vide classroom training to roughly 100,000 individuals annually,
but only a quarter of participants receive remedial education,
English as a second language assistance, or high school equivalency
training. The 1986 JTPA amendments require states to serve at least
some dropouts with 8 percent funds, but such a minimal standard
may not have much impact. Only 32 percent of the terminees found
jobs, at hourly wages averaging $5.47
Welfare
Congress specified reductions in "welfare dependency" as one of
JTPA's principal objectives, continuing a two-decade-old policy of
using employment and training programs to promote the selfsufficiency of welfare recipients. JTPA's efforts have been aug
mented by the Work Incentive (WIN) program, which serves
employable Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
recipients. In fiscal 1987 the appropriation for WIN amounted to
$133 million, less than a third of the level appropriated six years
earlier in inflation-adjusted dollars.
The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act permitted states
flexibility in designing and administering work-welfare programs
and to require AFDC recipients to work in return for assistance.
Stepping up the pressure to induce AFDC recipients to seek work,
the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act allowed the
states to require AFDC recipients to participate in a job search
program to establish or maintain their eligibility for assistance.
While all states operate work or training programs for AFDC
recipients, the number actually assisted is unknown. Beginning in
1987, the states must also implement employment and training
programs for food stamp recipients. In addition to federally
mandated or encouraged programs, some states also provide em
ployment assistance to poor individuals receiving state or local
general assistance.
Historically, coordination between WIN and other employment
efforts has been minimal.48 Since JTPA/welfare coordination is
apparently not a high state priority — Massachusetts and a few
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other states are exceptions — it is unlikely that cooperation has
increased in recent years.49 At the local level, few welfare adminis
trators are represented on PICs. Two of every five JTPA partici
pants receive some form of public assistance, nearly identical to the
experience under CETA. A survey of 45 SDAs found that twothirds of the welfare recipients served had not been referred by a
welfare agency or any other program. Moreover, only a fourth of
the WIN referrals who enrolled in JTPA obtained support services
from the WIN program. 50 Given general SDA practices, it is
unlikely that these enrollees received support assistance from JTPA
funds.
Other factors suggest that coordination between JTPA and
welfare programs may have decreased since JTPA's enactment.
Where a CETA prime sponsor had to deal with one major federal
program (WIN), Congress subsequently created five federal workwelfare programs, undoubtedly complicating both state and local
coordination efforts. At the same time, federal funding has dwin
dled, and the uncertainty of WIN's future hardly provides an
impetus for JTPA to invest much effort in cooperating with the
program. Finally, although the law requires the Labor Department
to ensure that WIN registrants are referred to JTPA, the admin
istration's laissez faire policy toward both programs renders this
provision toothless.
A lesser obstacle to coordination is JTPA's requirement that any
payments to AFDC recipients be counted as income. Senator Dan
Quayle reported that, by requiring agencies to reduce AFDC
benefits by the amount of money JTPA enrollees receive to cover
travel or other training-related expenses, welfare recipients are
discouraged from pursuing training. 51

Older Workers
On the average, the incidence of unemployment among older
individuals is relatively low, but those who lose their jobs tend to
remain unemployed longer than younger workers, or drop out of
the labor force entirely. Of a state's Title IIA allocation, 3 percent
is set aside (a little over $50 million nationally) for services to low
income individuals over 55. States pass most 3 percent funds to
SDAs.
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One of the very few social programs that Congress has singled out
for increased funding in the 1980s, the Senior Community Service
Employment Program (Title V of the Older Americans Act) is the
major employment program for the elderly. The program's budget
has risen from $275 million in fiscal 1981 to $326 million in fiscal
1987, almost matching the inflation rate. The Senior Community
Service Employment Program annually provides part-time public
jobs for approximately 100,000 older individuals in households with
incomes below 125 percent of the poverty line. This income criterion
is more generous than the JTPA standard.
During JTPA's first three years, the states spent only two-thirds
of the 3 percent set-aside. The mandatory allocation of funds for the
elderly — which did not exist under CETA — may have improved
coordination with the Senior Community Service Employment
Program. However, Congress left little room for effective coopera
tion between the two programs. Nearly 80 percent of the commu
nity service program's funds are allocated by the federal govern
ment directly to eight national contractors, including the American
Association of Retired Persons, the National Council on Aging and
the Urban League. Governors have almost no control over this
money. Thus whatever coordination occurs is probably due to
arrangements made by individual SDAs, but cooperation is un
doubtedly limited since the two programs offer different services to
their clients.
Three percent set-aside programs enroll about 25,000 individuals
annually. The reported characteristics of these enrollees do not
differ appreciably from older enrollees in other Title IIA programs.
Most 3 percent trainees enroll in brief job search programs, as
follows:
Service
Job search assistance
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Work experience

Enrollees receiving service
57%
27
21
8

Since a small proportion of participants receive multiple forms of
assistance, the total is slightly higher than 100 percent. Reports
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from 15 states indicate that 64 percent of terminees found jobs at an
average hourly wage of $4.50. 2
Economic Development
Coordination between JTPA and economic development pro
grams has attracted increasing attention in the employment and
training community, although the law itself barely addresses the
subject. However, the lip service to economic development has not
been matched by action. The few states which attempt to coordinate
JTPA with economic development programs tend to tap JTPA 8
percent education set-aside funds. One state targeted all of its 8
percent JTPA set-aside and 10 percent employment service set-aside
for economic development projects, and in addition required the
SDAs to reserve 10 percent of Title IIA funds for company-specific
training. Other means of coordinating the two programs include
either reserving a portion of jobs created through economic devel
opment projects for JTPA participants, or requiring contractors to
use JTPA as a first source in soliciting job applications. 53
A major obstacle to coordinating JTPA and economic develop
ment efforts is the divergent goals of the two programs. Many state
economic development policies are characterized by beggar-thyneighbor efforts to persuade firms to relocate, and requiring
employers to hire the poor fits awkwardly into an incentive
package. Consequently, a National Governors' Association survey
found that only two states had such hiring requirements, and most
states volunteered that they would not consider including JTPA
training as a carrot for luring employers. The wide range of
economic development programs — encompassing grants, loans,
loan guarantees, and tax incentives administered by various state
agencies — further impedes coordination. 54 Even if potential
employers were interested in JTPA trainees, it would be difficult to
dovetail the timing of the training with the hiring needs of the
employers.
Given the present nature of economic development programs,
initiatives to coordinate these programs with JTPA are probably
misdirected. Including JTPA as part of an incentive package to woo
firms from one state to another is no more than a corporate shell
game which wastes scarce dollars available for training.
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Great Expectations, Minimal Returns
There is little reason to believe that coordination between job
training and other social programs has improved much under
JTPA. While conceptually appealing, the importance of coordina
tion has been greatly exaggerated by many program administrators
and policymakers. Enhanced coordination can improve program
effectiveness, but should never have been expected to mitigate the
effects of multibillion dollar budget cuts in employment and
training programs.
Promoting cooperation among various social programs is inher
ently difficult. JTPA administrators have no control over other
social programs, and can attempt to facilitate coordination but not
mandate it. Responsibility for the different programs lies with
various levels of government, and in several programs the private
sector plays an important role. In many cases, no single adminis
trator has the authority or capability to compel various agencies to
coordinate divergent programs. Even in instances where the state
government possesses sufficient statutory authority, longstanding
bureaucratic arrangements may effectively block reform.
In addition to difficulties emanating from fragmented adminis
trative responsibility, the purposes, clientele and operations of
many social programs differ greatly from JTPA. Common instruc
tional goals characterize vocational education and JTPA, but
school financing is not directly dependent on graduates' job place
ment records. Both JTPA and work-welfare programs emphasize
employment results, but most work-welfare programs stress direct
job placement activities to remove welfare recipients from the rolls
as quickly as possible. Staff have little incentive, therefore, to place
a welfare recipient in a JTPA classroom training program rather
than directly in a job.
JTPA's coordination provisions are also too ambiguous to ensure
results. Compounding the problem, the Labor Department pursues
a deliberate nonintervention policy and state coordinative directives
are generally vague and inconsequential. Unless Congress articu
lates clear goals, which are further specified and enforced by federal
and state administrators, increased cooperation will remain only a
rhetorical objective.

56

CHAPTER 2

Several key assumptions by JTPA's designers regarding coordi
nation have proven to be erroneous. Elevating the role of states,
JTPA relies upon the governors to guarantee better interprogram
cooperation, but state agencies do little to promote coordination.
Another widely-held misconception was that reduced funding
would prompt JTPA administrators to work more closely with
other programs and more fully use alternative resources. However,
funding and personnel cuts across almost all social programs
instead caused widespread retrenchment, and administrators have
been reluctant to invest in coordination at the expense of direct
provision of services.
Even if the SDAs had desired to pursue coordination efforts more
vigorously, JTPA's administrative cost limitations constrain such
action. Even without significant investments in coordination and
with some creative accounting, the average SDA devotes the
maximum allowable funding to administration. Assessing barriers
to cooperation, negotiating interagency agreements to eliminate
coordinative obstacles, and monitoring progress to ensure smooth
implementation require significant resources which would undoubt
edly exceed JTPA's administrative cost limitations.
Finaly,Reagan administration efforts to revamp, drastically re
duce or abolish a number of programs related to JTPA inhibit
interprogram cooperation. Until the future of the employment
service, vocational education, and WIN programs becomes clearer,
cooperation between these programs and JTPA will be hampered.

Training Adults
and Youth

JTPA service delivery area (SDA) operators are permitted broad
flexibility in devising training strategies for enrollees, but the law
severely limits spending for administration, allowances and other
supportive services. The SDAs are also required to meet federal
performance standards governing job placement rates, wages, and
the cost of providing assistance. JTPA training eiforts may be an
improvement over CETA in some respects, but the program's
problems are serious and remain largely unaddressed.

Enrollees
Eligibility and Selection
As under CETA, eligibility is generally restricted to
• individuals whose families earn less than the federal poverty
guideline or less than 70 percent of the Labor Department's
lower living standard income level. (The latter guideline
varies by locality, ranging in the continental U.S. from
$9210 to $11,660 for the average-sized poor household of
three, compared to the uniform 1987 federal poverty guide
line of $9300.);
• individuals in families receiving cash welfare or food stamps;
• foster children; and
• handicapped adults whose personal earnings do not exceed
the income criteria, irrespective of their family's income.
57
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Unemployment insurance, cash welfare, and child support pay
ments are not counted as income in determining eligibility. Con
gress also permitted SDAs to assist individuals who do not meet the
income criteria but face other barriers to employment, including
displaced homemakers, addicts and school dropouts, but such
participants may not exceed 10 percent of total enrollment. How
ever, few SDAs actively utilize this provision.
The law singles out for special assistance subgroups within the
poverty population. SDAs are mandated to spend 40 percent of
their Title IIA funds on youth enrollees under 22 years old and
enroll dropouts and welfare recipients in proportion to their
presence in the area's eligible population. Less well-defined is the
requirement that JTPA serve "those who can benefit from and who
are most in need of assistance.
Very little is known about how SDAs recruit applicants for the
program. Past examinations of CETA and the Job Corps indicate
that most job training applicants learned about these programs by
word of mouth, and the same is probably true of JTPA.
Deciding who to select from among the applicants is one of the
thornier problems facing SDA administrators. The law emphasizes
assistance to those "most in need," but the Labor Department has
failed to define this ambiguous requirement and consequently most
states and SDAs ignore it. 1 Because serving deficiently skilled and
educated applicants is costly and fraught with difficulties, local
administrators tend to favor more employable individuals in order
to show "results." This practice, known in the trade as "creaming,"
is accomplished by establishing educational and occupational skill
qualifications as well as using more informal and subjective assess
ments of applicants' motivation and employability.
The extent of creaming is difficult to quantify because few SDAs
record the number of rejected applicants, let alone the reasons for
disqualification. However, every case study of JTPA has found
evidence of creaming. In one SDA, 60 percent of the dropouts who
applied were turned away. In another, 362 of 1844 eligible appli
cants were rejected because they were functionally illiterate, needed
remedial education, or had a limited command of English. Some
SDAs require high school or equivalency diplomas as a prerequisite
for enrollment.2 A comparison between the characteristics of
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employable AFDC mothers (those required to register for the Work
Incentive program) and AFDC mothers enrolled in JTPA also
tends to indicate creaming. Only half of the former have a high
school degree, compared with two-thirds of the AFDC mothers
enrolled in JTPA.3 Many SDAs also screen out applicants with
unsatisfactory work histories or skills. For example, some programs
reject applicants who type less than 25-30 words per minute for
secretarial training. A Denver skills center requires secretarial
applicants to possess a high school diploma and pass two typing
tests before admission.4
The subcontractors who provide services to enrollees may per
form additional screening. More than half of a sample of service
providers in Illinois established entrance criteria, typically involving
academic proficiency, in addition to the SDAs' qualifications. 5
Some SDA administrators have reported that service providers
screen 20-25 eligible applicants for each training opening. One SDA
used a 10-point system designed under CETA to favor individuals
with the greatest impediments to sustained employment. However,
an administrator noted that the system broke down under JTPA:
"Previously lots of sixes and sevens got into the training programs;
the contractors just won't take them now. They look for ones and
twos." Three-fourths of a sample of SDAs noted that JTPA
participants are better educated, have more job experience, and
have less need of support services than CETA's clientele. One
administrator explained why SDAs accepted service provider
screening: "This is the trade-off: we expect high placement rates and
low costs; they [service providers] get the freedom to take whoever
they think will help them achieve that."6
A comparison by the U.S. General Accounting Office of JTPA
and CETA client characteristics in a matched sample of 148 CETA
prime sponsors and SDAs with identical boundaries showed few
differences. 7 National totals of recorded participant characteristics
also indicate few differences between the two programs. These
findings do not prove that creaming is absent in JTPA, however,
because qualified participants who are similar in age, sex and years
of schooling may differ widely in employ ability. While SDAs
generally make no effort to define or recruit those most in need of
assistance, they usually set recruitment goals for women, minorities
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and welfare recipients and specify these targets in contracts with
service providers. Service providers generally have the discretion to
choose the best qualified applicants within these parameters, which
may explain why reported client characteristics do not indicate
creaming.
Creaming did not originate under JTPA. In fact, one study of
CETA found that almost all local prime sponsors used educational
criteria to screen out applicants, and that administrators generally
accepted the screening practices of service providers.8 However,
several reasons make it likely that creaming is practiced more
extensively under JTPA. First, cost and job placement performance
standards put pressure on SDAs to select more employable enrollees. Particularly in the case of adult performance standards, which
give SDAs credit only for job placements, there is little incentive to
invest funds in enrollees requiring remedial education before enter
ing occupational training. Many SDAs pursue a deliberate policy of
serving as many individuals as possible at the lowest possible cost
per trainee, which inhibits assistance to enrollees requiring more
intensive training to enhance employability. Finally, the larger
business role in JTPA and the concomitant emphasis on business
needs probably also promotes creaming. Employers do what comes
naturally and favor the most qualified applicants.
Although JTPA's ostensibly high job placement rates have gar
nered much praise for the program, the evidence indicates that
SDAs deliberately select more qualified applicants and exclude
those most in need in order to achieve this result. However, this
politically safe policy may be economically inefficient in the long
run, since job training programs produce the greatest net impact by
serving individuals with greater labor market handicaps.9

Characteristics
In 1985, Title IIA programs enrolled about 1.1 million partici
pants, nearly identical to the number assisted by the principal
CETA training program during the late 1970s. However, in order to
maintain this enrollment level, administrators had to cut inflationadjusted expenditures per enrollee by a third. Even by relying on
low cost services, JTPA's appropriation permits assistance to only
about one in 20 of the working-age poor.
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The typical Title IIA enrollee is an unemployed high school
graduate under age 30. Participants are about equally divided
between whites and minorities, two-fifths receive public assistance,
and a quarter have dropped out of school (table 3.1).
SDA training programs are required by law to allocate 40 percent
of total funding to youth enrollees. However, almost half the SDAs
have difficulty meeting the youth spending requirement, which they
attribute to the shortage of eligible youth in their area, the law's
restrictions on stipends which could have been used as an incentive
to enroll youth, inadequate recruiting, and an emphasis on low-cost
services. The General Accounting Office suggested that a more
important factor determining an SDA's inability to meet the youth
requirement was the absence of special programs targeted toward
16-21 year olds. 10 Despite these difficulties, the 40 percent youth
spending requirement has undoubtedly promoted greater service to
youth than would otherwise have occurred. Many policymakers
believe that assisting young people will reap a greater net long-term
impact than aid to adults, but this assumption rests largely on faith.
Emphasis on training assistance to youth has fluctuated signifi
cantly over the past quarter century.
Table 3.1.
Characteristics of 1.1 million Title IIA participants (1985).
Total
Youth (< 22)
Adults
Male
Female
White
Black
Hispanic
Under 22
22-54
Over 54
High school dropout
High school student
High school graduate
Public assistance recipient
AFDC recipient
Unemployment insurance claimant
Handicapped
Limited English

48%
52
51
33
12
44
54
2
26
17
57
40
21
6
10
4

47%
53
55
30
12
.
97
3
27
1
72
44
22
10
8
5

49%
51
46
37
13
100
26
37
37
36
20
2
12
3

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Women constitute slightly more than half of JTPA participants.
Compared to male enrollees, women are slightly older and better
educated, more likely to be black, twice as likely to be receiving
cash welfare, and more likely to have been out of work for at least
six months at enrollment.
Two of five participants receive public assistance, including some
who benefit from more than one program. A third receive food
stamps, a fifth are AFDC recipients, and slightly less than a tenth
obtain state or local general assistance or refugee assistance. States
with higher than average AFDC payments tend to enroll a higher
proportion of their welfare rolls in JTPA than states paying less
than the national average (29 vs. 20 percent). 11 This may imply that
states with higher AFDC payments make greater efforts to enroll
recipients in order to reduce welfare costs, or that the enrollees are
better qualified for undergoing training. The finding also apparently
contradicts the common notion that states with relatively high
AFDC payments discourage the work ethic.
Administrative Limitations and Support Services
JTPA departed radically from CETA in restricting income and
support services to trainees. Federal CETA administrators gener
ally required local programs to pay allowances equal to the mini
mum wage to all classroom trainees, even 14-year-olds in the
summer program. Total support expenditures, including classroom
training allowances, work experience wages and outlays for other
services, accounted for 59 percent of the 1982 CETA training
budget. 12 CETA's stipend policy was based on the assumption that
the poor could not pursue sustained training without income
support. A disadvantage of this policy was that, given the low
earnings of CETA's clientele, stipends could present an attractive
alternative to work for some trainees. 13
Taking this speculation as fact, the Reagan administration
charged that stipends made CETA an income support rather than
a training program, and proposed to ban the payments altogether.
After a prolonged and bitter debate, Congress and the administra
tion reached a compromise requiring SDAs to devote at least 70
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percent of Title IIA expenditures to training. No more than 15
percent can be spent on administration, and no more than 30
percent on combined administration and support costs (including
allowances and supportive services such as transportation assis
tance and child care). The new rules have almost completely
eliminated allowances. Spending in 1985 was reportedly allocated as
follows:
Training
Administration
Support

75%
14
11

The law leaves "training" largely undefined, but Labor Depart
ment regulations permit direct training costs to include outlays for
equipment, classroom space, job-related counseling, and half of the
costs for work experience if less than six months duration and
combined with another form of training. Other work experience
costs are considered a support service expense. Most states classify
participant recruitment and eligibility determination costs as train
ing expenditures. Contractor profits are probably also recorded as
training expenses, but because separate reporting of profits is not
required, it is impossible to estimate such costs.
During JTPA's first three years, the SDAs reported that admin
istrative outlays accounted for 14-15 percent of their Title IIA
expenditures. However, neither Congress nor the Labor Depart
ment adequately defined administrative expenses, allowing SDAs to
fudge management costs and to claim that their programs are lean
and trim. Labor Department regulations allow SDAs to hide
administrative expenditures by counting all performance-based con
tracting costs as training expenses. Performance-based contracts
involve withholding full payment from job trainers until the enrollee
finds a job. A large but unreported proportion of SDA funds is
allocated through performance-based contracts, significantly under
stating JTPA's true administrative costs. Even with the loopholes,
SDA administrators claim that the cost limits have had a negative
impact on local management by constricting staff size as well as
monitoring and evaluation activities. 14
The law directs SDAs to include allowances, half of work
experience expenditures, and other assistance necessary to enable
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participants to remain enrolled in training programs (including
transportation, child care and health care) as support service costs.
Apparently, program administrators do not find the cost limitations
onerous, because few SDAs request waivers. In fact, on the average,
SDAs report that they spend only three-quarters of the allowable
funds for provision of services; a U.S. General Accounting Office
survey found that support spending accounts for only half of the
allowable 15 percent. 15 The skimping on support services reinforces
the allegations of creaming and the proclivity of SDAs to stress
"pure" training. Only one of six participants receives support
services. Even if it is assumed that all support costs are for
allowances and various support services (i.e., ignoring the work
experience costs allocated as support), average support spending in
1985 amounted to only $161 per participant, or about $11.50 a
week. Arguing that JTPA's reduced budget should be channeled
directly to training and that support assistance encourages depen
dency, SDA policymakers hold support costs to a minimum. The
law notwithstanding, by 1987 the view that support services were
outside JTPA's responsibility was widespread. As a North Dakota
JTPA official put it, "Those clients who need other social or human
services prior to skill training should be served by other programs
designed to remove those barriers." 16
Transportation, child care and medical assistance are the most
typical support services offered, the latter usually restricted to
job-related needs such as eyeglasses or required physical exams. The
SDAs typically deny assistance to on-the-job training or work
experience program enrollees on the grounds that they receive
wages and therefore should be able to provide for their own needs.
The most common means of providing assistance are through direct
cash payments to enrollees, set-asides in contracts with service
providers, and unfunded agreements with outside agencies. Referral
of enrollees to social service agencies, which have faced severe
funding losses during the 1980s, does not guarantee that the
individuals receive assistance. The 20 percent of JTPA enrollees
who receive AFDC are automatically eligible for health assistance
through medicaid.
Less than 1 percent of JTPA Title IIA funding is spent on
allowances. Only one of seven participants receives stipends, aver-
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aging $34 weekly. Payments are based on such factors as the
number of hours spent in training, household size, income, and
commuting distance to the training site.
Denying support services has had a deleterious impact on JTPA's
effectiveness. More than half of SDA administrators and service
providers surveyed believe that because of the limits, JTPA enrolls
individuals who are less disadvantaged then GET A participants. A
majority also believe that they must operate curtailed training
programs because enrollees, lacking income support, cannot afford
long-term training. One positive impact noted by SDA directors is
that participants are more motivated to pursue training and are not
in the program to obtain a stipend. 17 However, it could also be
argued that the enrolled participants are likely to secure jobs on
their own and that provision of basic needs should come before
"building character."
As JTPA professionals often note, "You can't eat training."
Many poor individuals who require income and support services to
initiate and complete a job training program are excluded from
JTPA. Congress should consider liberalizing the statutory support
service cost limitations, and the Labor Department should encour
age SDAs to expand services to participants who need help. To
optimize the impact of limited resources, stipends should be ad
justed to the income needs of the enrollee's family. In addition,
SDAs should husband resources carefully by monitoring partici
pant progress and dismissing enrollees whose main interest appears
to be stipends rather than training.
Training

JTPA Title IIA programs offer many occupational courses
similar to CETA's, but despite this continuity JTPA's practices
differ greatly from its predecessor. Four distinct components ac
count for the bulk of JTPA enrollment. Classroom and on-the-job
training averages no more than about three to four months. Job
search training, designed to hone participants' job hunting skills, is
much shorter, usually lasting two weeks or less. Finally, work
experience programs place youth with limited employment back-
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grounds in entry-level jobs with government agencies and nonprofit
organizations. Some JTPA participants receive no assistance other
than counseling.
Although the categorization of services in the two programs
differs somewhat, the SDAs substantially expanded OJT and job
search assistance and reduced work experience and classroom
training compared to GETA (figure 3.1). National training distri
bution data mask an incredible degree of diversity among SDAs.
Forty JTPA Title IIA programs exhibited the following differences
in the proportion of participants enrolled in different types of
services. 18
10

Service

Range

Occupational classroom training
Basic education
On-the-job training
Job search
Work experience

2-76%
0-20
3-64
10-37
0-22

The factors that account for different service options are unclear.
An examination of CETA training found little connection between
local economic conditions, client characteristics, and the type of
services offered. 19
Classroom Training

Most JTPA classroom training is directly job-related, although a
small proportion is devoted to remedial education. Relatively more
women, blacks, the long-term (over six months) unemployed, and
public assistance recipients tend to be assigned to classroom
programs.
Classroom training programs are extremely brief, most scheduled
for between three and six months, but some for as little as two to six
weeks. JTPA trainees typically receive nearly 30 hours of instruc
tion weekly for a little over four months, a month less than the
average CETA classroom trainee. The actual difference is undoubt
edly even greater than the data indicate, because until 1986, when
Labor Department regulations proscribed the practice, SDAs could
categorize program completers in a "holding status" for up to three
months which some SDAs counted as part of the training courses.
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Figure 3.1
Compared to CETA, JTPA substantially expanded on-the-job
training and job search assistance.
CETA (1982)

JTPA (1985)

Job search assistance
and other

On-the-job training

Work experience

Classroom training

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Since many SDAs deny admittance to applicants considered
educationally deficient, it follows that JTPA downgraded remedial
education compared to the role this training component played
under GET A. In 1982, 14 percent of GET A enrollees received
remedial education assistance, compared to only 7 percent of JTPA
enrollees three years later.
The limited information available on occupational offerings
indicates that nearly half of JTPA training is for clerical and sales
jobs. Data from a dozen SDAs examined suggest that the distribu
tion of occupations for which enrollees are trained has changed
slightly since CETA.20
Training occupation
Clerical and sales
Machine trades and bench work
Technical (mostly health care)
Service (mostly building
maintenance and food service)

CETA

JTPA

38%
22
13

43%
16
19

12

10

SDAs typically contract with service providers — most com
monly public or private schools, community-based organizations,
or businesses — to serve an entire class of JTPA participants.
Individual referrals to schools are atypical, usually restricted to
cases where an entire class cannot be organized, especially in rural
areas.
On-the-Job Training
OJT involves learning an occupational skill through work. SDAs
usually reimburse firms for half of the employee's wage costs,
theoretically to reimburse employers for additional training costs
and to induce firms to hire JTPA eligibles who otherwise might not
be considered. However, absent careful monitoring JTPA may in
fact be providing windfall benefits to employers who take advan
tage of the subsidy for individuals they would have hired in any
case. The law restricts the use of JTPA funds to "activities which are
in addition to those which would otherwise be available," but this
vague standard is not easily enforceable.
SDAs typically negotiate OJT contracts with small businesses
who train no more than a few enrollees for entry-level jobs. As a
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rule, SDAs first screen applicants to select those who are likely to be
acceptable to the employer, and then refer several applicants to the
employer, who makes a final choice. Average OJT training duration
is a little less than 3.5 months, about a month shorter than under
CETA.21
The proportion of enrollment in OJT has doubled since CETA.
The local business representatives whose influence increased under
JTPA tend to favor OJT, and the program offers significant
advantages to SDA administrators working within the constraints
of JTPA's performance standards and cost limitations. OJT has
always produced high placement results because administrators
often require employment commitments beyond the reimbursement
period in return for the wage subsidy, and since enrollees receive
wages they generally do not need either allowances or support
services.
Not surprisingly, employers tend to select the most qualified
applicants for OJT slots. In fact, some SDAs even allow employers
to recruit their own OJT participants. White men (two-thirds of
OJT enrollees), adults, high school graduates, individuals not
receiving public assistance, and those unemployed for less than six
months are overrepresented in OJT compared with other forms of
training. The Labor Department has not yet released data on the
earnings of JTPA participants before enrollment, but comparable
CETA data indicate that OJT trainees had consistently higher
pre-enrollment earnings than other participants. With increasing
employer influence and a widespread orientation toward serving the
needs of business, the creaming problem is undoubtedly more
widespread under JTPA. For example, the Houston PIC announces
that its OJT program is designed "for businesses that want to
reduce labor costs and increase profits."22
Employers participating in CETA perceived only minor differ
ences in productivity between OJT trainees and other employees,
which may mean that the firms were taking no greater risk than
normal in accepting OJT trainees. Furthermore, without sufficient
on-site monitoring there is little indication of how much training
OJT enrollees actually receive. Employers who sponsored CETA
on-the-job trainees reported devoting little more staff time to orient
and instruct OJT trainees than other employees. Firms estimated
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that under CETA they devoted about 42 hours total staff time to
train or orient OJT trainees, or about 2 hours a week.23 If the same
practices continue under JTPA, it seems likely that OJT may
function more as a wage subsidy to induce the employer to hire a
JTPA-referred worker than as a reimbursement for presumed
additional training time required by a JTPA enrollee. Some SDAs
acknowledge using OJT in this fashion. However, the experience of
CETA as well as the more recent Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
demonstrates that absent careful monitoring, many employers hire
individuals they would have employed without government induce
ments, but still collect the subsidies.24
Job Search Assistance
At least a fifth of JTPA participants are engaged primarily in brief
job search programs. One analyst concluded from examining SDA
records that it is difficult to distinguish job search assistance from
"other services," and that the former is probably underreported.
Enrollees deemed job-ready are placed in job search programs.
Studies of JTPA's dislocated worker program indicate that the
projects frequently limit enrollment to individuals who have either
job leads or actual offers, a practice probably pursued by Title IIA
programs as well. The range of job search assistance includes
preparing resumes, locating job openings, direct referrals to em
ployers, interviewing tips, and job clubs providing advice and
support. Project participants usually receive several days of instruc
tion before pursuing a self-directed job search with some advice and
material assistance (typewriters, phones, copying machines, etc.)
from SDAs. National reporting data indicate that the average job
search participant is enrolled for four weeks, but these figures
undoubtedly include a holding period during which enrollees
receive no assistance. A study that examined local SDA operations
found that job search programs typically last no more than two
weeks.25
Year-Round Youth Programs
In 1985, nearly half a million youths below age 22 were enrolled
in Title IIA. The majority of youth enrollees receive classroom,
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on-the-job, and job search training, although they constitute a
minority within these programs (figure 3.2). In contrast, most
participants in work experience and miscellaneous training pro
grams are under 22. SDAs place most work experience enrollees in
part-time jobs in a variety of government agencies and nonprofit
organizations. Seventy percent of youth work experience enrollees
are in high school. National data, which most likely exaggerate
program duration, indicate that the average enrollee remains in a
work experience program for 4.5 months. Work experience pro
grams last longer than other forms of JTPA training, although since
most enrollees are students they probably work less than 20 hours
a week.
Because nearly two- fifths of youth enrollees are in school, the law
specifies that positive outcomes of youth programs must include
school completion, military enlistment, and — most significantly —
successful completion of a "competency-based" program. Such
programs typically tutor enrollees in basic education, job-specific
skills, "world of work" awareness or job search techniques, and
probably account for much of the assistance categorized as "mis
cellaneous" services.
Figure 3.2
Most enrollees in work experience and miscellaneous training
programs are under age 22 (1985).
Number under 22
(thousands)
66 |

474

)}

Percent of enrollees
under 22

Job search

I———I 31 %

75 |

|

82|

|

OJT

|

|

Miscellaneous

I

1 0 21
1 49 |

|

Component

Work experience |

[81%
| 31%
"1 61 %

| Classroom training
All JTPA

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Despite congressional emphasis, JTPA competency-based pro
grams have gotten off to an extremely slow start, although appro
priate models were readily available.26 Ignoring the law, the Labor
Department's initial positive termination standards gave SDAs no
credit for providing youth with basic competencies. The department
reversed its decision after JTPA got underway, but did not define
what SDAs could count as a competency-based outcome until June
1986. In the intervening two-and-a-half years the states were
responsible for ensuring that SDA competency-based programs
were "sufficiently developed," but less than half the states attempted
to enforce this vague standard.
The law is ambiguous about who is responsible for determining
acceptable competency standards. In somewhat confusing lan
guage, JTPA states that the Labor Department shall prescribe
performance standards, including attainment of "employment com
petencies recognized by the private industry council." Many state
and local officials have interpreted this provision as delegating
complete approval authority over employment competencies to the
PICs, and not surprisingly the Office of Management and Budget
agrees. The House-Senate conference report on JTPA makes it
clear, however, that both the Labor Department and the states were
intended to supervise competency-based standards.
The Labor Department has not been helpful in resolving the
confusion. It issued guidelines governing acceptable competencybased programs, but focused primarily on process issues rather than
on substance, rejecting content standards as infringing on local
autonomy. SDAs are credited for successful youth competency
attainment in one of three areas: preemployment or work maturity
skills, basic education, and job-specific skills. Preemployment and
work maturity skills include labor market knowledge, career plan
ning, job search techniques, consumer education, and positive work
attitudes and habits. Basic education programs may include read
ing, math, writing, or oral communications instruction. Job-specific
competency training is similar to classroom occupational training,
except that SDAs receive credit for participants' enhanced skills
rather than subsequent employment success. SDAs are free to
operate any of these three types of competency-based programs or
none at all, although it is nearly impossible for SDAs to meet the
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Labor Department's positive termination performance standards
without operating at least some competency programs.
The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that only about
three-fifths of the SDAs it surveyed operated competency programs
in 1985. The most commonly offered programs were in the least
rigorous preemployment and work maturity skills area, and only a
quarter of the SDAs operated basic education projects and a
quarter operated job skills projects.27 More recent Labor Depart
ment data indicate that about four of five SDAs now operate
competency programs, although emphasis on education and job
skill competency programs probably remains limited. The Office of
Management and Budget has repeatedly blocked Labor Depart
ment efforts to collect the information necessary to evaluate SDA
competency programs.
Summer Youth Programs
In addition to Title IIA youth training, JTPA's Title IIB contin
ues a summer jobs program for youth first initiated as a component
of President Johnson's antipoverty efforts and a stable fixture of
federal employment programs ever since. The projects typically pay
14-to 21-year-olds the minimum wage for part-time work in gov
ernment agencies and community-based organizations. The sum
mer program constitutes a major part of JTPA, with an annual
price tag of about $750 million. However, the Labor Department
did not collect even basic data on enrollees until 1986, precluding a
credible assessment. The department did finance an evaluation of
the CETA summer program before the transition to JTPA.28
Because the current program is similar except for increased provi
sion of remedial education, the study's findings as well as other
relevant CETA data probably fairly represent the JTPA summer
program.
Other summer programs for disadvantaged youth complement
JTPA's Title IIB. The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program provides
a tax break for employers who hire poor 16- and 17-year-olds
during the summer. The special summer credit is more generous
than the year-round TJTC program. Employers can receive a tax
credit of 85 percent of up to $3000 paid to eligible youths during the
summer. However, the effective maximum tax break of $2,550 is
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somewhat less than this, depending upon the specific tax liabilities
of the employer. Despite the generous terms, credits were issued for
only 27,000 teenagers in 1985. There is probably little coordination
between JTPA's and TJTC's summer programs.29
Several states and localities operate summer youth corps pro
grams which provide minimum wage jobs primarily on public land,
involving work on conservation and maintenance projects. Total
state and local funding is less than $20 million. The Michigan
Youth Corps, which spends $15 million to provide 12,500 jobs, is by
far the largest of the state programs. 30
Financing and administration. Annual JTPA appropriations
for summer youth jobs (in millions) have fluctuated widely:
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

$824.5
824.5
724.5
636.0
750.0

Adjusted for inflation, funding for 1988 is only about three-quarters
of the average CETA appropriation during the 1979-81 period.
While overall funding is lower, the uncertainty formerly associated
with appropriations has undoubtedly diminished under JTPA
because of the new forward funding system. Due to last minute
congressional wrangling over CETA summer jobs spending, local
prime sponsors sometimes received funding after operations began,
precluding project planning. The Reagan administration has repeat
edly attempted to limit funding for the summer program, but
Congress has rejected these proposals except for 1987. In January
1987 the President proposed an $800 million budget and offered
amendments allowing SDAs to serve young AFDC recipients
year-round with Title IIB funds.
The allocation of summer program funds is based primarily on
adult unemployment rates, using the same formula applicable to
year-round training programs. Consequently, urban areas with a
high proportion of poor youth are underfunded. Because of the
costs entailed, it is impractical to ascertain annually the distribution
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of poor youths among the SDAs. However, decennial census data
suggest that the regional distribution of poor youth is nearly
identical to the distribution of poor 16-65-year-olds. Thus using
poverty rather than unemployment data may mitigate funding
fluctuations and inequities in the summer program. 31
The summer jobs program is administered by state and local
officials and private industry councils in the same manner as the
Title IIA program. Congress specifically exempted the summer
program from the cost limits applied to other JTPA programs, but
Labor Department regulations prohibit summer programs from
spending more than 15 percent of total costs on administration.
Reported administrative spending was slightly lower.
During the late 1970s, the U.S. General Accounting Office found
that many youths were not adequately supervised on the job and
were therefore probably not receiving useful work experience.
Consequently, the Labor Department monitored summer programs
more closely and required local administrators to increase their
oversight activities. Analysts found no serious problems at work
sites visited in 1983, and concluded that enrollees received mean
ingful employment experiences. Following JTPA's enactment, fed
eral monitoring has been pro forma at best, and there is little
indication that the states exercise careful oversight of SDA summer
programs.
Typically, one worksite employee supervises five enrollees, al
though the ratio ranges from 1:1 for technical jobs to 1:10-12 for
maintenance or conservation crews. Supervisors include both reg
ular worksite employees as well as temporary summer program
employees who lead the work crews. Orientation assistance varies
from brief sessions to two days of formal training, although most
programs provide manuals to supervisors. Because the orientation
is usually held at central locations, not all supervisors can leave
work to attend. Supervisors almost unanimously endorse the
summer program as a worthwhile endeavor, but offer several
criticisms. Many believe they need more training on how to manage
teenagers. Few programs make adequate efforts to match enrollees'
job assignments with their interests, which produces frustration for
all parties. Finally, supervisors recommend that programs dismiss
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participants with excessive absences to maintain the morale of other
enrollees, and institute a rewards system for exemplary youth.32
Enrollees and services. Eligibility for participation is based on
the same income criteria as Title IIA, but 14- and 15-year-olds also
qualify for Title IIB. Of the approximately 5-6 million eligible
youth, about 750,000 or 12-15 percent enroll each summer. Local
recruitment efforts often generate more applicants than can be
placed in jobs. Administrators use a variety of techniques to address
this dilemma, including lotteries, first-come first-served enrollment
policies, point systems which favor targeted groups, and restrictions
on the number of hours participants can work in order to spread
available funds.
The typical summer youth enrollee is a minority high school
student (table 3.2). Compared to youth in Title IIA programs,
summer enrollees are younger (a third are 14- or 15-years-old), less
likely to be white or dropouts, and more likely to be AFDC
recipients. JTPA and CETA summer enrollee characteristics differ
little.

Total

Table 3.2
Nearly two of three Title KB enrollees are
minority high school students.
CETA (1981)
JTPA (1986)
766,400
743,700

Male
Female
14-15
16-19
20-21
Dropout
High school student
High school graduate
White
Black
Hispanic
AFDC recipient
Single parent
Handicapped
Limited English

52%
48
35
59
6
6
82
13
33
50
14
37
3
7
4

51%
49
34
40 (16-17)
26 (18-21)
6
81
13
32
43
20
NA
3
11
10

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Although the law permits SDAs to provide a wide variety of
services to summer youth enrollees, the program has remained
primarily a work experience program with some remedial education
and "world of work" instruction. Participants usually work 32
hours per week for six to eight weeks at the federal minimum $3.35
hourly wage.
Most enrollees work at government agencies, schools and
community-based organizations. The summer program's lengthy
history allows administrators to establish long-term relationships
with agencies and offices which previously provided satisfactory
work opportunities. Moreover, widespread budget cuts have stim
ulated demand for subsidized summer enrollees. Program adminis
trators can afford to be choosy in selecting worksites.
Most participants are assigned to maintenance, clerical or office
work positions, but other assignments include aide positions in
agencies serving the elderly, handicapped and children; making car
deliveries; and working on conservation projects. In one locale,
youth helped record the oral histories of Indochinese immigrants; in
another, enrollees worked at a cable TV studio and were able to
participate in filmmaking. However, given the age and inexperience
of most enrollees, such assignments are atypical.
Summer programs typically provide enrollees with a total of two
to three days of "world of work" instruction, including an expla
nation of the labor market and various occupational opportunities,
job search and interview tips, and help with preparing resumes.
Some administrators conduct group seminars, while other pro
grams delegate world of work training to worksite supervisors. The
quality of instruction varies greatly, but reports from both admin
istrators and enrollees indicate that these programs are generally
inadequate and uninteresting to the youth.
In 1982, only 3 percent of total summer participants received
occupational training. Whether participants are assigned to work
experience or training positions, few receive job placement help and
even fewer obtain unsubsidized jobs which might enable them to
work part-time during the school year. 33
In 1986 the summer program devoted an average of 5 percent of
its budget to provide basic education to about one in ten enrollees,
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an investment similar to the 1982 CETA program.34 Following 1986
congressional amendments requiring SDAs to assess the reading
and math skills of enrollees, and to spend at least some money on
basic education, the SDAs planned to increase their provision of
remedial assistance as follows:
1986
SDAs providing basic education
Title IIB funds devoted to education
Enrollees receiving assistance

57%
5
8

1987
(estimate)
100%
12
21

Most SDAs rely on reading and math tests to determine enrollees'
need for remediation. However, nearly a third of local projects
restrict remediation enrollment to students only, excluding dropouts — who may need help the most — and graduates. Education
participants receive an average of 12 hours instruction weekly (at a
cost of $775), and spend another 20 hours at their work experience
assignment. Projects commonly offer enrollees stipends or academic
credit to encourage class attendance, and some make work experi
ence job offers contingent upon enrollment in remedial courses. Few
SDAs provide basic education themselves; most rely on local
schools. 35
An assessment. Assessing the impact of summer employment
programs is difficult both because of a paucity of data and
disagreements over the appropriate goals of the program. During
the riot-torn summers of the 1960s, the program was commonly
referred to as "fire insurance" because it helped keep teenagers off
the streets. The current program places more emphasis on educa
tional goals.
Research on the program's impact has focused on evaluating the
benefits of summer work experience alone or in combination with
remedial education, and determining to what extent localities use
the summer jobs for government activities which would have been
performed in any case. Work experience has produced tangible
benefits for communities as well as providing enrollees with both
job opportunities and income. However, numerous studies demon
strate that summer work experience by itself does little to improve
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future employability and earnings, for which more intensive skills
training is necessary. 36
A six-year experimental program supplementing summer work
experience with remedial education is now in progress. The project
provides 14-15- year-olds likely to drop out of school with 90 hours
of basic reading and math instruction as well as a short course
aimed at reducing teen pregnancy. Results from the project's first
two years are encouraging. Poor, deficiently educated youngsters,
who typically experience learning losses during the summer, main
tained their reading level and slightly increased their math profi
ciency. Enrollees bettered the control group's performance by half
a grade in reading and nearly a full grade in math. These results
represented an improvement over the first year's outcomes, largely
because a standardized curriculum replaced the previous practice of
allowing each school to develop its own program. Sexually active
participants were 50 percent more likely than the control group to
use contraceptives — nearly half of both groups were sexually active
at the beginning of the summer. Instructional costs per enrollee
amounted to slightly more than $500, in addition to the costs of
about $1000 per participant for the average summer program. 37
In 1983 some localities used summer youth enrollees as substi
tutes for regular government employees, thereby effectively substi
tuting federal for local funds.38 However, given the age and
inexperience of the participants, it is unlikely that the substitution
problem was very serious.
Summer work experience programs have provided jobs to mil
lions of poor youth who probably would not otherwise have found
work. This role is extremely important, especially in the case of
minority youth with disturbingly low labor force participation rates
and even lower employment to population ratios. However, several
changes could enhance the program's effectiveness. First, the avail
able funds could be spread further by paying less than the minimum
wage to 14- and 15-year-olds. Second, the Labor Department
should encourage SDAs to increase basic education offerings.
Nearly a third of the SDAs believe that summer remedial education
is the responsibility of the school system and not JTPA. Congress
may need to reconsider 1986 proposals requiring SDAs to devote a
specified proportion of Title IIB funds to remediation in order to
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prod these laggards. Third, the Labor Department should develop
curriculum standards for brief job search courses which would
teach enrollees to prepare resumes, locate openings and interview
for job opportunities. Finally, a portion of summer program funds
should be reallocated to Title IIA youth training or education
programs. Despite the increase in short-term costs, investments in
education and training will reap more lasting gains than work
experience programs.
Miscellaneous Training Issues

Little is known about the quality of JTPA training. The federal
government has failed to monitor training quality, and private
industry councils generally rely upon reported placement and cost
outcomes rather than reviewing curricula and visiting training
sites.39 A U.S. General Accounting Office study shortly before
CETA's demise found that programs which carefully considered
program assignments, provided assistance appropriate to partici
pant needs, and carefully monitored training progress had much
higher placement rates than other prime sponsors. However, ad
ministrators often routed applicants to available openings, paying
scant attention to participant needs, and neglected to contact
participants following enrollment to smooth obstacles to successful
program completion and subsequent employment.40 While no
similar assessment has been made since 1982, it is unlikely that the
situation has improved.
The proportion of enrollees receiving sequential training — e.g.,
remedial education followed by OJT or classroom occupational
training — is not known, but the number cannot be very large.
Two-fifths of the SDAs enroll participants in a single program
only.41 Under the Labor Department's reporting system, partici
pants receiving sequential training are placed in the "other services"
category, accounting for 11 percent of enrollees. Average reported
training duration for these individuals is only a little over three
months, allowing little opportunity for sequential training, and the
"other services" category includes many participants who are in
school or only receive job search assistance.
Congress directed the SDAs to increase training opportunities for
women in nontraditional occupations, but local programs have
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largely ignored this directive and occupational training remains
highly sex-segregated. A Wisconsin study found that women were
primarily trained to be waitresses, secretaries, hospital attendants,
cashiers and tellers, while men prepared for work as janitors, cooks
or kitchen helpers, truck drivers, and for various construction
positions. Congress also encouraged SDAs to boost service to
displaced homemakers, typically middle-aged women with little
employment experience who are entering the labor market due to
divorce or the death of their spouses. However, very few programs
actively recruit displaced homemakers, and those SDAs which do
so provide these women primarily with job search assistance, which
can hardly be expected to supply them with employable skills.42

Service Providers
SDAs utilize many training institutions which operated under
CETA. However, the relative importance of various training con
tractors and the assistance they provide have changed significantly.
Most SDAs use more than one agency to recruit and select
enrollees, and SDAs typically subcontract training instead of
operating programs directly. Only one of six SDAs provided all
training directly in 1985, and about two-thirds subcontracted at
least half their training funds (figure 3.3). The most widely used
subcontractors are public education institutions, operating in 85
percent of the SDAs. Postsecondary schools are the most com
monly utilized education institution, although about half the SDAs
contract with public high schools.43
Thirty percent of the SDAs use for-profit schools to provide
primarily job-specific training, but the training is generally expen
sive, which clashes with JTPA's emphasis on reducing costs, and the
schools tend to vigorously screen applicants. For example, one
proprietary school turned down 25 JTPA eligibles for every 1
accepted, and another screened 118 eligible individuals to enroll
19.44 Further reflecting the role that business representatives play in
determining JTPA policy, two-thirds of the SDAs turn to private
employers to offer on-the-job training, although some of the SDAs
which decided to rely heavily on OJT have encountered difficulty in
developing enough training positions.
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Figure 3.3
Most SDAs subcontract training.
Do not subcontract
Subcontract all

Subcontract less than 50%
Subcontract 80-99%

Subcontract 50-80%
Source: National Alliance of Business

Community-based organizations (CBOs), nonprofit groups
which provide a variety of services to the needy, played an
increasingly important role in employment and training programs
during the 1960s and 1970s. Major CBOs with nationwide networks
include Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America, Inc.,
SER-Jobs for Progress, the AFL-CIO's Human Resources Devel
opment Institute, 70001 Training and Employment Institute, the
Urban League, and Wider Opportunities for Women. The role of
CBOs has diminished considerably under JTPA. For example, two
of the larger CBOs experienced the following reductions from their
height under CETA to JTPA.

CETA
Local affiliates
Funding (millions)

Opportunities
Industrialization
Centers

SERJobs for
Progress

148
$150

65
$119

80
$ 49

40
$ 35

JTPA (1987)

Local affiliates
Funding (millions)

Although about 80 percent of SDAs contract with at least one
CBO, only half of these utilize CBOs for any training. The others
use CBOs for outreach, eligibility determinations, or helping JTPA
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terminees find jobs. In most of the local programs which have no
contracts with CBOs, no CBOs operate within the SDA's
boundaries.45
The major reason for the decline of CBOs under JTPA was the
elimination of GETA public jobs and Youth Employment and
Demonstration Projects Act programs in which CBOs played an
integral role. JTPA's severe restrictions on work experience pro
grams and allowance payments and emphasis on performance
standards also severely hurt CBOs. The rise of performance-based
contracts, with full payment delayed until terminees find work, has
caused cash flow problems for CBOs dependent upon JTPA funds
for survival.46 The poor quality of training offered by many CBOs
may also have played a role in their exclusion as providers of
training. However, CBOs are important for recruiting individuals
most in need and representing the interest of the needy.47 The
declining role of CBOs reflects JTPA's emphasis on the needs of
business rather than the needs of the individuals JTPA was designed
to help. Altogether, a third of the CBOs operating CETA programs
were not awarded SDA contracts, but most of these did not even
apply for funding because their role was curtailed under JTPA.48
In addition to recruiting and training enrollees, subcontractors
also help find jobs for many JTPA terminees. Program operators
are often expected to place their own enrollees, but almost twothirds of SDAs use a variety of institutions to place JTPA
graduates.49
Entity used for job placement
Training provider
SDA administrative agency
Employment service
Community-based organization
Public school

SDAs using entity
53%
43
30
20
18

In line with JTPA's emphasis on low costs, short-term training
and high job placement rates, contractors who fail to meet these
specifications are weeded out. One former CETA contractor noted
that in order to obtain a JTPA contract, his agency had to switch
from "taking the tough cases to becoming an efficient personnel
office for local businesses." Illinois youth service providers who had
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operated under CETA indicated that they reoriented their JTPA
programs away from remedial and vocational training toward
preemployment and job search assistance. 50
Performance-based contracting rapidly emerged following JTPA's
enactment and has provided several distinct advantages to SDA
administrators. Contractors have a powerful incentive to place their
trainees — or to report them as placed — which helps the SDA to
claim success in achieving the performance targets. Second,
performance-based contracting permits "management by numbers,"
minimizing on-site monitoring time and expense. Finally, Labor
Department regulations allow SDAs to categorize administrative
and support services expenditures as "training" costs if provided
through performance-based contracts. As noted, this enables SDAs
to evade the law's strict nontraining cost limitations. By 1985,
performance-based contracts accounted for three of four SDA
contracts with service providers. The contracts typically specify
uniform job placement and cost targets regardless of enrollee
characteristics, giving contractors every incentive to select the most
qualified individuals. 51
Despite their popularity, SDAs have noted two disadvantages to
performance-based contracting. The absence of advance funding
can present serious problems for contractors dependent upon JTPA
financing. Second, such arrangements encourage contractors to
overstate placements to claim the maximum possible profit, and
therefore require careful monitoring, which is not widely practiced
under JTPA. A Massachusetts PIC director, in characterizing the
consequences of JTPA's so-called performance-driven system,
noted, "The move towards performance-based contracts has raised
the specter of programs designed and operated for the numbers
game."52 Performance-based contracts can represent a useful tool
for holding service providers to their commitments. However,
JTPA's experience demonstrates the importance of augmenting
performance-based contracts with standards for training quality,
follow-up monitoring, and measures to prevent creaming.

4

Performance Standards
and Results

Perhaps the most important factor which led Congress to em
phasize performance standards was widespread, though largely
unsubstantiated, criticism of the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act. As dissatisfaction with CETA mounted, Congress
directed the Labor Department in 1978 to develop performance
standards to assess the effectiveness of the program. Four years
elapsed before the Labor Department implemented performance
criteria on a trial basis, but the experiment was abandoned during
the transition from CETA to JTPA. 1 Performance standards ap
pealed to JTPA's designers as a way to eliminate the need for
detailed, costly oversight by the federal government, so long as
localities delivered results.
The use of objective, measurable and fair standards to judge the
quality of job training programs is universally hailed but not easily
accomplished. Legislative pronouncements typically represent dec
larations of vague intent rather than realistic objectives. Conse
quently, administrators must specify performance measures and the
means of achieving them. Key outcomes such as a "quality job" and
"educational achievement" require definition, taking into account
the abilities of the program's clientele. Equally difficult is the task of
adjusting standards for localities with radically different economic
conditions, client characteristics, and training institutions. Even
many quantifiable factors elude precise measurement, and perfor
mance standards are no better than their statistical foundation. For
example, local unemployment statistics are little better than
guesstimates.2 Even under the best-designed system, significant
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factors that affect performance, such as participant motivation, are
difficult to measure and are thus ignored.
Poorly drafted performance standards may produce the appear
ance of program success without the substance and also cause
unintended and deleterious side-effects. Guidelines which reward
operators for graduating enrollees from educational programs but
fail to specify the educational standards can produce the "suc
cessful" attainment of meaningless credentials which may well be
disregarded in the market place. Even when the standards are
carefully defined, the administrators may respond by selecting the
most qualified applicants, undermining the goal of helping those
who most need assistance. Granting their obvious potential useful
ness, performance standards nevertheless cannot fully answer the
question, "How much difference does JTPA really make?" Care
fully designed experiments which randomly assign individuals with
similar characteristics to training and control groups may provide
insights, but such efforts are costly and frequently difficult to
implement in more than a handful of local programs.
JTPA's Requirements

Congress decreed that "the basic return on [JTPA's] investment is
to be measured by the increased employment and earnings of
participants and the reductions in welfare dependency." The law
directs the Secretary of Labor to prescribe adult performance
standards which may include placement in unsubsidized jobs, job
retention, increases in earnings, and reduced welfare payments. For
youth, the following criteria must also be considered: attainment of
competency-based standards, successful completion of school or an
equivalency degree program, and enrollment in other training
programs or the military. The standards must consider participants'
labor market experience both before enrolling and after program
completion. Finally, the law requires the establishment of cost
standards applicable to the above measures. The Labor Depart
ment may modify the performance measures no more than once
every two years.
Apart from the difficulties inherent in designing and implement
ing performance standards, the law presents two major problems.
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First, JTPA's drafters confused performance standards with impact
evaluations, which attempt to gauge the net impact of a program.
For example, the law emphasizes decreased welfare dependency and
the postprogram employment and income status of recipients
following their training. About half of all recipients leave the
welfare rolls within two years, most without any additional govern
ment assistance (although many later return). Thus many recipients
who participate in JTPA would probably have left the welfare rolls
without job training. Determining the net impact of JTPA would
require tracking an appropriate control group of welfare recipients
who did not enroll in JTPA. Performance standards are unsuited to
determining the program's net impact, because they only measure
results without gauging JTPA's contribution to the outcome. After
a false start, the Labor Department did not begin impact assess
ments until 1986, and the project's implementation has been fraught
with difficulties.
The second problem presented by the law is the application of
performance standards to competency-based programs devoted to
teaching enrollees basic education, training them for entry level
skills, or exposing them to job search techniques. Applying perfor
mance criteria to such disparate activities requires standardized
program guidelines and detailed information for each program
component, which few if any SDAs maintain. Moreover, standard
ized federal program regulations clash with JTPA's emphasis on
state and local control.
Despite these statutory flaws, the inclusion of performance
standards in the law represents an advance. But this achievement
has been partly vitiated by the Labor Department's overreliance on
performance standards to the exclusion of other means of oversee
ing JTPA, and the overemphasis SDAs placed on the targets. In
addition, the administration's implementation of the standards
themselves has been deficient in a number of important respects.

Federal Implementation
The Labor Department's choice of seven performance standards
(four for adult enrollees and three for youth participants) was based
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on both the law and the criteria considered during the GETA years.
National Performance Standards (1986-7)

Adult
Entered employment rate (total)
Entered employment rate (welfare recipients)
Hourly wage
Cost per placement
Youth (16-21)
Entered employment rate
Positive termination rate
Cost per positive termination

62%
51%
$4.91
$4,374
43%
75%
$4,900

The entered employment rate standards are denned as the propor
tion of JTPA terminees who find jobs. The two cost standards
reflect total outlays divided by the number of job placements (plus
other positive outcomes for youths). The seven standards have
remained in effect since 1983, but the numerical targets for each
standard have, in most cases, been made more stringent.
The positive termination standards applied to youth are ambig
uous. These benchmarks are supposed to measure the proportion of
16-21-year-olds who obtain work; successfully complete a
competency-based program; return to school after dropping out;
complete primary, secondary or postsecondary schooling; or enroll
in other training programs or the military. The Labor Department,
however, left the definition of youth competencies up to localities,
and the U.S. General Accounting Office found that programs range
from rigorous classroom training to one-session motivational sem
inars. These extreme variations preclude meaningful comparisons
between SDAs using the positive termination standards, and in fact
discourage quality programs by giving equal credit to brief, super
ficial courses.3
In devising the performance standards, the Office of Management
and Budget and the Labor Department initially flouted the law's
requirement that trainees' postprogram experiences be considered.
Both the job placement and hourly wage standards are based on the
JTPA trainee's first day on the job. No distinction whatsoever is
made between temporary or permanent employment, or part-time
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or full-time jobs. The Office of Management and Budget refused
until 1986 to allow the Labor Department to even collect data to
establish postprogram standards. This has effectively delayed postprogram measures until at least mid-1988, six years after JTPA's
enactment.
Setting proper target figures for placement rates, earnings, and
costs necessarily reflects tentative judgments. Information about the
normal labor market experiences of the poor and the impact of
training is at best fragmentary, and performance targets conse
quently reflect the values and best estimates of administrators. The
Labor Department initially used 1982 CETA performance results as
a baseline, then arbitrarily adjusted the figures upward. The depart
ment raised most of the standards by 10 percent, for example,
because of an undefined "productivity improvement factor" that by
the stroke of a pen made JTPA more efficient than CETA.
The law also requires the Labor Department to devise adjust
ments to the performance standards to produce equitable measures
for SDAs facing varying economic conditions and enrollees. Four
of five states currently use the Labor Department's optional
adjustment methodology, and it has a significant impact on the
performance standards. In states which use the department's model,
SDA performance is judged by adjusted standards which may differ
greatly from the national standards.
One important reason for the discrepancy between the adjusted
standards and the national standards is that until 1986 the Labor
Department issued two sets of performance standards annually: the
national standards and model standards (table 4.1). The depart
ment holds that the law's prohibition on changing the performance
standards more frequently than biennially does not apply to the
model's performance standards. For example, although the na
tional standards remained unchanged between 1984 and 1985, the
department made the targets relatively more difficult to attain by
significantly tightening the adjustment model's performance stan
dards. Despite this action, most SDAs were still easily able to meet
— or at least claim to meet — the standards. In 1986, for the first
time, the national standards and the model's standards were
identical for five of the seven benchmarks.

Table 4.1
The actual performance standards SDAs faced often differed
drastically from the national standards.
National
standards
(1984-5)

Model
standards
(1984)

Median
adjusted
standards
(1984)

Model
standards
(1985)

Median
adjusted
standards
(1985)

VO

o

Range
(1985)

National
standards
(1986-7)

Model
standards
(1986-7)

Performance standards
Adults
Entered employment rate (total)

55%

47%

57%

57%

56%

31-71%

62%

62%

Entered employment rate (welfare recipients)

39%

None

48%

None

48%

4-97%

51%

51%

Hourly wage

$4.91

$4.44

$4.63

$4.64

$4.63

$3.13-6.74

$4.91

$4.64

Cost per placement

$5704

$6242

$4167

$3740

$4570

$2185-9153

$4374

$4374

Entered employment rate

41%

21%

34%

36%

35%

12-57%

43%

43%

Positive termination rate

82%

80%

75%

75%

76%

61-98%

75%

75%

$4900

$2710

$3453

$3362

$3557

$496-6002

$4900

$3711

Youth

Cost per positive termination

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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The second important element of the adjustment model is the
various economic, demographic, and client characteristic factors
used to adjust the standards. The annual adjustments are based on
the correlation between these factors and past performance results,
and a regression methodology is used to estimate the relative
importance of each factor. CETA data were used until JTPA
information became available in mid-1985. The local unemploy
ment rate, average wage, proportion of families in poverty, and
population density are the components for determining the different
economic conditions that prevail in SDAs. Adjustments for varying
participant characteristics include the proportion of enrollees who
are welfare recipients, high school dropouts, handicapped, members
of various minority groups, females, and students. The only training
factor considered is the duration of training measured in weeks. The
same factors are not used in adjusting each of the seven perfor
mance standards, and factors have been added or dropped from one
year to another to attempt to improve the model's predictive ability.
For example, the population density factor was added in 1986 for
four of the performance measures.
The 1986 adjustments to the adult job placement standard for
Cleveland illustrate the model's application to a high unemploy
ment area where the SDA serves a severely disadvantaged popula
tion. The performance standard is derived by applying the Labor
Department "weights" to the difference between Cleveland's demo
graphic and economic characteristics and the average for all SDAs.
With these adjustments, Cleveland's adult job placement standard
is reduced to 47 percent, well below the national standard of 62
percent (table 4.2).
An examination of the 1984 and 1985 adjusted standards shows
the significant variations between the national and SDAs' median
adjusted performance standards (table 4.1). In some instances the
basis for the discrepancies is puzzling. That the adjusted adult job
placement standard was slightly higher than the corresponding
national standard seems reasonable, since the model incorporated
the 1982 recession level unemployment rate, and it is likely that job
placements rose during the recovery when unemployment dropped.
However, the adjusted youth job placement standard was much
lower than the corresponding national standard.
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The adjusted cost standards for adults and youth were signifi
cantly lower — more difficult to meet — than the national stand
ards. The adjusted job placement standard for welfare recipients
was also more stringent than the national standard. In contrast, the
adjusted adult wage standard and the youth positive termination
standard were both more lenient than the respective national
standards.
The adjustment factors had a much greater overall impact on the
model standards in 1984 than in 1985. In the latter year, there was
very little difference between the model and the median adjusted
standards, except for the adult cost placement benchmark. How
ever, in 1984 the adjustment factors effectively tightened the model
standards in all cases but the youth positive termination rate. Some
of the principal adjustment factors responsible for these shifts raise
serious concerns about the validity of the Labor Department's
model. The Labor Department's highly questionable assumption
that it would be less costly for the SDAs to serve single mothers
made the adult cost standard much more difficult to meet. For
youth, the principal reason for the divergence between the median
adjusted standards and the model standards for all three bench
marks was that the SDAs served a higher proportion of high school
graduates. However, it is unclear why serving more graduates
should simultaneously make placements more difficult to achieve
and positive terminations (which include job placements) easier.
To ensure that the performance standards would be uniformly
applied across the country, the Labor Department in 1983 proposed
mandatory adoption of the adjustment methodology. However, the
Office of Management and Budget rejected this proposal on the
grounds that it would unduly interfere with state autonomy.
Consequently, state use of the department model is optional.
Governors can either apply the national performance standards
directly to the SDAs, or adjust the standards utilizing their own or
the Labor Department's methodology. Labor Department regula
tions require that state-developed adjustment methodologies be
based on reliable data and applied consistently among SDAs. The
states are free to make different adjustments for each of the seven
standards. A state may apply the national standards to the job

Table 4.2
The Labor Department's adjustment model greatly reduces
Cleveland's adult entered employment standard.*
Adjustment factors

Cleveland

Average for
allSDAs =

Economic and
demographic factors
1 . Population density(thousands of persons per
square mile)
2. Unemployment rate
3. Average annual wage (thousands of dollars)
4. Proportion ofpoor families

3.27
12.7
20.4
9.1

16.9
9.4

Participant characteristics
(percentages of all terminees)
5. Welfare recipients
6. Dropouts
7. Handicapped
8. Blacks
9. Females

61.6
35.1
4.1
73.0
46.5

29.8
25.0
9.1
23.8
52.8

*Only the most significant factors in the model are listed,
using Cleveland's 1985 data.

0.6
8.0

Difference

X

DOL
weights

= Adjustment

2.67
4.7
3.5
-0.3

.827
-.717
-.653
-.223

2.21
-3.37
-2.29
.07

31.8
10.1
-5.0

-.252
-.172
-.128
-.073
-.063

-8.01
-1.72
.64
-3.59
.40

49.2
-6.3
Total
Model standard

-15.66
62.40

Adjusted standard

46.74
vo
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placement target, the Labor Department-adjusted standard to the
wage benchmark, and a state-adjusted standard to the cost criteria.
Three states have rejected the Labor Department's model and at
least six states have considered such a move. If more states follow
suit, the uniformity of the national performance criteria would be
undermined. Nationwide consistency was further impaired by the
Labor Department's decision to allow SDAs to use either the 1986
or the 1987 adjustment model in calculating their 1987 performance
standards.
The adjustment factors are designed to compensate for the
problems of SDAs which face relatively severe economic conditions
or serve a disproportionately disadvantaged clientele. Conversely,
the adjustments also attempt to discourage SDAs from trying to
beat the system by enrolling more qualified applicants. However,
the adjustment factors alone cannot prevent creaming, and impor
tant flaws render the claimed scientific validity of the Labor
Department's model questionable.
First, the formula can only be as reliable as the data or the
standards upon which it is based. However, the economic and
demographic data given the most weight are unreliable or outdated.
As indicated previously, local unemployment data are little better
than guesses. Poverty adjustments are based on 1979 data. While
population density data may remain relatively stable in the short
run, they are a questionable measure of the accessibility and cost of
transportation to the poor. The inaccuracy of the estimates is
further compounded by the fact that geographic boundaries for the
data reported by the Census Bureau and other agencies do not
necessarily coincide with the geographical jurisdictions of the
SDAs. Information on participant characteristics, if properly col
lected and reported, is more accurate, but these factors generally
have less influence on the adjustment model. Training duration
figures are extremely deficient both because of poor collection
procedures and because duration is defined as weeks rather than
hours of training.
Apart from these general deficiencies, other difficulties afflict
specific standards. Because the youth positive termination rate and
the cost per positive termination are poorly defined, the adjustments
have little meaning. In the case of the job placement standard for
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welfare recipients, the Labor Department's technical consultants
have concluded that the adjustment model does not satisfactorily
explain the range of performance among SDAs.4
The Labor Department's inconsistent application of the adjust
ments over the 1984-87 period also raises doubts about the validity
of the models. For example, four local economic and demographic
factors strongly influence the adult job placement standard, but
only the local unemployment rate is used to modify the youth
placement benchmark. Educational attainment is not considered in
the adult cost standard adjustment, although it is more costly to
train educationally deficient participants. The weights for many of
the factors have changed greatly from year to year, and occasionally
the department changes the directional value of a given factor —
that is, factors which would make the standard harder to meet one
year have been changed to make the target easier to attain in the
next. Some of the Labor Department's modifications represent
reasonable adaptations to changing conditions or corrections of
past misjudgments, but the changes have been too extensive to
inspire confidence in the overall method. For example, the propor
tion of enrolled unemployment insurance recipients was considered
one of the most important factors in adjusting the job placement
standard in 1984, but by 1986 its influence in the model was almost
negligible. The same is true for the proportion of enrolled older
workers, a factor not even included in the 1987 model.
State Direction
Although the federal role in performance standards is supposed
to be preeminent, governors have the authority to mandate addi
tional performance criteria, modify the federal standards, award
monetary incentives to SDAs which exceed performance standards,
and sanction SDAs which perform poorly. Federal nonintervention
further augments state flexibility in implementing performance
standards.
To date, however, the states have wielded little of this authority,
even to address widely acknowledged program deficiencies. JTPA
requires SDAs to serve those "most in need," and to allocate
"equitable services" to welfare recipients and school dropouts.
However, both the Labor Department and the states have generally
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failed to enforce these requirements, in spite of numerous reports
that SDAs ignored these provisions. The states also accord a low
priority to promoting effective youth competency standards. 5 With
regard to postprogram measures, the majority of states collected
posttraining data before the Labor Department issued regulations
on the subject in 1986, but virtually all failed to implement
standards measuring job retention.6
Providing financial awards to SDAs which exceed performance
standards and sanctioning SDAs which perform poorly was sup
posed to provide governors an important means of exercising
influence over local operations, but the SDAs deny that the
incentive grants exert much influence on local policy.7 Six percent of
a state's Title IIA funds, a little over $100 million nationally, is
annually allocated to governors for incentive awards and for
technical assistance. However, during JTPA's first three years, the
states spent only a third of the available 6 percent set-aside funds.
Of the funds spent, the states devoted about half to incentive
awards rewarding exemplary performance. The law also requires
governors to provide incentives for SDAs which target "hard-toserve" individuals, but the states allocate only about a tenth of their
6 percent funds toward this goal. The remaining 40 percent of the
set-aside is used for technical assistance.8
If an SDA fails to meet performance standards for two consec
utive years, the governor must intervene and choose a new admin
istrative entity, restructure the PIC, select different service provid
ers, or take other action necessary to improve performance.
Technical assistance must be offered before the governor steps in.
While precise information is not available, the National Governors'
Association has no record of a single case where a state sanctioned
an SDA for failure to meet performance standards.
Governors may modify the national performance standards by
using either the Labor Department's adjustment methodology or
their own model. However, even states which use the federal
methodology can make additional adjustments for local conditions,
and nearly half the states do so but to a very limited degree. States
granted adjustment requests to less than 100 SDAs, most com
monly for the adult wage or youth job placement standards in cases
where the SDA's unemployment rate or client characteristics devi-
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ated substantially from the national averages.9 Recognizing the
imprecision of the model, the Labor Department also allows
governors to adjust performance standards within a predetermined
"tolerance range," but few states do so. Tolerance range adjust
ments for 1986 were as follows:
Adults

Youthi

Range ( + /-)
3.7 percent

Entered employment rate (total)
Entered employment rate
(welfare recipients)
Hourly wage
Cost per placement

3.8 percent
$0.13
$450
5.2 percent
5.0 percent
$400

Entered employment rate
Positive termination rate
Cost per positive termination

Standards and Reality
SDAs reported that they met all four performance standards for
adults but did not do as well for youths. In 1985, seven of every ten
adults found jobs paying an average hourly wage rate of nearly $5
at a cost of about $3000 per placement. Job placements exceeded
the standards at a lower cost than allowed by the standards, and the
average hourly wage rate was exactly on the mark (table 4.3).
However, the national positive termination rate for youth was well
short of the designated target until 1985.
Table 4.3
SDAs were generally able to exceed the performance standards.
Standards Results
(Oct.l983-Junel984)

Standards
(1984-5)

Results
(1984)

Results
(1985)

Adult
69%
67%
55%
58% 66%
Entered employment rate (total)
Entered employment rate
57%
57%
39%
41% 55%
(welfare recipients)
$4.91
$4.85
$4.91
$4.90 $4.82
Hourly wage
$5,704 $3,395 $2,941
$5,900 $3,308
Cost per placement
Youth
50%
41%
52%
41% 54%
Entered employment rate
74%
78%
82%
73%
82%
rate
termination
Positive
$4,900 $2,561 $2,317
$4,900 $2,817
Cost per positive termination
Administration
Training
and
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment
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JTPA's claimed results significantly exceed CETA's performance
except for hourly wages. GETA placement rates ranged from 39-48
percent over 1978-82 (compared to 60 percent for all 1985 JTPA
terminees), and CETA's average cost per placement was over twice
as high as JTPA's. However, JTPA adult and youth terminees
earned about 10 percent less than CETA participants after adjust
ing for either inflation or average wage growth, even though CETA
served a slightly higher proportion of youth, as follows:
JTPA (1985)
CETA (1981)
Actual wages
Adjusted for inflation

Average hourly wages
$4.65
4.32
5.27

Adjusted for wage growth
5.18
Placement and wage rates are strongly correlated with both
demographic characteristics and the type of training received (table
4.4). Placement rate differences between men and women are
neither large nor consistent across different types of training.
However, male enrollees have significantly higher wages: in fact,
male high school dropouts earn on average more than women with
a high school diploma but no further education. However, gender
earnings differentials are not as great as for the total labor force,
probably because JTPA trainees qualify mostly for entry-level
occupations. Placement rates for whites average 10 percentage
points higher than blacks, while Hispanic performance is midway
between the two groups; differences in wage rates exhibit a similar
pattern.
Public assistance recipients, the long-term (over six months)
unemployed, and high school dropouts find job less often than the
average enrollee, although the reported placement rates for drop
outs is a surprisingly high 59 percent. Wage rates are the mirror
image of placement rates for these three groups, with dropouts
more likely to obtain a job but with the lowest average wage.
Not surprisingly, on-the-job trainees are much more likely to
obtain work with relatively higher wages than most other trainees,
since the most qualified applicants are assigned to OJT and most
continue to work for the same employer (figure 4.1). Selective

Table 4.4
JTPA Performance (1985).
Characteristics

Total
Placement Hourly
wage
rate

$4.65

Classroom
Training
Placement Hourly
wage
rate

On-the-job
Training
Placement Hourly
wage
rate

Job Search
Placement Hourly
wage
rate

75%

$4.53

Work Experience
Placement Hourly
wage
rate
42%

$4.04

Other Services
Placement Hourly
wage
rate
51%

$4.40

Total

62%

Adults
Youth

70
51

4.92
4.15

59
48

5.02
4.37

79
70

4.98
4.37

77
71

4.78
3.95

63
37

4.70
3.78

70
40

4.82
3.92

Male
Female

63
61

4.92
4.39

54
55

5.12
4.60

74
78

5.15
4.40

78
71

4.75
4.26

38
45

4.20
3.93

54
50

4.56
4.22

White
Black
Hispanic

66
55
61

4.73
4.43
4.63

59
49
51

4.84
4.63
4.92

79
70
75

4.91
4.50
4.61

77
71
77

4.68
4.33
4.43

47
38
30

4.08
3.89
4.09

57
42
49

4.47
4.24
4.41

Public assistance
recipient

57

4.48

49

4.64

74

4.53

68

4.38

37

3.93

50

4.39

59

4.37

45

4.49

76

4.50

71

4.18

51

4.30

55

4.19

54

4.56

48

4.70

72

4.66

70

4.54

36

3.98

41

4.33

Dropout
Unemployed six
months prior to
application

54%

$4.80

76%

$4.81

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Note: National totals differ slightly from those presented in table 4.3 because data in this table are based on a sample of enrollees.
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enrollment practices also probably contribute to job search terminees' high placement rates. Classroom trainees (some of whom
receive only remedial education) have relatively low placement rates
but they receive the same hourly wage rates as OJT participants and
25 cents per hour above job search graduates. Those assigned to
either work experience programs or miscellaneous "other services"
have both low placement and wage rates, largely because many of
these enrollees are high school students.
Figure 4.1
Placement rates and earnings differ markedly by type of training.
Placement
rate

$4.81

Hourly
Wage

$4.80

l—$4.80
75%

— $4.60

$4.53
54%
42%

—$4.40

20% —

—$4.20

$4.04
1—$4.00

OJT

Classroom
training

Job search

Work experience

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Not all observers believe that JTPA's results demonstrate unqual
ified success. There are good reasons to believe that the program's
reported performance is exaggerated, and administrators' singleminded focus on producing good numbers has promoted creaming
and discouraged more intensive training.
Selected state postprogram surveys show that roughly a third of
the trainees employed at termination are out of work three months
later. However, in Massachusetts, with nearly full employment, 90
percent of employed terminees retained their jobs. In several states
where follow-up results are recorded for individuals not employed
at termination, between 30 and 50 percent find work within three
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months. Almost all of the employed adults work full time. Former
OJT trainees are the most likely to retain their jobs, followed by
classroom training graduates. Retention rates for other terminees
are generally significantly lower, but this is probably attributable to
the high proportion of youths in the other programs. 10
Widespread anecdotal reports indicate that many SDAs and
service providers manipulate enrollment and termination reporting
to inflate placement rates. In Illinois, one-fourth of the service
providers examined did not officially enroll individuals until train
ing was underway to avoid counting early program dropouts who
were less likely to find work. Some service providers waited until a
likely job was identified, and one agency delayed all paperwork and
only submitted the names of individuals who were almost certain to
complete the program. 11 Program termination reports are similarly
manipulated to enhance claimed results. As already indicated, many
SDAs place graduates in a three-month "holding status," reporting
the placement rate not at termination but instead within the
following three months. A Michigan SDA places graduates in
nonpaying "internships" until they obtain employment to avoid
counting them as jobless. State and SDA definitions of acceptable
job placements vary widely. Denver considers a trainee placed if the
employer confirms that the hiring decision has been made, while in
another SDA the individual must remain employed for over five
months to count as an acceptable placement. 12
Instances of outright fraud are not unknown. A Washington,
D.C. contractor receiving half a million dollars reported that almost
all graduates found jobs, while in reality almost none had. 13 While
such incidents are probably rare, the SDAs' inattention to moni
toring clearly leaves JTPA vulnerable to flagrant abuses. A 1982
U.S. General Accounting Office examination of 35 randomly selected
proprietary schools found that half the schools inflated their job
placement rates beyond what their own records indicated. In addition,
employers contacted had not hired individuals the schools claimed to
have placed with them in one of five cases. 14 Absent careful monitor
ing, there is good reason to believe that reporting is even more
suspect under JTPA, as reimbursement is often contingent upon
placement success. Follow-up surveys in two states indicate that
claimed placement rates may be exaggerated by 5-10 percent. 15
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Pressure to meet the original performance standards and main
tain high performance led to widespread creaming. Many local
administrators who acknowledge creaming argue that federal policy
leaves them little alternative. This "devil made me do it" alibi is
somewhat disingenuous because rather than protesting against
performance standards, most SDAs trumpet their figures as proof
of local program success. Nevertheless, both the law and federal
policy supply a strong impetus toward creaming. Without allow
ances, it is impossible to train the individuals lacking independent
means of support who probably need help the most. Federal adult
cost standards, reduced by a third since JTPA's inception after
adjusting for inflation, hinder SDAs from providing the deficiently
educated the basic competency and training they need to secure
better jobs. However, the average adult cost per placement for 1985
was $1600 below the median adjusted standard, demonstrating the
SDAs' eagerness to provide even less intensive assistance than the
performance standards allowed. Enforcement of the law's mandate
to serve those "most in need" could provide some counterweight
against creaming, but would entail increased costs per placement.
In enacting JTPA, Congress recognized that a performance
standards system had potential drawbacks. The law directs the
National Commission for Employment Policy, a JTPA-funded
federal advisory group on employment issues, to evaluate the
impact of the Labor Department's standards. The commission
funded a descriptive study of state performance standard policy, but
it has only recently begun to take the necessary steps to determine
the impact of the standards on participants, services and costs as
required by law.
Finally, the evolution of training under JTPA raises serious
questions about program quality. The proportion of on-the-job and
job search training increased from about a fifth to nearly half of all
training from CETA to JTPA. Cost limitations, superficial perfor
mance standards and business influence had more to do with this
shift than the track records of OJT and job search in improving
future employability. JTPA's emphasis on job search assistance is in
some ways beneficial because few individuals are knowledgeable job
hunters. However, the SDAs' failure to combine job search with
more intensive training is troubling. Virtually every study of job

Does Training Work?

103

search assistance has concluded that while the training has clear
short-term benefits, the impact dissipates within one to two years.
On the other hand, the congressional decision to limit work
experience programs was probably justified except for welfare
recipients, because careful research has indicated that this is the
only group that benefits from work experience. 16
In contrast to other forms of assistance, quality classroom
training has a proven track record for cost-effectively improving
enrollees' long-term job prospects. Comparisons for JTPA are not
available, but during CETA, classroom trainees had proportion
ately higher long-term earnings gains than participants in other
forms of training. 17 Classroom training remains the most popular
service offered by SDAs, but the proportion of participants trained
in the classroom has declined from ahnost half under CETA to a
third under JTPA. Moreover, average classroom training duration
has dropped by a month since CETA, although the Labor Depart
ment recognizes that longer and more comprehensive training is
crucial in improving enrollees' employability. 18 A study of CETA
found that graduates' subsequent earnings increased more than
proportionately with lengthier training. 19 Research on the Job
Corps program for poor youths yields identical findings.
Does Training Work?
Most CETA and JTPA research indicates that the programs
improve the skills, earnings, and employment rates of participants.
Studies of CETA found that enrollees' higher earnings were prima
rily due to increased working time rather than higher hourly wages.
Also, the positive impact was apparently not directly tied to
occupationally-specific training because, with the exception of those
trained for clerical jobs, within two years most CETA terminees no
longer worked in their field of training.20
There is less agreement regarding the relative merits of classroom
and on-the-job training in enhancing employability. Most CETA
evaluations were based on comparing the experiences of CETA
participants with a very different "comparison" group derived from
a sample of the Current Population Survey.21 In attempting to
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equitably compare the experiences of two such different groups,
researchers made statistical adjustments to control for divergent
earnings histories and demographic characteristics. The inherent
weakness of this method is demonstrated by the fact that, although
each study used essentially the same data, researchers often arrived
at startlingly different conclusions.22
The Labor Department's follow-up of enrollees in 20 SDAs to
evaluate JTPA will not be available before 1990. Few states or
SDAs have critically assessed their operations. An Indiana study
which is better than most found that former enrollees made
considerable gains in the two years following program participa
tion. Although the comparison group was clearly more advantaged
than the JTPA participants, the earnings of white female and black
male former enrollees actually surpassed those of the comparison
group.23 Vermont found that employed adult terminees boosted
their hourly wages by an average of 14 percent over their previous
jobs. Most enrollees with job experience viewed their new job as a
step up from prior positions.24
In sum, while JTPA probably improves participants' employability, its achievements fall far short of the Labor Department's claims
made on its behalf. Although the introduction of performance
standards — if appropriately implemented — should have im
proved the quality of training, JTPA's single-minded focus on
attaining dubious numerical targets may have done more harm than
good. As a Lima, Ohio administrator explained, "We must show
paper success whether clients are served or not."25 In its review of
CETA shortly before JTPA's enactment, the U.S. General Ac
counting Office concluded that "relying solely on placement rates to
monitor program performance is inadvisable."26 Disregarding this
advice, the Reagan administration heavily emphasized placementbased performance indicators and neglected other means of moni
toring JTPA. Responsibility was delegated to the states, few of
whom provided constructive leadership.

Aiding
Dislocated Workers

The dynamics of economic change have invariably led to the
obsolescence of occupational skills and the displacement of work
ers. The anxieties of displaced workers that new jobs will not
become available have been exaggerated, as economic growth has
usually been accompanied by rising productivity, generating new
jobs and better working conditions. The economic and psycholog
ical adjustments faced by displaced workers are nonetheless formi
dable.
In the early 1980s, several factors combined to produce grave
economic dislocation in the United States, as an ever increasing
number of industrial as well as newly developing nations became
fully competitive with American industry in world markets. Ac
cording to one estimate, trade difficulties resulted in a net loss of
about two million jobs between 1979 and 1984. 1
The transition of employment from the goods-producing to the
services sector in recent decades was compounded by the onset of
the worst recession since the Great Depression. Ironically, even the
prolonged economic recovery following the 1981-2 recession did not
end the dislocation problem because other nations pursued vigor
ous export policies, taking advantage of the overvalued dollar and
the reinvigorated purchasing power of Americans. The U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics estimated that more workers were displaced in
1985 than in any previous year in the 1980s.
To aid dislocated workers, Congress added a new component to
federal job training legislation. However, when Congress enacted
JTPA's Title III dislocated worker program, it possessed little
reliable information about the magnitude and nature of the dislo105
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cated worker problem. The Congressional Budget Office estimated
shortly before JTPA's passage in 1982 that the number of dislocated
workers ranged between 100,000 and 2.1 million, depending on the
definition of the term.2 Dislocation had not been considered a
serious problem since the early 1960s, and it literally took an act of
Congress to compel the Reagan administration to survey the extent
of worker dislocation. However, the survey's preliminary results
were only available two years after JTPA's enactment.
Assessing the scope of dislocation is compounded by the difficulty
of defining who is a dislocated worker and determining the labor
market impacts of dislocation. To estimate the number of displaced
workers, the Bureau of Labor Statistics decided to include workers
who had held their previous job for three years or more and were
laid off due to the shutdown or relocation of a plant or company,
slack work, or the abolition of their position. The BLS definition is
narrower than that favored by some observers who argue for the
inclusion of previously self-employed job losers and against the
exclusion of those with less than three years tenure. On the other
hand, the BLS definition is more expansive than alternatives which
count only job losers from declining industries. Definitional dis
agreements reflect differing viewpoints about the reemployment
difficulties experienced by job losers. Some analysts believe that
dislocated workers with lengthier job tenure face greater readjust
ment problems, particularly if they are displaced from declining
industries, than other job losers. However, the evidence on whether
dislocated workers face longer unemployment spells or greater
subsequent wage losses than other job losers is not conclusive.
Dislocated workers constitute about 10-20 percent of the unem
ployed. The latest Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that 10.8
million workers aged 20 years and over were dislocated between
1981 and 1985, including 5.1 million with at least three years tenure.
Sixty-seven percent of the latter were employed in January 1986, 18
percent were unemployed, and 15 percent had dropped out of the
labor force. Forty-four percent of the workers who regained
full-time employment earned less than in their previous job. Minor
ity, unskilled, deficiently educated, and older workers suffered
disproportionately severe reemployment problems.3 An analysis of
a 1984 BLS survey found that nearly half of the reemployed
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dislocated workers had changed occupations. Operators, fabrica
tors, and laborers moving into service occupations accounted for
most of the shift.4 Most jobs in these broad occupational categories
require few skills.

Programs Antedating JTPA
Concerned about the impact of automation on unemployment,
Congress enacted in 1962 the Manpower Development and Train
ing Act (MDTA), the first targeted federal assistance program for
dislocated workers. However, when unemployment declined shortly
after MDTA's passage, Congress redirected the program toward
serving the low-income unemployed.
Also in 1962, Congress enacted what would later become a major
and sustained federal effort to aid dislocated workers. The Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program differs from MDTA,
CETA and JTPA in that it specifically benefits workers displaced by
foreign trade, provides primarily income support rather than
retraining, and also assists the affected firms. At its height in 1980,
TAA provided more than $1.6 billion to over 500,000 displaced
workers. However, the program's high costs and the fact that most
beneficiaries were concentrated in a few high-wage industries made
TAA an easy mark for budget cutters after 1981. The Reagan
administration favored the termination of the trade program, but
Congress extended TAA until 1991. In 1987 the program provided
income support or job-related assistance to some 60,000 dislocated
workers at an estimated cost of $206 million.
To qualify for TAA assistance, the Labor Department must
certify that workers lost their jobs as a result of import competition,
a judgment that is necessarily not only subjective but also often
highly politicized. Job losers employed by a certified firm for at least
six months and who participate in a job search program are eligible
for a year of benefits. Those enrolled in approved job training
programs may receive payments for an additional six months. In
fiscal 1987 an estimated 55,000 workers received $176 million in
income support, averaging $3200 per person. In addition, qualified
individuals are also eligible for state-approved training, job search
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allowances, and relocation assistance. However, job-related assis
tance is limited by the available funds. Congress budgeted only
$29.9 million for these programs for fiscal 1987, and due to
inadequate federal reporting requirements, it is not clear whether
states in the past have even fully expended the federal appropria
tion. Consequently, very few dislocated workers have benefitted
from TAA job-related assistance. During 1986, an estimated 7700
persons were trained, 1400 received job search allowances, and 1100
were provided relocation assistance.5 In 1987 the Reagan adminis
tration proposed replacing TAA and JTPA's dislocated worker
program with a new program that would more than double total
federal aid to dislocated workers and emphasize job-related assis
tance rather than income support.
JTPA Operations
The Reagan administration's initial opposition to incorporating
a new program for dislocated workers as part of JTPA received
scant congressional consideration because of rising concerns over
dislocation in the midst of the worst slump since the Great
Depression. The JTPA legislative debate centered on the larger Title
II program, with little attention paid to the dislocated worker
program. The staff director for the Senate Employment and Pro
ductivity subcommittee characterized the law's language as "re
markably close to the first draft."6
Because so little was known about the most cost-effective means
of assisting dislocated workers, Congress placed few stipulations on
the program, delegating administrative responsibility largely to the
states. Both eligibility requirements and authorized services are
broadly defined. The most significant restriction is the law's require
ment limiting nontraining costs to 30 percent of the federal
allocation. In addition, although the law does not prohibit the use
of dislocated worker funds for public service employment, Labor
Department regulations forbid the practice.
Financing
For 1987, Congress appropriated $200 million for the dislocated
worker program (figure 5.1). The law requires that at least 75
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percent of the funds be allocated directly to the states. In the
absence of regular surveys on dislocated workers in each state, the
distribution formula is based on the state's relative proportion of
unemployed persons and the relative proportion of individuals
unemployed 15 weeks or longer, although the duration of unem
ployment may not be a reliable indicator of dislocation.
Figure 5.1
States have spent only two-thirds of available
dislocated worker funds.
Millions
$250

Appropriations
Expenditures

$200

Fiscal
Oct. 19831982
June 1984
1984
1985
1986
1987
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

The Labor Department has reserved 25 percent of the dislocated
worker appropriation — the maximum allowable under the law —
to aid areas facing high unemployment, mass layoffs, or natural
disasters. In screening state applications for the funds, the Labor
Department considers whether the needs of the area can be met with
allocated JTPA or other funds, and also the number of displaced
individuals requiring assistance.
Similar to the Title IIA distribution formula, reliance on volatile
unemployment rates produces substantial year to year fluctuations
in the distribution of dislocated worker funds among the states.
However, because the average state spent only two-thirds of its
available Title III funds through June 1986, volatile funding
allocations probably did not cause serious problems in the states
that failed to spend the available funds.
Based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of dislocated
workers, the West and Midwest are overfunded while the South gets
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less than its fair share, if the funds were distributed solely on the
basis of total dislocated workers in each region.7
Region
South
Midwest
Northeast
West

Dislocated workers
(1981-5)
34.1%
29.9
18.7
17.3

Title HI funds
(1982-6)
27.7%
32.7
19.1
20.5

Ironically, although the South gets less than its fair share of
dislocated worker appropriations, the region spends relatively little
of its formula funds. The Midwest, which is overfunded, spends the
highest share of its formula appropriation, as follows:
Region

Proportion of formula funds spent (1982-6)

U.S. average

70%

Midwest
West
South
Northeast

79
70
65
62

State underspending is primarily attributable to a heavy reliance
on low-cost job search assistance and an inability to rapidly
organize projects. Eleven states exacerbated their underspending
problems by reserving up to a fourth of their federal allocation for
contingencies. Because states spent only about half of Title III
appropriations through mid-1985, the Reagan administration suc
cessfully convinced Congress to reduce 1986 funding by over half,
to less than $100 million. The administration argued that unexpend
ed funds carried over from the previous year would allow the states
to maintain an even level of funding for dislocated workers. While
this was true for the entire country, almost half the states could not
maintain equivalent expenditure levels in 1986 because they had
spent a relatively high proportion of their previous allocations.8
Therefore, the budget reduction effectively penalized states which
had diligently utilized Title III funds. Congress restored 1987
dislocated worker funding to $200 million.
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The Labor Department contends that underspending could be
ameliorated by eliminating the allocation formula and providing
the department with discretionary authority to distribute all Title
III funds.9 However, state officials note that it is impossible to
obtain a discretionary grant in less than four months, although one
purpose of the fund is to rapidly respond to emergencies. 10 During
1985, the department issued only three grants within the first threeand-a-half months of the program year, two-thirds of the funds
were awarded during the last half of the year, and about two-fifths
were not issued until the final month. In 1986, according to
departmental press releases, a tenth of the discretionary funds were
not released until the final week of the program year.
To augment assistance to dislocated workers, the law requires
states to match federal funds allocated by formula on a dollar-fordollar basis. The matching requirement is reduced by 10 percentage
points for each 1 percent that the state's unemployment rate exceeds
the national average. For example, if the national jobless rate is 7
percent and a state's is 8 percent, the state need only match 90
percent of the federal allocation. A state with a 17 percent
unemployment rate would not have to provide any matching funds.
The matching requirement has had a negligible impact on
boosting funds for dislocated workers. In 1985, nine states provided
only $15 million in matching funds against the $167 million federal
formula allocation. 11 The law and regulations are loosely drawn
and permit counting in-kind contributions and half of unemploy
ment insurance payments to enrollees in lieu of direct cash contri
butions. Labor Department regulations which explicitly delegate to
governors the responsibility for determining what constitutes an
allowable match make the law's requirement even less meaningful.
States typically pass the responsibility for generating the phantom
matching funds to administrators of local dislocated worker
projects. 12 Most local project administrators interviewed by the
U.S. General Accounting Office acknowledged that the in-kind
resources would have been generated even without the requirement.
The matching requirement has had an impact on the selection of
participants and service providers. Both states and localities target
services to unemployment insurance recipients, at the expense of
other dislocated workers not receiving financial assistance. States
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also tend to favor service providers such as community colleges
who, because of high overhead costs, can easily supply the spurious
required match. 13

Administration
Like JTPA's Title IIA, the dislocated worker program limits
administrative and support costs to 30 percent of the federal
allocation. The law specifies no further limitation, but Labor
Department regulations restrict administrative expenditures to 15
percent. These restrictions only apply to federal formula funds, not
to the discretionary allocations. In 1985, projects allocated 79
percent of total dislocated worker outlays to training, 16 percent to
administration and 5 percent to support services. Although admin
istrative costs slightly exceeded the limit, it is unlikely that states
ignored the regulations because the data include both formula and
discretionary fund expenditures. The Labor Department did not
require separate reporting for these two categories until 1986.
Although the states possess considerable authority, few display
vigorous leadership in administering dislocated worker programs.
In addition to their failure to spend the available funds, one study
noted that state administrators could not readily name all the
dislocated worker projects in their state, let alone provide basic
information on project activities. 14
In 43 states, the same agency administers both the Title II and III
programs. The states utilize one of three arrangements for distrib
uting dislocated worker funds: 26 states allocate funds for specific
projects, 14 states operate statewide programs through the employ
ment service or community college system, and the balance of the
states allocate the funds to SDAs or other political jurisdictions.
The states exercise little oversight of dislocated worker projects.
Minimal technical assistance is provided, and state JTPA officials
usually do not seek financial or in-kind contributions from compa
nies responsible for layoffs. 15 Most projects collect only federally
required information, and a survey of 20 states indicated that only
one in four collect follow-up data on participants. 16 The U.S. Office
of Technology Assessment criticized the Title III data collection
system as "a slender basis for analyzing the performance of JTPA
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programs, for determining funding needs in relation to perfor
mance, for learning from experience, and for improving future
performance." 17
Dislocated Worker Projects
During 1985, 221,000 individuals were enrolled in over 500 Title
III projects, a small fraction of the potentially eligible population. A
third of the projects are located in New York, California, and Ohio.
Each serves an average of 78 enrollees at one time, but the average
is skewed upward by about 5 percent of the projects, which serve
over 800 enrollees. About two-fifths of the projects are designed for
a particular plant, company or industry, but these projects tend to
serve other eligible individuals in the surrounding area. Most
projects are administered by public institutions, primarily JTPA
Title IIA service delivery areas, community colleges and employ
ment offices: 18
Service delivery areas
Educational institutions
Community-based organizations
Employment service
Unions and/or employers
Other state agencies
Administrator undetermined

31%
26
13
9
9
4
8

SDAs which administer both Title II and III operations usually
integrate applicant intake, participant assessments, and job place
ment efforts for both programs. However, in areas where the SDA
does not administer a Title III project — the more common
situation — there is little coordination between the two programs. 19
Statutory provisions in the trade adjustment assistance legislation
seriously impede coordination with JTPA's dislocated worker pro
gram. For example, the law prohibits the supplementation of TAA
training funds with money from other federal programs.20
Enrollees
Congress opted for a broad eligibility definition for Title III
programs, authorizing each state to "establish procedures to iden-
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tify substantial groups of eligible individuals." States may qualify
persons who:
(1) have lost their jobs or received notice, are eligible for
unemployment insurance or have exhausted their benefits,
and are unlikely to return to their previous industry or
occupation;
(2) have lost their job or received notice as a result of a
permanent plant closure;
(3) are unemployed for extended periods with limited oppor
tunity for reemployment in a similar occupation in the
local labor market; or
(4) were self-employed and are unemployed as a result of
general economic conditions in the community.
Using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics definition, but including
workers with less than three years job tenure, 3.1 million workers
were displaced during 1985, but only 221,000 were enrolled in
program year 1985, including 147,000 newly enrolled.
About two of three enrollees are 22-44-year-old white males with
high school educations who had previously worked in a manufac
turing job. Nearly half are members of low-income households
(table 5.1). The Labor Department contends that "the States are
conducting sufficient outreach to contact older and less-educated
dislocated workers." In fact, high school dropouts and older
individuals, who face disproportionate reemployment difficulties,
are underserved by dislocated worker projects. A third of unem
ployed dislocated workers, but only a fifth of enrollees, failed to
complete a high school education. A fifth of unemployed dislocated
workers, but less than a tenth of the participants, is over 54. The
U.S. General Accounting Office found that about a quarter of the
dislocated worker projects do not enroll older workers — possibly
in violation of JTPA's civil rights provisions — and one of nine
excludes individuals with less than a high school education.21 On
the other hand, the long-term unemployed are overrepresented in
dislocated worker projects. A third of the enrollees had been jobless
more than six months, although only a quarter of the unemployed
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dislocated workers had been out of work that long.
Table 5.1.
The typical Title m enrollee is a high school
educated white male (1985).

Male
Female

62%
38

White
Black
Hispanic
American Indians, Asians, etc.

70
19
8
3

16-21
22-44
45-54
55 and over

4
73
14
8

Less than high school education
High school graduate

20
80

Receiving AFDC
Receiving unemployment insurance
Low income
Previously employed in manufacturing industry

4
54
46
60

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and General Accounting Office

Participant characteristic data indicate that the deliberate selec
tion of more qualified applicants, referred to in the trade as
"creaming," is common. Case studies of 15 dislocated worker
projects, while not representative of all projects — 10 were selected
on the basis of their successful job placement performance —
provide insights on the participant selection process. Project admin
istrators used a trial job search period lasting from one to ten days
as a screening device, and at the end of the period selectively
enrolled individuals who had either job leads or offers. Question
naires and interviews were also commonly used to assess the
motivation, however defined, and employability of applicants.
Requiring applicants to attend a number of intake events before
being formally enrolled was another means to weed out the
unmotivated. The projects which emphasized high placement rates
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practiced aggressive recruitment strategies to enroll more qualified
individuals.22 The U.S. General Accounting Office found that
employers selected applicants in 10 percent of Title III projects.23
Despite the fact that JTPA serves only a small proportion of
dislocated workers, project administrators report difficulty in re
cruiting enrollees, probably because displaced workers are not
aware of the Title III program or in some cases because the projects
have poor reputations. Because most projects are ad hoc, shortterm efforts, it is impossible to establish a continuous referral
network in the community.
Training and Support Services

Labor Department planners originally assumed that enrollees
would be retrained for new careers, but local project operators
instead emphasize short-term assistance costing an average of a
little over $800 per participant. Two-thirds of enrollees receive job
search assistance, primarily brief workshops and counseling, but
less than half obtain any kind of occupational training or remedial
education (table 5.2). However, as is true for Title IIA programs,
dislocated worker projects vary markedly in the services they
provide. According to the Labor Department, the median length of
stay in Title III is 3.8 months, but General Accounting Office
reports suggest that this figure is exaggerated.24
Job search assistance predominates because of its low cost, short
duration (typically two weeks or less), administrative convenience,
and a preference on the part of many enrollees for immediate
placement rather than training. Based on a sample of 15 projects,
the cost per placement for job search programs was only a third as
much as either classroom or on-the-job training. Job search pro
grams can be taught in-house to large groups, lowering unit costs.
Specialized personnel are not required, and the need for support
services is minimal compared with more intensive forms of training.
Job search assistance can serve a variety of functions, such as
weeding out the unmotivated or separating job-ready participants
from those requiring more specialized training.
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Table 5.2.
Less than half of Title HI enrollees receive any job training (1985).
Percent of

Percent of

projects
participants
offering service* receiving service*

Total

Median

duration
(weeks)

Cost per
participant

16

$ 828

Job search
assistance

84

66

NA

NA

Training
Classroom
On-the-job
Remedial

94
88
67
32

NA
26
16
6

NA
9
15
2

NA
$2200
$1600
NA

Support services

58

23

NA

$ 196

Relocation
assistance

14

2

NA

$ 600

Sources: U.S. General Accounting Office and Department of Labor
*Due to multiple responses or participants receiving multiple services, totals are
greater than 100 percent.

Where training is offered, it is typically provided in conjunction
with job search assistance. Case studies show that a battery of basic
education, interest, and aptitude tests are used to screen classroom
training participants. The tests tend to be rigorous when the service
provider operates under a performance-based contract. According
to project administrators, the tests often serve to weed out referrals
to vocational schools. In addition to the use of tests, administrators
seldom assign participants lacking independent means of financial
support to training programs.25
Most dislocated worker projects are arranged hurriedly because
employers frequently fail to provide advance notice of layoffs. Due
to these pressures, limited funding and the fact that most projects
last no more than a year, administrators tend to rely upon existing
service providers, usually community colleges or vocational schools.
Title III projects tend to enroll participants in existing courses
rather than working with the institutions to develop courses
designed to meet the special needs of JTPA's clientele. Dislocated
worker classroom training programs only last nine weeks on
average, even briefer than corresponding Title IIA classes. A third
of them are 5 weeks or less, and only a fifth last beyond 20 weeks.
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About one of six dislocated worker enrollees receives on-the-job
training. Title III OJT programs are similar to employer-provided
training in Title II A, and are limited due to the inability of program
administrators to procure sufficient OJT slots. The following broad
occupational categories are most common in projects providing
classroom or on-the-job training:
Percent of projects offering
Occupation
Classroom training OJT
Clerical or office
60% 64%
Semiskilled equipment or machine operation
55
83
Technical paraprofessions
52
42
Skilled crafts or trades
48
60
Service
33
55
Sales
17
41

Remedial education accounts for only 6 percent of total enroll
ment, despite widespread indications that many enrollees need such
assistance. Two-thirds of the projects provide no remedial ed
ucation.26 Even where it is available, most projects do not orient
remedial education toward dropouts but instead offer two week
brush-up classes in conjunction with classroom or on-the-job
training. Because of the preponderance of high school graduates in
Title III and the availability of remediation classes in local schools,
most state officials see no need for additional remedial education
assistance from JTPA.27 Many dislocated workers shun remedial
training as a tacit acknowledgment of illiteracy. Sensitive to this
problem, some projects design refresher courses specifically for their
participants. However, this requires a level of investment and
expertise which most projects are unwilling or unable to achieve.
Support services, including transportation assistance and child
care, are also very limited. The dislocated worker program only
spends a third of the 15 percent of expenditures allowable for
support costs, and more than two-fifths of the projects do not
provide any support services. Less than a quarter of participants
receive services, at an average cost of $196 or between $10-20 per
week. Only 2 of 15 projects examined paid stipends, amounting to
$50-60 per week.28
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To sustain dislocated workers while in training, the law prohibits
states from denying unemployment insurance benefits to eligible
individuals who are enrolled in Title III. However, some states have
discouraged assistance to program participants by requiring them
to document JTPA enrollment and file individual waivers to qualify
for UI benefits. In two of five SDAs surveyed, Title III trainees were
either ineligible for UI or else state policy required case by case
reviews. ?Q
Relocation assistance is offered in isolated cases. Two percent of
participants receive such assistance at an average expenditure of
about $600. The law limits relocation assistance to individuals who
either cannot obtain employment within commuting distance or
have a job offer in another locale. For most project participants,
relocation is a last resort.30
Performance Record
The law requires the department to set standards based on
placement and retention in unsubsidized jobs, but lacking an
established performance record the Labor Department initially set
no national benchmark, and instead required governors to establish
their own job placement standards. Governors were also encour
aged to implement cost standards.
Based on reports that more than 60 percent of participants
entered employment in three-quarters of the states in 1984, the
department adopted this rate as a guideline for 1986-7. As in the
case of Title IIA, and in spite of the law's requirement that job
retention be considered, the job placement guideline does not
distinguish between part-time versus full-time or temporary versus
permanent jobs. The apparent reason for the department's reluc
tance to set a definitive standard is the difficulty of collecting
representative data on dislocated worker programs. The ad hoc,
short-term nature of most dislocated worker projects has hindered
the collection of random sample data, without which the standards
cannot be fairly adapted to projects facing diverse circumstances
and enrollees. Performance standards have apparently had less
influence on dislocated worker projects than on Title IIA programs.
Half the states do not use performance-based contracts, and only
three states rely exclusively on such contracts.31
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About 69 percent of program terminees found jobs, with hourly
wages averaging over $6 at an average cost of $2000 per placement.
Job placement performance is similar to the average for adults in
Title IIA programs, and the average hourly wage — though below
enrollees' previous earnings — is more than a dollar higher. Three
of every four who were reemployed found work in four broad
occupational categories: 32
semiskilled equipment or machine operation
skilled crafts or trades
clerical or office work
service positions

34%
15
13
12

Projects operated by unions and/or employers report the highest
wage rates, but the reported placement rates of different program
operators varied little. 33
Operator

Hourly wage

Unions and/or employers
Service delivery areas
Educational institutions
Other public institutions

$7.62
6.70
5.88
5.93

The claimed job placement rates for the long-term unemployed,
blacks, welfare recipients, dropouts, white males, and unemploy
ment insurance recipients are within a narrow range of 61 to 71
percent. These reported results are baffling, since a much higher
differential in placements would normally be expected, but the
projects seem to claim success for all comers. Women earn the
lowest hourly wages ($5.25), while individuals with more than a
high school education earn the most ($7.07).
Performance outcomes differ for various types of training. OJT
enrollees achieved the highest placement rates but earned relatively
low hourly wages. Classroom and job search training graduates had
similar placement and hourly wage rates.
OJT
Placement rate
Hourly wage

83%
$6.12

Classroom
training
62%
$6.56

Job search
assistance
66%
$6.40
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The reported performance results are subject to serious flaws. In
addition to the defects already noted, job placement data do not
distinguish between new jobs and recalls of dislocated workers by
their former employer. For example, Michigan "achieved" a re
markable 93 percent placement rate with an hourly wage rate
averaging $9.47 simply because General Motors recalled about
2000 auto employees who had enrolled in dislocated worker
projects. 34

Trade Politics and Pending Legislation
Alarmed by rising trade deficits exceeding $100 billion annually
for three consecutive years, Congress has pushed the trade issue to
the forefront of the national agenda. In 1987, to stem protectionist
pressures, President Reagan took the unusual step of proposing to
consolidate JTPA's Title III and Trade Adjustment Assistance into
a new dislocated worker program financed at $980 million for 1988,
more than double the $406 million funding received by these
programs the previous year.
In an implicit criticism of state management of Title III, the
legislative proposals — including the administration's — envisioned
expanding both federal and local involvement in the prospective
dislocated worker programs. Most policymakers also acknowl
edged the need to more rapidly respond to mass layoffs and plant
closings by obtaining early notice of layoffs from firms and
establishing teams to provide technical assistance for rapid imple
mentation of local projects.
Nearly half of the displaced workers surveyed by the U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics received no advance notice of their layoff.35
Administrators require at least several months to prepare an
effective dislocated worker program. Congress should require large
firms to provide at least three months notice of mass layoffs. The
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment found little evidence substan
tiating business claims that an advance notice requirement would
cause serious problems.36 Even a Reagan administration task force
concluded that "advance notification is an essential component of a
successful adjustment program."37
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The Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service is a model program
which relies on itinerant teams of experts to help rapidly organize
local dislocated worker projects. Ensuring the involvement and
cooperation of both management and labor as well as community
agencies is a key element in the program, a strategy of proven worth
in U.S. projects as well.38 The U.S. Department of Labor is now
undertaking a pilot project testing the Canadian approach, and
Title III reform proposals incorporate this model.
Additional funding should improve the cost-effectiveness of Title
III, as most projects have less than 100 enrollees at a time, far too
few to operate efficient programs. The added funds could also
enhance the impact of the program by making it possible for
administrators to target assistance to the most disadvantaged
displaced workers; substantially increase training, basic education,
and support services; and improve data collection.

6
The Job Corps
Investing Pays Off

A product of the Great Society's antipoverty efforts, the Job
Corps is the nation's oldest continuous federal youth training
program. Its high costs have prompted continuing scrutiny, but by
the early 1980s the program's accomplishments were acknowledged
across the political spectrum. The Job Corps' statutory goal is "to
assist young individuals who need and can benefit from an unusu
ally intensive program, operated in a group setting, to become more
responsible, employable, and productive citizens."
The program operates residential centers in the belief that
removing poor youth from their debilitating environment is a
necessary precondition to improving employability. The model
reflects the view that poor individuals are trapped in an intergenerational "culture of poverty" which can be best combated through
intensive services to youth. Having profited from experience, the
Job Corps' effectiveness has improved since the program was
established in 1964, but its basic structure has changed little under
JTPA. It remains a federally-administered program. Throughout its
history, the corps has provided extremely disadvantaged youths
with basic education and vocational training, followed by job
placement assistance after leaving a center.
Several states operate year-round youth corps programs which
are similar to the Job Corps, spending approximately $100 million
annually to assist some 15,000 enrollees. The $44 million California
Conservation Corps, which operates both residential and nonresidential camps, is the largest state effort. State and local youth corps
pursue a broad variety of educational and vocational goals. Al123
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though many state and local programs do not restrict eligibility to
poor youth, enrollees are primarily disadvantaged. 1
Administration and Financing
As of mid-1987, the Job Corps funded 105 centers. Businesses
and nonprofit organizations administered 75 centers under con
tract, while the federal Departments of Agriculture and the Interior
operated 30 civilian conservation centers (CCCs), modeled upon the
New Deal's Civilian Conservation Corps. CCCs emphasize con
struction and natural resource projects and are located on public
lands, primarily in national parks and forests. Contract centers
operate in both urban and rural locales.
Nearly three-quarters of Job Corps centers and training slots are
located in the South and West (table 6.1).2 Because many eligible
youth do not live in close proximity to Job Corps centers, only a
little over half of enrollees are assigned to centers in their home
states.3 The law limits nonresidential trainees to no more than a
tenth of participants, and approximately this proportion of nonres
idents are enrolled each year. Currently no center is strictly
nonresidential.
Table 6.1
Relatively few Job Corps centers are located in
the Northeast and Midwest (1987).
Number
Civilian
Contract conservation
centers
centers

South
West
Midwest
Northeast

35
16
11
13

12
11
5
2

Distribution
All
centers

45%
26
15
14

Training
slots

49%
24
14
13

Low income
16-21-yearolds (1980)

37%
21
23
20

Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and Abt Associates, Inc.

The training capacity of the centers varies widely, from 100 to
2600 slots. Centers which can train over 500 corpsmembers at a time
constitute a fifth of all centers but serve almost half of total enrollees
(figure 6.1). All of the 30 civilian conservation centers and a quarter
of the contract centers have a capacity of less than 250 slots,
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reducing their ability to operate administratively efficient training
programs. The six largest private contractors operate 48 centers and
train three-fifths of enrollees.
Distribution
Centers
Civilian
conservation centers
Six largest
private operators
Other private
operators

Average center
capacity

Training slots

29%

16%

213

46

58

490

26

27

407

The major source of program instability has been widely fluctu
ating funding support and attempts by Presidents Nixon and
Reagan to abolish the corps, resulting in capacity enrollment
ranging from 25,000 to 40,000. In inflation-adjusted 1986 dollars,
Job Corps funding reached over $1 billion in 1966, but dropped to
$300 million in the mid-1970s (figure 6.2). Financing rose initially
following President Carter's inauguration but declined again, sub
sequently increasing when the administration made reducing youth
unemployment a major domestic priority. Since 1981, constant
Figure 6.1
Twenty-one centers train nearly half of all corpsmembers.
5 (_j

Over 1000

|

21%

|

500-1000

|

23%

|

400-499

16|
12J
1 9 |

53 [

300-399

I

12%
16%
|2

Under 300

Number of centers

Center Capacity

Proportion of slots

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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dollar funding for the Job Corps has ranged from $600 to $680
million. Center enrollment capacity has closely followed the avail
able funding.
Figure 6.2
Job Corps appropriations have fluctuated
since the program began.
Millions
$1,200 i

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

On its 20th anniversary in 1984, President Reagan gave the
program a glowing endorsement, stating, "Your vital program has
provided hundreds of thousands of deprived youths with basic
educational and vocational training to prepare them for their future
in the workplace. This is in keeping with the American spirit of
helping others reach their full potential, a spirit that has sustained
our Nation from its very founding."4 However, several months later
the Reagan administration executed an about-face and proposed in
early 1985 to eliminate the program. Congress remained steadfast in
its support of the Job Corps and rejected the Office of Management
and Budget's repeated attempts to reduce Job Corps funding. For
1987, Congress raised the funding by 7 percent to $656 million and,
acknowledging defeat, the administration proposed a nearly iden
tical $652 million budget for the following year. The House of
Representatives voted to boost 1988 Job Corps funding to $783
million.
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The administration's efforts to eliminate or scale back the Job
Corps, while unsuccessful, nevertheless diminished the program's
cost-effectiveness. The program's utilization rate, a measurement
of average center enrollment compared to capacity, declined
from over 99 percent in 1983 and the first half of 1984 to about 95
percent in 1984-5, increasing costs by about $600 per corpsmember
service year. Job Corps director Peter Rell testified before a
congressional committee that the efforts to end the program were
"the major reason" behind recruitment difficulties, because young
people were wary of enrolling in a program which might imminently
close.5
Labor Department staff reductions further impaired federal
administration. From 1980 to 1987 federal Job Corps personnel
diminished by over a third, from 294 to 190. Three business Job
Corps operators protested the effects of the personnel cuts on the
program's effectiveness, and one, RCA, criticized the "drastic
decrease in the level and quality of technical assistance." The
business representatives also noted that the Labor Department's
annual program reviews, designed to improve center operations,
have become more cursory.6 These criticisms were substantiated in
a leaked internal Labor Department memorandum on the Job
Corps which concluded, "It seems clear from all indications that we
are not doing a fully adequate job of monitoring." The memo also
acknowledged that the Department "practically eliminated" train
ing and technical assistance contracts which had supplemented
departmental staff assistance to centers.7
Job Corps costs are far higher than those of other JTPA
programs, primarily because of the expenses associated with oper
ating residential facilities (figure 6.3 and table 6.2). The cost per
training year (the cost of serving a corpsmember for a year) declined
steadily between the start of the program and the late 1970s, as two
administrations deferred needed capital improvements and permit
ted health care and allowance expenses to fall behind the cost-ofliving. Rectification of these problems and the expansion of the
program raised corps costs slightly until the early 1980s.8 From
1982 to 1985 inflation-adjusted costs per training year declined by 2
percent.

128

CHAPTER 6

Figure 6.3
The Job Corps' high costs are primarily due to
residential expenses (1985).
Recruitment and placement

Education and training
Residential living and
support services

Administration

Construction and rehabilitation
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Despite cost reductions over the past two decades, continued high
costs — $15,800 per training year in 1985 — have prompted efforts
to improve cost efficiency and repeated attempts to close or
contract-out the civilian conservation centers, which are more
costly. Excluding expenses over which centers have little control
(e.g., allowances, construction, recruitment and placement), costs
per training year in 1984 ranged from $8300 to $20,000 across
centers. The differences were primarily attributable to salaries and
economies of scale.9
Center capacity

Under 300
300-700
Over 700

Cost per training year
$10,751

10,185
9,394

Even after controlling for size, CCC costs per training year were
40 percent more than at contract centers because of higher voca
tional training and residential living costs. Higher staff costs
account for more than half the differential. The costs of union
instructors constitute 65 percent of the difference in training
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Table 6.2.
Job Corps Costs (1985)
Cost

Distribution

Cost per
training year

(millions)

Total*

$602.1

100.0%

National administration

$ 3.5

0.6%

$15,731
$

92

32.0

5.3

835

278.9
79.2
72.8
33.1
28.9
22.0
16.6
13.7
5.0
7.5

46.3
13.2
12.1
5.5
4.8
3.7
2.8
2.3
0.8
1.2

7,286
2,070
1,902
866
756
575
434
357
132
195

Education
Salaries
Miscellaneous

29.1
25.4
3.7

4.8
4.2
0.6

760
663
96

Vocational training
Salaries
Work experience projects
Miscellaneous

73.8
53.2
11.4
9.1

12.2
8.8
1.9
1.5

1,928
1,391
298
238

7.2

1.2

189

148.4
81.0
12.3
55.1

24.6
13.4
2.0
9.1

3,877
2,117
321
1,439

29.3

4.9

765

Recruitment and placement
Residential living and support
Salaries
Enrollee allowances
Food
Energy, utilities, and telephones
Medical and dental
Leases and maintenance
Clothing
Recreation
Miscellaneous

Equipment (including educational
and vocational)
Center administration
Salaries
Contractor profit
Miscellaneous
Construction, rehabilitation,
and acquisition

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Due to different reporting sources, these totals differ slightly from data cited
earlier.
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expenditures, and higher residential costs are explained by civil
service salaries and costlier food expenditures (56 and 32 percent of
the difference, respectively).
CCC enrollees experienced better labor market success than
contract center corpsmembers in 1984:
Placement rate

Civilian conservation centers
Contract centers

84%
71

Hourly wage rate

$4.47
3.91

However, a comparison of relative training expenses (excluding
equipment) in 1982 indicates that the superior performance of
CCCs may not be commensurate with the costs. 10 Moreover, CCC
enrollees are probably slightly more advantaged.

Job Corps Enrollees
Recruitment and Screening
Unlike other JTPA components, the Job Corps has sought
consistently to limit enrollment to poor youths who face impedi
ments to employment. The Job Corps' high costs, the nature of the
target population, and the difficulties inherent in a residential
program necessitate a careful selection process. The law requires
that applicants must be
• 14 to 21 years old (although in practice only 16-21-year-olds
are accepted);
• economically disadvantaged and in need of education,
training or counseling to secure meaningful employment,
meet Armed Forces requirements, or succeed in school or
other training programs;
• living in an environment that would "substantially impair
prospects for successful participation in other programs
providing needed training, education, or assistance;" and
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• "be free of medical and behavioral problems so serious that
the individual could not adjust to the standards of conduct,
discipline, work, and training which the Job Corps
involves."
Several of the standards involve highly subjective judgments, re
quiring staff to single-out individuals who have employment hand
icaps severe enough to necessitate exceptional assistance but not so
debilitating as to preclude success. The screening process is of
crucial importance in minimizing the number of enrollees who drop
out of the corps. Early leavers receive little benefit and drive up
already high residential costs.
Until the early 1980s, most recruitment and screening was
performed by public employment offices, but the Labor Depart
ment subsequently instituted a more competitive system. All con
tracts are awarded through competitive bids and provide a fixed
price (typically $160 to $240) for each recruit. Currently state and
local government agencies, private profit and nonprofit groups, and
Job Corps centers augment the recruitment efforts of public em
ployment offices.
Although the corps often pays recruiters a premium for enlisting
women, it continues to experience difficulties attracting women to
the program. Parental reluctance to allow their teenage daughters to
enroll in a residential program, as well as the fact that prospective
female corpsmembers are more likely to be single parents, probably
contribute to problems in recruiting women. Congress, in 1982,
ordered the department to "immediately take steps to achieve" 50
percent female enrollment, but the proportion of women instead fell
from 38 to 32 percent during the succeeding four years.
A persistent criticism of recruiters centers on their lack of effort
to determine if applicants could be better served by alternative
programs. Congress intended the Job Corps to be a last resort for
youth whose living environment impairs their employment and
education prospects. In 1979, the U.S. General Accounting Office
concluded that the program's screening was so lax that "nearly any
disadvantaged youth can qualify." GAO noted that an inadequate
eligibility determination procedure had characterized the corps
since its inception. 11 More recent investigations indicate that the
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problems GAO enumerated continue. 12 However, while it is clear
that Job Corps screening has not satisfied the letter of the law, the
characteristics of corpsmembers indicate that recruiters generally
enforce the law's intent.

Characteristics
The Job Corps' clientele has remained remarkably similar over
the years. The average corpsmember reads at the 6th grade level.
Almost three of four have never held a full-time job. Four of five are
high school dropouts, and nearly half of their families receive
welfare (table 6.3).
Female enrollees generally have completed more schooling than
males. One of four female enrollees has completed the 12th grade,
compared to about one of fifteen men. One of six female and one of
twenty male enrollees are nonresidents. Nonresidential corpsmem
bers have completed slightly more years of schooling than residen
tial enrollees, but their entry reading levels are nearly identical.
Eighteen percent of nonresident enrollees are Hispanic, compared
to 8 percent of residents.
The clientele of civilian conservation centers differs markedly
from that of contract centers, and is probably less disadvantaged.
Half of CCC enrollees are white, compared to only a quarter of
contract center enrollees. Only one in ten CCC participants is
female. Although CCC corpsmembers are slightly younger and
have consequently completed less schooling, their entry reading
levels are on average a grade higher than contract center
participants. 13
Given the subjectivity of the Job Corps' eligibility requirements,
it is possible only to estimate the number of potentially eligible
individuals. About one million of the approximately four million
disadvantaged 16-21-year-olds are high school dropouts. An addi
tional but unknown proportion are deficiently educated graduates.
Like other job training programs, the 100,000 annual enrollees
represent a fraction of those potentially eligible. However, due to
the program's residential nature only a minority of the eligible
youth wish to enroll.
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Table 6.3
Most corpsmembers are minority high school dropouts
with severely deficient reading skills (1985).
Percent
Characteristics
Sex
68.2%
Male
31.8
Female
Age at entry
16
17
18
19
20
21
Over 21

19.5
20.3
20.0
17.6
12.5
8.5
1.6

Race
Black
White
Hispanic
Indian
Other

56.9
28.2
8.9
3.9
2.1

Highest grade completed
l-7th grade
8th grade
9th grade
10th grade
llth grade
12th grade or more

4.7
13.5
22.8
22.1
16.5
20.4

Entry reading level
Under grade 3
Grades 3-4
Grades 5-6
Grades 7-8
Above grade 8

7.7
23.8
30.9
23.9
13.7

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Upon arriving at a center, the new corpsmember receives a
week-long orientation explaining the educational and vocational
programs, residential rules, health services and recreational activi
ties. Most of the centers assign a veteran corpsmember to each new
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enrollee to facilitate his or her transition to center life. The average
enrollee remains at a center for seven months, but a third leave
within three months (figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4
Corps is that half the enrollees remain
Job
the
of
problem
A major
than six months (1985).
less
for
centers
in the

15%
10%
Percent of enrollees

20%

25%

Source: U.S. Departmentof Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Education
Centers organize the educational and vocational programs by
dividing the day in half for each track, alternating weeks, or using
both methods depending upon the occupational training course. 14
In 22 centers examined, 10 used a split-day schedule, 6 alternated
weeks, and 6 used a combination schedule. The split-day schedule is
more advantageous to enrollees, who have problems under the
alternating week schedule in sustaining their attention for a full day
of educational instruction and retaining course material during the
off week. Centers which alternate weeks of educational and voca
tional instruction do so primarily to accommodate commuting
vocational instructors.
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Basic Education
Over four-fifths of corpsmembers have completed the 9th grade,
but only 14 percent read at that level. However, entry-level abilities
range from the functionally illiterate to those who can read fairly
well. Therefore, instructors first administer standardized tests to
determine at what level corpsmembers should begin their reading
and math program. In addition to the placement test, the Labor
Department recently required centers to administer adult basic
education tests to all new enrollees to uniformly gauge educational
gains.
To accommodate divergent reading abilities, Job Corps reading
instruction is individualized. Enrollees move through a series of
short, competency-based lessons, progressing to the next lesson
only after passing a test to ensure proficiency. Individuals proceed
at their own pace and are assisted by instructors when they need
help. Basic course materials are standardized, but the Labor
Department encourages centers to test innovative and experimental
approaches, and the Job Corps has pioneered in developing instruc
tional materials for youth and adults who failed in or were failed by
the schools.
Lack of confidence and motivation typically compound corpsmembers' reading difficulties. Although the program deemphasizes
competition between enrollees, staff report that poor readers often
feel stigmatized by other corpsmembers. Centers are not equipped
to deal with learning disabilities, and individuals with severe
disabilities are usually terminated from the program. Many enroll
ees are more interested in occupational training than education, and
participants' interest and progress often lag when they do not see
the relevance of schooling to their careers. Consequently, educa
tional and vocational instructors often work together to resolve
occupational training problems attributable to poor reading skills.
The Job Corps' reading program is remarkably successful in
comparison to traditional schooling techniques, although the cen
ters have been slow to utilize computer-assisted instruction, prob
ably because of financial impediments. Recent achievement tests
indicate that corpsmembers on average gain about two months of
reading achievement for every month of instruction. Thus enrollees
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not only perform dramatically better than they had in school, but
outpace average student performance. The average corpsmember,
enrolled in the program for seven to eight months, probably
progresses from a 6th grade reading ability to a 7th or 8th grade
level. Although the Labor Department has required centers to
maintain records of participants' reading gains, a 1985 study found
that reporting was so inadequate that "no reliable data" existed to
assess reading improvement. 15 However, since that time the depart
ment has revised its instructions, requiring centers to use a uniform
standardized test to assess corpsmember educational progress.
Some centers offer courses in English as a second language,
primarily for the Hispanic, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian
corpsmembers who account for about a tenth of enrollees. These
individuals usually remain in ESL programs until their English is
adequate for educational and vocational training, which typically
takes six months to a year. The Labor Department does not report
the average length of stay for ESL enrollees, but it is probable that
many do not remain long enough to complete an occupational
training course.
Most new enrollees' math skills do not extend much beyond basic
addition and subtraction. Instructors estimate that 40-60 percent of
new corpsmembers have difficulty with fractions, measurements,
percentages and decimals. The math program offers individualized
and self-paced instruction designed to make corpsmembers profi
cient in consumer math. Unlike the program's other education
courses, the math curriculum is based primarily on commercially
published texts rather than on Job Corps materials, although some
supplementary exercises have been developed specifically for the
program.
Math instructors generally encounter few problems teaching from
the standardized curriculum, although, as in the reading program,
teachers commonly use supplementary materials. Math education is
linked to some degree with vocational training, particularly in labs
where students practice measurement exercises. Teachers also work
informally with vocational instructors when corpsmembers face
training difficulties attributable to deficient math skills.
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High School Equivalency and Beyond
Enrollees who attain 8th or 9th grade reading proficiency enter
the high school equivalency degree program. The Job Corps has
designed a special curriculum for the program, although many
instructors supplement this material and a fifth of the instructors
questioned were so dissatisfied with the curriculum that they did not
use it at all.
Evaluations of the Job Corps demonstrate that attainment of an
equivalency degree has a significant impact on later employment
success and educational achievement. 16 However, only about a
seventh of the enrollees take the General Education Development
(GED) test. Ninety percent of those who take the test pass it.
Several factors partially explain the limited number of corpsmembers who take the test. A fifth of new enrollees in 1985 had
completed the 12th grade. Most of these individuals probably
already possessed a diploma or equivalency degree, and in fact only
4 percent took the GED while in the corps. A third of enrollees
leave the program within three months, and it takes about that
much time to complete GED instruction. However, even of those
who had not completed the 12th grade and stayed in the Job Corps
longer than six months, less than a third take the GED test. Not
even half of those staying over a year take the test. One study
examined the correlation between entry reading level and GED
attainment for corpsmembers who had completed grades 9 through
11 and remained in the program for over six months. The distribu
tion follows:
Entry reading level
Less than 7th grade
7th to 8th grade
9th grade or higher

Obtained GED
16%
46
65

Although the Job Corps' GED program has improved considerably
in recent years — the proportion of enrollees obtaining equivalency
degrees has doubled since the late 1970s — more emphasis on
securing equivalency degrees for corpsmembers is necessary. 17 The
limited number of long-term participants who receive certificates
suggests that the record can be further improved. In late 1986, the
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Job Corps instituted a GED performance standard to promote the
high school equivalency program.
Corpsmembers who complete their vocational program and
attain a high school diploma or equivalency degree may receive
postsecondary education or training through the corps' advanced
career training program. Begun in 1979 to encourage lengthier
program stays and provide a career ladder for outstanding achiev
ers, the Labor Department canceled the program in 1981 but
revived it three years later. Currently, 30 centers contract with a
variety of private vocational schools and community colleges to
train about 2 percent of corpsmembers at an annual cost of $1.5
million.
Health and Consumer Instruction
In addition to math and reading courses, Job Corps centers
provide health and "World of Work" education. The latter pro
gram offers training in job search skills and consumer education,
typically beginning at the same time as the math and reading classes
and lasting 30 to 40 hours over a two- to eight-week period. Because
the World of Work program is typically completed within a few
months of enrollment, most centers offer a 5-15 hour refresher
course for corpsmembers preparing to leave the center.
Although the curriculum is standardized, the health education
program offers group rather than individualized instruction de
signed to help enrollees make informed decisions about their health
needs. The program usually begins within a month and a half after
corpsmembers arrive at the center, and provides 27 lessons for an
average of 32 hours instruction.
Instructors
Job Corps teachers' salaries and benefits are inferior to working
conditions in local schools. Entry-level teacher salaries at the
centers are 15-20 percent below starting wages at area schools,
although corps instructors face a longer workday and a 12-month
working year. However, centers report few difficulties in recruiting
competent instructors because many teachers are attracted by a
program that offers a strict disciplinary system and the challenge of
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teaching students who failed in or were failed by the established
educational system. An oversupply of qualified teachers in recent
years has also benefited the program.
As government civil service employees, teachers at civilian con
servation centers are better paid than contract center instructors,
but civil service procedures delay processing of hiring new teachers
by as much as two to six months. The lowest paid CCC instructor
makes about as much as the highest paid teachers at contract
centers. The latter usually leave after three to five years for a better
paying job, while many CCC instructors have over 10 years tenure.
Vocational Training
Job Corps enrollees' work histories are commensurate with their
limited educational achievements. Seventy percent have never held
a full-time job, and another 12 percent have previously worked full
time but not within six months of enrollment. Half of those who
had held full-time jobs earned the minimum wage or less.
Shortly after enrolling, each corpsmember participates in a threeto five-day vocational orientation program and learns about the
training opportunities at the center. However, fewer than half of the
centers provide new enrollees with some hands-on exposure to
various trades, and instructors believe that a more intensive orien
tation is necessary to allow enrollees to make informed vocational
choices. Vocational assignment is generally determined by corpsmember preference, and four of five corpsmembers are assigned to
their first vocational choice. 18
The Job Corps offers training in about 120 occupations, although
each center typically offers only 8-10. Four of five corpsmembers
are trained for one of eleven occupations:
clerk typist or secretary
cook or baker
welder
nurse's or medical assistant
auto repair
carpenter

9.3%
9.1
8.8
8.8
8.7
8.2
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custodial or maintenance
mason
painter
electrician
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8.0
6.7
6.5
3.4
3.0

The remainder of the training opportunities represent a wide variety
of occupations. About half of these require relatively few skills, such
as keypunch operator, warehouseman and receptionist, while the
others are more skilled jobs, such as accountant or appliance repair
person.
Occupational enrollment reflects traditional gender patterns.
Most women are trained to be clerk typists, nurse's aides, cooks, or
clerks. Greater variety is generally available to men, in addition to
the listed occupations. The Labor Department's comprehensive
review of the program's offerings in 1983 concluded that Job Corps
trades correlated well with occupational demand projections. The
review panel recommended 12 new offerings, including computer
and health-related trades, and several of these occupations were
added by 1987. High initial investment costs inhibit new vocational
offerings.
Center operators provide most of the training. In addition, the
Washington Job Corps office selects national contractors, usually
labor unions, to provide some training. Each service provider offers
training for distinctly different occupations. For example, almost 80
percent of national contractor training is for construction trades,
provided primarily by carpenters', masons' and painters' unions. In
1982 contract center instructors provided training for 75 percent of
the 32,000 enrollees who spent over three months in the program,
national contractors taught 16 percent, and civilian conservation
center instructors trained the remaining 9 percent of enrollees.
CCCs rely heavily on national contractors to provide training, while
the contract centers commonly use in-house staff. Both kinds of
centers also use local subcontractors for a small proportion of
training. 19
Like Job Corps education courses, much of the vocational
training program is individualized and self-paced, consisting of a
series of competency-based lessons. The adequacy of facilities and
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equipment varies from center to center, with the larger centers being
generally better equipped. Some of the smaller centers have out
dated or insufficient equipment, most commonly for construction,
clerical, automotive and welding courses. In 1980, the Job Corps
began a major overhaul of its vocational program to establish
standardized courses which stress the basic skills necessary to
perform in each occupation. Industry and training experts as well as
Job Corps personnel designed the courses, which were then tested at
selected centers. Implementation of the new system, which will
encompass all major occupational offerings, is scheduled to be
completed in 1988.
Although hands-on experience is considered an important ele
ment of the Job Corps' vocational program, opportunities for
learning while doing are not uniformly available across occupa
tions. Corpsmembers training in the construction, automotive, and
industrial production trades tend to receive the most hands-on
experience in actual or simulated settings, while health, clerical and
sales training is more classroom oriented.
The centers generally have little difficulty recruiting and retaining
vocational instructors, but face somewhat greater problems than
the education program experiences. Salaries of CCC and national
contractor instructors are at least comparable with similar private
sector jobs, which results in extremely low turnover. Although the
wages offered by contract centers are not as generous, they too
experience minimal recruitment and turnover problems because the
steady work hours offered by the program attracts instructors.20
The Residential Living Program
The most unique feature about the Job Corps is its residential
nature. 21 The program's designers believed that providing a struc
tured and supportive living environment was essential to break the
"cycle of poverty" trapping many impoverished youngsters, but this
theory is by no means universally accepted. Disentangling the
elements which account for the Job Corps' success is no easy task.
The most recent net impact study of the program included only
residential enrollees because, when the study began in 1977, very
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few enrollees lived outside the centers. Moreover, differences be
tween the two types of enrollees preclude simple comparisons of
postprogram outcomes.
A demonstration project underway in mid-1987, called Jobstart,
is designed to replicate the Job Corps approach in a nonresidential
setting. Seventeen- to 21-year-old dropouts from impoverished
homes with limited reading skills were randomly assigned to either
Jobstart training or a control group in late 1985 and 1986. Jobstart
involves 15 sites, 11 administered by local JTPA Title II agencies
and 4 by Job Corps centers. All sites are to provide at least 5.5
months of instruction, significantly less than the Job Corps' average
in recent years of seven to eight months, which may complicate
assessments of the project.22
Operating a residential program poses a severe challenge for both
Job Corps staff and participants. Corpsmembers must adjust to
living in a new environment away from home while pursuing a
disciplined education and training program, an especially difficult
challenge for troubled youngsters lacking self-confidence. Many
corpsmembers fail again, and either drop out or are dismissed from
the program.
Corpsmembers receive living allowances of $40 to $100 monthly
based on duration of enrollment as well as performance.
Monthly
allowance
$ 40
$ 60
$ 80
$ 90
$100

Duration
Entry to 2 months
2-6 months
After 6 months
Merit allowance
Merit allowance

Proportion
of enrollees
(November 1986)
32%
32
14
7
14

Success or failure in the program often hinges upon whether new
enrollees can adjust to group living. Housing accommodations in
various centers range from a barracks to college-type dorm rooms.
Anywhere from 2 to 42 enrollees sleep in a single room, although 8
or less is typical. Staff and corpsmembers share housekeeping
chores. A staff of resident advisers (RAs) living in the dorms is
responsible for acclimating enrollees to center life and minimizing
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behavioral problems, including drinking and fighting. The RAs play
a crucial role in maintaining discipline. Center officials report that a
drop in the number of RAs below a critical threshold is associated
with unacceptable levels of misbehavior.
Extensive counseling also helps corpsmembers adjust to center
life. Homesickness is a universal problem, and enrollees also receive
individual and group counseling for a wide variety of personal,
educational and vocational difficulties. Most contract centers sched
ule regular group counseling sessions fairly often, usually every
week, which are supplemented with monthly individual counseling.
In contrast, at CCCs most counseling is provided informally by
RAs. Formal counseling is generally used only when a corpsmember requests it or a teacher or RA makes a referral.
Job Corps staff consider the recreational program a vital tool in
channeling the energy of enrollees into acceptable activities. Corpsmembers themselves plan and operate most recreational activities
— which include team sports, dances, parties, and center stores or
snack bars — to ensure that they are appealing.
All centers have elected corpsmember governments, varying from
moribund bodies to those extensively involved in almost all facets of
center activities. Not surprisingly, corpsmember governments are
most interested in recreational programs and food service. The
Labor Department also requires each center to encourage leader
ship potential. More gifted corpsmembers are enrolled in a leader
ship training course lasting from 6 to 40 hours, and then assigned
work as aides in classrooms, recreational facilities, offices and
shops. In return for extra responsibilities and work, the individual
receives special privileges such as living in an honor dorm, use of
recreational facilities outside normal hours, and passes to leave the
center.
Corpsmembers receive comprehensive health care to ensure that
medical problems do not inhibit their progress in the program. Each
center has a full-time nurse or medical technician, and those centers
without a staff doctor establish consulting arrangements with
outside physicians. In addition to routine medical services, almost
all centers operate alcohol and drug abuse and pregnancy pro
grams. Job Corps staff at various centers estimate that 1-10 percent
of female participants arrive pregnant at centers, and a small
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proportion become pregnant while enrolled. Pregnant corpsmem
bers generally remain in the program until the seventh month of
pregnancy.
Life at the centers is fairly regimented. Attendance is carefully
monitored, and enrollees must obtain passes to leave the center for
any reason. Staff conduct periodic inspections of both living and
storage areas, and about half the centers routinely search all
packages coming in or out of the facilities to keep out alcohol and
drugs. If a crime is committed, most security officers try to handle
the matter internally unless it involves a serious offense. Centers
which rely on informal procedures have some difficulty levying
consistent sanctions for like offenses.
Almost all centers use trained security personnel. Demands on
these employees vary greatly between centers, with some expected
to provide counseling while others merely follow formal security
procedures. Because salaries are not competitive with local security
agencies, the Job Corps experiences difficulty in recruiting and
retaining qualified security personnel.
Running the residential program is a demanding job requiring a
diversity of skills. The staff is primarily composed of residential
advisors and counselors, although the duties associated with each of
these positions vary greatly across centers. There is approximately
one residential staff member for every eleven enrollees, a ratio which
varies little among centers.
RAs at some centers (especially CCCs) do a great deal of
counseling, while others primarily perform custodial work. In
contrast to most positions at Job Corps centers, RAs and related
jobs such as dorm attendants are subject to fairly high turnover.
Salaries are generally low, and many RAs are college students or
else take the position as a second job. Almost half the centers
examined in 1984 experienced an average annual RA turnover rate
of 35 percent.
Job Corps counselors are better paid but face diverse duties.
Counselors are supposed to advise corpsmembers on their educa
tional and vocational goals as well as personal problems. In
addition to their therapeutic duties, counselors also typically man
age the performance evaluation panels which monitor corpsmember
progress. Professional qualifications are minimal considering the
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demands placed on counselors. Only 1 of 23 centers examined in
1984 required a master's degree — a bachelor's degree in psychol
ogy or sociology was usually acceptable. To assist counselors, the
national office requires each center to hire a mental health consult
ant to be available for a few hours a week to advise or train
counselors and to accept referrals of particularly difficult cases.

The Dropout Problem
Ensuring that as many new entrants as possible complete the
program is critical to the success of the Job Corps. Over the years,
the Job Corps has greatly diminished the proportion of early
leavers, but the problem remains serious. The Job Corps is a
voluntary program, and enrollees are free to leave when they wish.
The average stay in the centers is 7.2 months, but a third of
participants leave within 3 months, half of these within the first
month. By minimizing early departures and providing more inten
sive training, the Job Corps has nearly doubled average training
duration since the program began (figure 6.5). Program completers
now stay, on average, over a year in the Job Corps.
Figure 6.5
The average stay in the Job Corps has increased significantly.

7.9
7.2

Months of training
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Despite the improvements, only a third of enrollees completed
the program in 1985 (table 6.4). Women are more likely to leave for

Table 6.4
Most corpsmembers do not complete their training program (1985).*
Male
residents

Male
nonresidents

Female
residents

Female
nonresidents

Total

Average
stay
(months)

37,600

3,300

16,100

3,500

60,500

7.2

6.8

10.5

7.3

8.2

7.2

-

Completed
program

28.7%

53.7%

34.6%

40.2%

32.3%

13.5

Quit
Resigned
AWOL

49.1
30.1
19.0

37.5
20.2
17.3

48.3
28.8
19.5

52.1
25.2
26.9

48.5
29.0
19.5

3.9
4.6
2.9

Left for
disciplinary
reasons

16.2

4.5

8.3

1.4

12.6

5.3

Medical

1.9

.8

4.5

1.9

2.5

4.1

Withdrawal of
parental
consent

2.2

.7

2.6

.3

2.1

2.1

Administrative

1.5

2.1

1.2

2.1

1.5

3.9

Terminations
Average stay
(months)
Reasons

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Details do not total 100 percent because reasons for 0.5 percent of terminations are unrecorded.
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medical reasons (primarily due to pregnancy) and less likely to
depart for disciplinary infractions than men. Nonresidents are
much more likely to complete the program than residents, partly
because they do not face the pressures and regimentation of center
life. In 1985, 35 percent of residents compared with 25 percent of
nonresidents remained less than three months in the Job Corps.
Residents are more likely to depart for disciplinary reasons because
most serious incidents occur after hours when nonresidents have left
for the day.
Corpsmembers who leave without notice usually stay in the
program for less than three months and constitute the bulk of the
early leaver problem. Corpsmembers have indicated the following
principal reasons for early departures:23
•
•
•
•
•

homesickness;
an inability to adjust to the Job Corps' structure and rules;
insufficient pay;
poor screening by recruiters; and
enrollees' inability to make decisions about their interests
and goals.

Interviews with center staff confirm many of these impressions. Staff
view homesickness as the most important reason for dropping out
within the first month, and an inability to adjust to center life as the
principal explanation for those leaving in the second or third
month. Lack of privacy, racial and ethnic animosities, regimenta
tion, and bullying or assaults are the most common adjustment
problems.
Younger Corpsmembers are more prone to drop out early, and
the likelihood decreases with age. During 1984, 34 percent of
16-year-olds compared with 23.5 percent of 21-year-olds left the
program within three months. Similarly, only two-fifths of the
youngest Corpsmembers stay over six months, compared to threefifths of the 21-year-olds. Job Corps administrators have long
known that younger enrollees are prone to drop out, and over the
years the average age of the Corpsmembers has increased: a little
over a decade ago nearly two-thirds of enrollees were under 18,
compared with 40 percent currently. To improve the cost efficiency
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of the Job Corps, a persuasive case can be made for excluding
16-year-olds from the program.
Whites — who are a minority in the centers — are much more
likely than ethnic or racial minorities to leave the Job Corps within
three months:
Whites
American Indians
Hispanics
Blacks
Asians

38%
32
31
25
8

The likelihood of whites dropping out is increased for those
assigned to predominantly black centers. Over a quarter of the
whites assigned to centers with over 70 percent black enrollment
leave within the first month, compared to 16 percent of the whites
assigned to other centers. Interestingly, the white dropout rate does
not differ for the two types of centers in the second and third month
of enrollment, which may indicate that white dropouts are uncom
fortable in a black environment rather than that racial tensions
constitute a persistent problem.
Enrollees at civilian conservation centers are more likely to stay
in the program over three months than those at contract centers.
The size and location of a center, corpsmember gender, and whether
enrollees are assigned to their preferred occupational training
program apparently have little impact on the dropout problem.24
The Labor Department and center operators have reduced the
numbers of early leavers through various techniques. Recruiters are
expected to carefully screen potential enrollees for serious medical
and behavioral problems, and the Labor Department audits recruit
ers who refer too many unsuitable applicants. The referral of clearly
ineligible applicants to centers is apparently not a serious problem.
The 2.5 percent of corpsmembers terminated for medical reasons
had been in the program for an average of four months, making it
unlikely that many of these medical problems predated admittance
to the Job Corps. Similarly, since the 1.5 percent of enrollees
terminated for administrative reasons (including ineligibility as well
as a failure to make sufficient progress) had also typically been in
the program for four months, it is doubtful that many were
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admitted due to poor screening. Moreover, some screening errors
are attributable to false information provided by applicants who
conceal mental health problems or criminal records from recruiters.
Legal restrictions often prevent recruiters from independently ver
ifying this kind of information.
While recruiters apparently enlist few ineligible applicants, they
often fail to fully explain the program to applicants, which signifi
cantly contributes to the dropout problem, according to both center
staff and corpsmembers. A recent evaluation found significant
variations between recruitment agencies in the accuracy and com
pleteness of information they possessed concerning individual cen
ters. The recruiters were generally knowledgeable about center
training programs, but often lacked information about center living
conditions, recreational programs, health facilities, and the sur
rounding community. Many recruiters had not visited the centers
for which they solicited applicants, and were therefore dependent
upon the centers' promotional literature, hardly an unbiased
source. Some recruiters did not even possess copies of the corpsmember handbooks produced by each center.
Job Corps centers use various approaches to minimize the
number of dropouts. Center staff commonly phone prospective
enrollees to ensure that they have been informed about center living
conditions, know what training opportunities are available, and are
genuinely committed to the program. Many centers have a big
brother or sister program to help orient new enrollees, and several
make dormitory assignments with an eye toward ensuring racial
balance and minimizing bullying. Counseling staff try to spot
problems which might lead to early departures, and minimize
homesickness by permitting calls and visits home.25
Postprogram Experiences
Placement assistance
Upon leaving a center, corpsmembers are provided job search
assistance and a readjustment allowance. Until 1985, public em
ployment offices provided most of the job search assistance in about
four-fifths of the states, but by competitively bidding placement
contracts the national office has expanded the role of alternative
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organizations. Job Corps centers, a state human resource depart
ment, private corporations, Wider Opportunities for Women (a
community-based organization), and the United Auto Workers
now augment the employment service network. All agencies are
now paid a fixed fee for every job placement, replacing the previous
practice of reimbursing for all expenditures whether or not a
placement resulted.
Upon a corpsmember's departure, the Job Corps center notifies
the responsible placement agency that the former enrollee is due to
arrive in the area. Contact is facilitated because corpsmembers can
only pick up their readjustment allowance at the agency office, and
over 90 percent of terminees are located. Corpsmembers who stayed
in the program at least six months receive $75 for each of the first
six months, and $100 for each month over six. Terminees who
remained in the corps more than nine months are paid $100 for each
month they were enrolled.
Since they are judged partially by their alumni placement record,
some centers offer placement assistance, complementing the work
of the placement agencies over which they have little control. The
remote locations of civilian conservation centers generally render
placement efforts impractical, but some contract centers use their
work experience program to generate jobs for graduates. National
contractors are especially successful at using their local contacts to
place corpsmembers.
Longer Training Pays Off
Placement agencies report that program completers are relatively
easy to place, while early leavers require considerable assistance.
The Job Corps performance standards reflect this fact. Two of the
standards assess center success in retaining participants. A third
standard gauges the success of long-term enrollees (over six months'
time) in finding work or continuing their education. The Labor
Department has established a range of acceptable performance
rather than a target figure (table 6.5).
Although the national average performance was within the
acceptable range for the three targets, a third of the centers had
overall unacceptable ratings for the year ending in June 1986.
Despite the Labor Department's tough talk on sanctions, no more
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than four contracts were terminated due to poor performance. Thus
the standards have been used more as guidelines and have probably
had limited influence on center operations.
Table 6.5
One of three centers failed to meet the performance standards.
90+ day
retention
rate

180+ day
positive
180+ day
retention termination
rate*
rate

Total
centers

Unacceptable
rating

35
-

Performance standards
1985
1986
1985 outcomes
Range

65-75%
64-75

75-83% 80-90%
80-92
73-80

66

76

86

46-94

62-90

63-97

105
-

70
65

77
75

89
90

18
12

3
3

65
71
64
67
63
63

77
77
73
75
75
73

88
85
87
84
84
80

13
11
10
7
5
4

2
2
8
3
3
3

Program operator
Agriculture Department
Interior Department
Management &
Training Corp.
Singer
RCA
Teledyne
Res-Care, Inc.
Minact

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Proportion of 90+day enrollees who remain over 180 days.

The department issued a fourth performance standard in late
1986 designed to encourage attainment of high school equivalency
diplomas. Unlike the other benchmarks, the GED standard is
applied individually to each center and is based on a regression
model which considers the age and reading level of participants, as
well as other enrollee and center characteristics. The target gauges
equivalency attainment among enrollees who enter the program
with at least a fourth grade reading level and are old enough to take
the GED test. A model standard of 30 percent GED attainment was
chosen based on 1984 performance, and each center must meet the
model-adjusted target plus or minus 9 percentage points, but the
adjustments cannot lower the standard below a 10 percent GED
attainment rate. Using 1986 enrollee and center characteristics, the
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model produced performance targets ranging from 10 to 38 percent
across centers.
A fifth performance standard assessing educational gains was to
be issued during 1987. Centers are now required to administer a
standardized test to corpsmembers on three "national test days"
every year. The department will use the test results to establish
minimal educational improvement goals for each center.
The Job Corps' national office has used performance standards in
a more creditable manner than other JTPA programs. Performance
standards have been applied to accomplishments over which centers
have more direct control, such as length of training and educational
progress. The corps' performance standard system is also based on
more reliable data than that collected in other JTPA programs
because centers record, for example, the entry reading levels of
enrollees. The fact that a third of the centers failed the 1985
benchmarks indicates a need for either greater enforcement or a
recalibration of the standards. Even the performance of the major
contractor with the worst record (RCA) was not much different
from that of the average center. Other JTPA performance systems
could benefit by adopting some of the Job Corps' practices.
The Job Corps' definition of a successful placement is similar to
the Title IIA program's positive termination outcome, but without
the deficiencies that mar that standard. Corpsmembers who acquire
a part-time or full-time job or an on-the-job training position of at
least 20 hours a week; enroll full time in a school, training or
apprenticeship program; or join the military or national guard
within six months of termination are considered successfully placed.
Other JTPA programs generally count placements within a three
month postprogram period.
The Job Corps' placement reporting practices have raised trou
bling questions. Until the early 1980s, the program only reported
outcomes for corpsmembers it was able to locate. Currently, the
corps assumes that unlocated corpsmembers have the same rate of
placement success as the recorded group of individuals who receive
no assistance from placement agencies. However, this assumption is
questionable because performance standards discourage placement
agencies from submitting records for individuals not placed. A
more serious problem is the failure of the national office to verify
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reported placements. The Labor Department's inspector general
found that about one of four reported placements were spurious in
1982.26 No similar audits of reported performance have been
performed during the past five years.
For the year ending in June 1986, using the corps' estimation
procedure, 74 percent of terminees were successfully placed. If only
those individuals who were located are counted, the positive
termination rate rises to 81 percent, while discarding the estimation
technique but including unlocated individuals lowers the rate to 66
percent. Four-fifths of those placed obtained jobs or joined the
military, and the remainder entered school. Male enrollees and
program completers fare best in the labor market (table 6.6).
Former female corpsmembers are more likely to drop out of the
labor force to assume family responsibilities, which reduces their
positive termination rate. Reported Job Corps outcomes are very
similar to the outcomes for the relatively more advantaged youth in
the Title IIA program.
Table 6.6
Program completers achieve the best postprogram results (1985).
Positive
termination
Hourly
rate*
wage
Total
Male
Female

74%
77
68

Termination Reason
Completed program
Disciplinary reasons
Resigned
AWOL
Medical
Administrative
Removal of parental consent

83
72
73
69
49
64
71

4.55
3.89
3.90
3.85
3.66
3.70
3.80

Length of Stay
0-89 days
90-179 days
180+ days

67
71
80

3.80
3.92
4.34

$4.17
4.28
3.90

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
*Data reflect authors' adjustment of Labor Department statistics to account for
unlocated terminees.
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Enrollees who train to become carpenters, masons, and painters
are generally most successful at rinding relatively high paying jobs
within six months after leaving the corps (table 6.7). The relatively
superior outcomes for trainees in these construction trades is
probably attributable to two factors. First, a sizable proportion of
construction training is offered by national union contractors who
have an established employment network for Job Corps graduates.
Second, union construction programs tend to select older and
relatively more qualified corpsmembers.27
The likelihood of completing training or positively terminating
from the program does not vary much by training occupation. Job
placement and wage rates exhibit more variation; occupations with
large numbers of women fare worst in the labor market. Except for
clerk typists and secretaries, trainees who remain for longer periods
in the program tend to find better paying jobs. Overall, only a third
of employed terminees find work in their field of training.
Longer Term Impact
The Job Corps underwent a careful assessment during the late
1970s and early 1980s. The findings convincingly demonstrate the
program's worth in improving enrollees' employment prospects,
and the evaluations have protected the Job Corps from serious
budget cuts despite White House efforts in the 1980s to discredit the
program's established record.
A comprehensive study examined the experiences of a random
sample of 1977 corpsmembers over a four-year period and a
comparison group of youth with similar characteristics. The simi
larity of the two groups was confirmed by the fact that the
experiences of the early Job Corps leavers paralleled those of the
comparison group.
The positive impacts of the program, which persisted throughout
the four-year follow-up period, were striking. Former corpsmem
bers had significantly greater employment and earnings, more
education, better health, and less serious criminal records than the
comparison group. The corpsmembers were also less likely than the
comparison group to receive cash welfare payments, food stamps or
unemployment insurance. Former enrollees received on average
half the amount of cash benefits obtained by members of the

Table 6.7.
Construction trainees achieve greatest labor market success in the short term (1985).

Total

Trainees

Duration
(months)

Completed
training

Positive
termination
rate

Job
placement
rate

Hourly
wage

Job
matches
training
occupation

Percent
males

50,588

7.2

35%

81%

66%

$4.17

35%

68%

4,613
4,442
4,403
4,156

6.1
7.2
6.2
7.5

39
37
35
36

80
83
85
85

65
69
71
74

3.84
4.23
4.13
4.68

51
25
28
46

62
93
95
93

3,383
3,280
1,727
1,527

6.5
7.5
6.9
6.9

40
33
36
41

83
83
82
87

69
72
71
76

4.13
4.53
4.48
4.28

39
42
41
44

87
95
87
92

4,692

7.1

41

79

59

3.97

36

21

4,440

6.2

41

78

61

3.76

42

23

4,059

6.6

43

79

62

4.01

36

24

Male dominated occupations
Cook or baker
Welder
Auto repair
Carpenter
Custodial or
maintenance
Mason
Painter
Electrician

Female dominated occupations
Clerk typist or
secretary
Nurse's or
medical
assistant
General or
sales clerk

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
Note: Table excludes unlocated terminees.
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comparison group. Despite the program's persistent difficulties in
securing high school equivalency degrees for enrollees, former
corpsmembers were much more likely to have earned diplomas or
equivalency degrees than nonparticipants, and more had enrolled in
college.
Counting civilian jobs and military enlistments, former corpsmembers worked an average of one and a half weeks more in the
first follow-up year than the comparison group, and three to five
weeks more in the second through the fourth years. The civilian
employment rate was 6 percent higher for corpsmembers. Annual
earnings, in 1977 dollars, were $262 higher than nonenrollees'
earnings in the first year and $405 to $652 higher in the next three
years, about 15 percent higher than the comparison group. Parti
cipants' higher earnings were primarily attributable to increased
working time rather than to higher wages. The evidence was mixed
as to whether the Job Corps' positive employment impact was
fading toward the end of the four-year follow-up.
Imputing dollar values to Job Corps benefits — admittedly an
inexact science — analysts concluded that the program yields $1.46
for every $1 invested. From a societal perspective, benefits exceeded
costs by over $2300 per corpsmember in 1977 dollars ($4200 in 1986
dollars), and the program's investment in the average enrollee was
paid back in just three years. Most of Job Corps' benefits were
derived from the increased economic output and decreased criminal
behavior of corpsmembers.28
Interestingly, the program's benefits were not apparent during
the year after corpsmembers left the centers, as the alumni had some
difficulty readjusting to the outside world, indicating that shortterm results may not be a reliable barometer of long-term employ
ment success. Somewhat surprisingly, the study found that general
or sales clerk trainees fared best in the long run. Adjusting for
participant characteristics, individuals trained as clerks, welders and
electricians had the highest earnings, while former corpsmembers in
the other principal vocational programs earned at or below the
average for all corps alumni (table 6.8). Former painter trainees,
who exhibited nearly the best results in the short term, fared poorly
in the long run. On the other hand, the former clerk trainees with
the highest long-term earnings performed below average in the
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immediate postprogram period. The findings, while they do not
make intuitive sense and bear further investigation, provide further
support for cautiously interpreting performance measures based on
short-term results.29
The evaluators also examined the impact of the program from the
perspective of corpsmembers and the taxpayers who foot the bill.
Not surprisingly, program participants reap most of the benefits
from the Job Corps. However, taxpayers also gain from reduced
social program and criminal justice costs, and from the labor value
of the projects corpsmembers contribute while enrolled. Overall, the
cost-benefit ratio for taxpayers is only slightly negative, 98 cents for
every dollar invested.
Although benefits persisted during the four-year follow-up pe
riod, the analysts assumed that the benefits of the Job Corps
diminished after time. However, if the benefits continue throughout
Table 6.8.
Corpsmembers trained as clerks achieve the best long-term labor
market success compared with a control group.
Increased earnings
(1977 dollars)

Average

$ 655

Men
General or sales clerk
Welder
Electrician
Carpenter
Auto repair
Mason
Cook or baker
Custodial or maintenance
Painter

1251
1186
1150
695
605
546
242
235
-651

Women
General or sales clerk
Clerk typist or secretary
Nurse's or medical assistant

1708
495
189

Source: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

former enrollees' working lives, the program's cost-benefit ratio
would be much more favorable, $2.11 for every dollar invested —
over $10,000 per corpsmember in 1986 dollars. 30
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Although the evaluation of the Job Corps reviewed the experi
ences of enrollees who entered the program a decade ago, there is no
reason to believe the corps is less effective today. In fact, the current
program is probably more effective because the proportion of early
dropouts has declined and average training duration has increased.
A Quarter Century of Progress
Despite some anxious moments, the Job Corps has survived the
Reagan administration attacks relatively unscathed. Nonetheless,
staff cuts at the federal level and reduced resources for research and
development threaten the corps' ability to experiment with new
approaches to serve severely disadvantaged youth. Contrary to
fashionable deprecations of Washington, the Job Corps' achieve
ments are due both to national leadership as well as the dedicated
center staff which the program has consistently attracted. Since its
inception, the Job Corps has collected the information necessary to
pinpoint problems and taken steps to enhance its educational,
vocational, and residential programs. Other JTPA components
could benefit greatly by adopting these practices.
Efforts to boost training quality and provide a greater proportion
of enrollees with high school equivalency degrees are now under
way. Additional funding would permit expanded use of computers
in instruction, which showed considerable promise in a late 1970s
study. However, given the program's high costs, efforts to improve
cost efficiency should also continue. Increasing individual center
capacity would undoubtedly reduce unit costs. While reductions are
possible, as long as the Job Corps operates residential facilities it
will remain an expensive program, albeit cost-effective in the long
run.

7

Farmworker and
Indian Programs

In addition to the Job Corps, Congress retained federal admin
istration over programs for two special groups who are among the
poorest members of American society: migrant and seasonal farm
workers and Indians. Even the Reagan administration acknowl
edged that the migration patterns of many farmworkers make state
administration inadvisable, and efforts to aid Native Americans
have traditionally been the responsibility of the federal government.
Migrant and Seasonal Farmworkers
The conclusions of the latest presidential commission which
examined the problems of migrant and seasonal farm laborers in
1978 remain valid today.
American farmworkers and their families still live and work
under conditions which are cruel and harsh by any standard:
They are ill-housed, ill-clothed, under-nourished, face enor
mous health hazards, are underpaid, underemployed, undereducated, socially isolated, politically powerless, excluded from
much of the work-protective legislation that other American
workers take for granted, and unable to compete in the labor
market for the higher wages that would permit them to resolve
their own problems or ameliorate the bleak reality of their
existence. 1
Given the nature of their employment, involving geographic
mobility or intermittent work, estimates of the number of migrant
and seasonal farmworkers are necessarily subject to significant
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variations. After a drastic decline throughout most of this century,
the overall hired farmworker population appears to have stabilized
at roughly 1.5 million in the 1980s. The most disadvantaged of these
are the approximately 250,000 migrant farmworkers, and the poor
seasonal farmworkers whose number is uncertain.2 Because of the
low pay, temporary employment and difficult working conditions,
migrant and seasonal farm labor is dominated by poor immigrants,
many from Mexico, who often face even harsher working condi
tions in their native country.
Federal farmworker employment and training programs date
back to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, and were incorpo
rated into CETA with a separate earmarked appropriation. Except
for the introduction of performance standards, JTPA made no
significant changes in the program's statutory authority.
Financing
Congress stipulated that annual JTPA farmworker appropria
tions equal 3.2 percent of Title IIA funding, although actual
appropriations have sometimes slightly exceeded this amount, as
follows:
Appropriation
Oct. 1983-June 1984
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988 (proposed)

$45.3 million
65.5
60.4
57.8
59.6
57.1

In inflation-adjusted dollars, the 1987 appropriation was a third of
CETA's 1980 funding level. Farmworker programs operate in 48
states and Puerto Rico, but nearly two-fifths of the funds are
allocated to California, Texas, Florida, Puerto Rico and North
Carolina.
Most projects are administered by community-based organiza
tions initially established by the antipoverty programs of the 1960s.
All participating grantees operate statewide projects, except in
California. Six training contractors administer 23 of the 53 total
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projects, and receive 41 percent of all funds. The average project
received slightly over $1 million from JTPA in 1986, distributed as
follows:
Allocation

Distribution by
Number of projects Funding received

Total

53

96.1%

Under $500,000
$500,000 - $999,999
$1 million-$1,999,999
$2 million - $2,999,999
Over $3 million

15
16
17
2
3

6.4
21.3
39.2
9.9
19.3

The Labor Department reserves approximately 4 percent of the
annual appropriation, primarily for farmworker housing assistance.
A 1986 analysis sponsored by the Labor Department's inspector
general concluded that the financial management records of farm
worker projects were inadequate to ensure that funds were properly
spent, and that the Labor Department had done little to correct
previously identified problems. Many of the grantees had not been
audited in three years. However, most of the problems uncovered
were resolved, and the inspector general recommended disallowing
less than 1 percent of total expenditures.3
Enrollees and Services
JTPA assists some 50,000 farmworkers annually, less than half
the number served by GET A. Individuals who (1) did a minimum of
25 days of farm work or earned $400 in farm wages in any
consecutive 12-month period in the previous two years, (2) obtain at
least half of their earnings or spend half of their time engaged in
farm work and (3) belong to an impoverished family are eligible for
assistance. The average enrollee earned less than $3000 in the year
before entering JTPA, and nearly two-fifths had eight years of
schooling or less. Despite their destitution, few farmworker enrollees receive welfare. Enrollees are about equally divided between
migrant and seasonal farmworkers (table 7.1).
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Table 7.1
The typical JTPA farmworker enrollee is a minority adult male
with less than a high school education.
JTPA
(1985)

(1979-81 average)

50,054

123,800

Seasonal

47%
53

55%
45

Male
Female

64
36

63
37

Hispanic
Black
White
Other

56
21
20
3

54
26

16-21
22-44
Over 44

23
62
15

33
49
18

High school dropout
High school student
High school graduate

68
1
31

67
14
19

Limited English
Welfare recipient
Single parent

27
11
12

27
NA
NA

Total
Migrant

CETA

17
3

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Over three-fourths of program funds are devoted to training, but
less than half of the enrollees receive any training. The majority
receive nontraining services, costing an average of $124 in 1985.
These services are targeted at migrant enrollees, and include health
care, meals, temporary shelter, child care and transportation (table
7.2). Enrollees receiving some form of training remain in the
program for an average of five months. Most classroom training
probably emphasizes basic education skills, because less than a third
of farmworker grantees offer occupationally-specific classroom
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training. One analyst concluded that occupational classroom train
ing is of satisfactory quality, based on teacher qualifications,
training duration, and the views of former participants and the
employers who hired them.4 Other "training assistance" — a
catchall category including job search training, counseling, and
outreach and eligibility determination costs — is the least expensive
training-related assistance.
Table 7.2
About half of JTPA farmworker enrollees receive services only (1985).
Terminees

Total
Nontraining
services only
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Training assistance
Work experience
Administration

Costs
$64.2

Total
nonadministrative
costs per terminee

Support service
costs per terminee

41,824

million

$1252

$133

53%

4%
40
20
8
9

124
3189
2005
1459
3842
-

124
196
88
95
244
-

19
15
8
4
-

18

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Expenditures for support services have declined sharply since the
late 1970s, when CETA allocated over a third of its farmworker
program budget to support assistance. Emphasizing training, the
Labor Department limited nontraining-related support services to
15 percent of a local project's budget. As in other programs under
JTPA, OJT and job search assistance have increased compared to
CETA, and the funding of work experience projects has declined.
Outcomes
The Labor Department has issued performance standards gov
erning expected job placement rates and costs per placement.
However, the department has relied too heavily upon these mea
sures to guide the program and paid too little attention to the
quality of training that enrollees receive.
For 1986, projects were expected to match 1984 performance
results within a fairly generous 15 percentage point margin, but the
adjustment margin could not lower the job placement standard
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below a 40 percent rate or raise average costs per placement above
$8,000. Participants receiving services only are excluded from the
calculations for the standards, and administrative costs are not
considered in assessing costs per placement.
For JTPA's first three years, farmworker performance standards
did not credit youth positive terminations, as did the Title IIA
program. Consequently, youth enrollees who learned the 3Rs were
counted as negative terminations, which discouraged remedial
education programs and increased costs per placement. Although
beginning in July 1986 youth positive terminations were no longer
considered a negative outcome, the performance system still does
not encourage provision of remedial education for youth.
Outcomes for JTPA's first three years follow:

Job placement rate
Cost per placement
including administrative costs

Oct. 1983June 1984
66%
$3556
$4472

1984
62%
$4044
$4974

1985
62%
$4543
$5548

Anecdotal reports indicate that projects manipulate enrollment and
termination data to attain prescribed standards. Labor Department
auditors found that about 5 percent of reported JTPA placements
could not be verified. 5
Reported job placement rates are comparable with the Title IIA
program, as is the average hourly wage of $4.58. Costs per
placement are nearly $2000 higher, probably because training
duration is longer in the farmworker program. JTPA farmworker
program performance cannot be directly compared with CETA,
which did not report results separately for trainees and those
receiving support services only. Counting all terminees, CETA job
placement rates during 1982-3 were about 20 percent, compared to
29 percent for JTPA in 1985. However, since CETA provided a
larger proportion of enrollees with services only, JTPA and CETA
placement results probably do not differ significantly. CETA ter
minees who found work earned slightly over $4 hourly, about the
same as JTPA terminees after adjusting for wage growth.
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Most job placements are for nonagricultural jobs. About half of
those who find work do so in occupations unrelated to their
training. Job holders generally earn higher hourly wages than they
did in their previous employment.6 White enrollees have the best
placement results, while those with limited English language skills
are least successful at finding work (table 7.3). High school dropouts attained a relatively high 59 percent placement rate, but not
surprisingly fared worse than graduates. Seasonal farmworkers
have much higher placement rates than migrants.
Table 7.3.
White male high school graduates are most successful
at finding employment (1985).
Placement Rate
Characteristic
Total

62%

Migrant
Seasonal

52
65

Male
Female

66
57

Hispanic
Black
White

59
55
74

16-21
22-44
Over 44

61
64
56

High school dropout
High school graduate

59
67

Limited English
Welfare recipient
Single parent

47
56
55

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Work experience and classroom training have the highest re
ported costs per placement, over twice as expensive as OJT or
training assistance, although significant miscategorization distorts
the accuracy of these comparisons. OJT placement rates are
significantly higher than other forms of training.
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Service

Total
Classroom training
On-the-job training
Training assistance
Work experience

CHAPTER 7

Placement rate

62%
53
80
53
60

Cost per placement

$4543
5987
2507
2756
6388

Despite its costliness, effective classroom training, by improving
participants' education and skills, may achieve the most durable
employability gains.
Follow-up surveys of former enrollees and their employers
indicate a need for greater Labor Department attention to local
operations. Many employers with OJT contracts said they would
have hired the workers without a subsidy. Eighteen percent of the
placements were for temporary jobs, and 13 percent for part-time
work. A large proportion of individuals who are placed remain with
the same employer for only a short time (about half are let go),
although most subsequently find work.7 These deficiencies reflect
the difficulties involved in assisting poor farmworkers as well as
program inadequacies. In some cases a temporary or part-time
placement may represent the best alternative. Nevertheless, the
findings reinforce the necessity for increased Labor Department
oversight and federal funding to provide more intensive training.
The JTPA farmworker program is seriously overextended in
attempting to stretch insufficient funds to serve its client population.
By increasing the number of immigrant farmworkers with legal
status in this country, the new immigration law has expanded the
eligible population and placed an even greater burden on the
program.
Native Americans
Indian families living on or near reservations have average
incomes only two-fifths as large as the typical American family, but
must stretch this income to raise an average of twice as many
children.8 The Indian unemployment rate estimated by the U.S.
Bureau of Indian Affairs approaches 50 percent.9 Because of their
extreme poverty andjoblessness, Indians were early beneficiaries of
federal employment and training assistance and antipoverty pro-
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grams, but no separate Indian training program existed until the
enactment of CETA. Except for the introduction of performance
standards, JTPA made no significant changes in the program's
statutory authority.
Funding
Congress stipulated that annual JTPA Indian appropriations
equal 3.3 percent of Title IIA funding, although actual appropria
tions have sometimes slightly exceeded this amount.
Appropriation
Oct. 1983 - June 1984
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988 (proposed)

$46.7 million
62.2
62.2
59.6
61.5
58.8

Indian grantees in selected areas also share in the distribution of
summer youth employment funds, and received $13.6 million in
1987. Largely because of the elimination of CETA public service
jobs, Indian employment and training funds have drastically de
creased since the 1979 peak appropriation of $222 million, over four
times larger in inflation-adjusted dollars than JTPA's 1987 funding.
Cuts in related Indian social programs compounded problems
caused by diminished employment and training assistance.
Indian programs operate in all states, but Arizona, California
and Oklahoma, where nearly two-fifths of the Indian population
reside, receive an identical proportion of the funds. For 1987, 190
grantees — including tribal governments, intertribal consortia, and
off-reservation Indian organizations — received an average of
about $325,000 to administer the program, but the average masked
an incredible degree of diversity (figure 7.1). The plethora of small
programs is due to the dispersion of small groups of Indians
throughout the United States, funding cuts since CETA, and a
governmental decision to maintain separate administrative author
ity for smaller tribes and bands. To maximize administrative
efficiency, some tribes consolidate JTPA and other federal program
funds. The Labor Department recommended disallowing 5 percent
of the expenditures audited between October 1983 and March 1987,
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a rate significantly higher than the other federally administered
training programs. 10 However, historically most costs recom
mended for disallowance have been approved on appeal.
Figure 7.1
Relatively few projects receive most JTPA Indian funds (1987).
$500,000-$1 million
(20 projects)

$100,000-$500,000
(103 projects)

Over $1 million
(7 projects)

Under $100,000
(58 projects)

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration

Enrollees and Services
Federal regulations permit assistance to nearly any Native Amer
ican who is unemployed, underemployed or economically disadvantaged, making several hundred thousand Indians eligible for JTPA.
Some 54,000 Indians enrolled in various JTPA programs in 1985, as
follows:
Native American programs (Title IV)
Summer youth programs (Title IIB)
Adult and youth programs (Title IIA)
Job Corps
Dislocated worker programs

32,700
12,000
6,000
2,500
1,000

Because the number of eligible Indians far exceeds available
JTPA slots, local Indian program administrators adopt a variety of
screening mechanisms with widely divergent goals. The typical
JTPA Title IV Indian enrollee is an adult high school graduate who
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earned less than $4000 in the year before entering JTPA. Charac
teristics of the Indians enrolled during 1985 follow:
51%
Male
49
Female
2
14-15
28
16-21
63
22-44
7
Over 44
27
High school dropout
8
High school student
65
High school graduate
22
Welfare recipient
18
Single parent
Classroom training, subsidized public employment, and job
search assistance account for most of the aid received by JTPA
Indian program participants, who, on average, remain enrolled for
a little over 3.5 months (table 7.4). Reported data should be
regarded as, at best, ballpark estimates. Data collection has mea
surably improved since CETA, when Labor Department records
were extremely spotty. Major reporting deficiencies continue, how
ever, due to misunderstanding of reporting terms or deliberate
misreporting of performance outcomes and the Labor Depart
ment's inadequate monitoring and technical assistance.
Table 7.4
Unlike other JTPA programs, subsidized public employment remains
_____an important part of the Indian program (1985).______

Total
Classroom training
Work experience
On-the-job training
Public service employment
Training assistance
Services only
Administration

32,700
31%
22
10
7
{31
-

$61.4
million
17%
19
6
12
20
5
21

$1492
1065
1669
1185
3450
{1489
-

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration
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Nearly a third of participants receive classroom vocational
training. Projects utilize community colleges and private vocational
schools where available, allowing enrollees a broad selection of
occupational choices, but classroom training programs on isolated
reservations are usually limited to secretarial or construction trades.
Unlike other JTPA programs, the use of subsidized public
employment — including public service employment and work
experience — remains important in Indian programs, accounting
for nearly a third of participant enrollment. Because Indians face
extremely high unemployment and have limited access to jobs on
the reservation, Congress stipulated that the Labor Department
could not prohibit local administrators from operating public
service employment programs. This did not prevent the Labor
Department from attempting to limit public jobs spending to 10
percent of a grantee's allocation or to the official unemployment
rate percentage, whichever is higher, but local programs have
countered by reclassifying public service employment as work
experience. Enrollees in subsidized positions primarily perform
clerical work for tribal enterprises and social programs. With 25-40
applicants per opening due to severe job shortages on reservations,
competition for these slots is often severe.
As in the farmworker program, "training assistance" is a catchall
category including job search assistance, counseling, and outreach
and eligibility costs. These programs, which typically offer no more
than a few days of assistance, have significantly increased since
GETA despite the limited usefulness of job search programs in areas
where few job openings exist.
On-the-job training remains limited due to insufficient private
jobs on reservations and persistent bias against Indians off reserva
tions. Nonreservation OJT participants have more varied voca
tional options, although most tend to work in fast food restaurants,
gas stations, and entry level jobs in offices. OJT slots on reservations
are generally restricted to construction trades. 11
Outcomes

The Labor Department has issued JTPA Indian program perfor
mance standards governing expected job placement and positive
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termination rates as well as costs per positive termination. The
positive termination standards reflect an important goal, but are too
ambiguously defined to adequately assess performance. Reported
outcomes indicate an improvement compared to CETA's final year.
Oct. 19831983 June 1984
(CETA)
Job placement rate
Positive termination rate
Cost per positive
termination

33%
66%
$3003

1984

1985

49%
80%

47% 47%
80% 79%

$2642

$2294 $2250

Trainees who found work earned an average of $4.97 hourly. Since
few public service employment and work experience enrollees find
unsubsidized work, these two programs have high costs per entered
employment, as follows:
Service
Average
Classroom training
Work experience
On-the-job training
Public service employment
Training assistance and services only

Cost per placement
$ 4,922
4,041
8,537
2,127
15,047
2,469

The Labor Department's overreliance on performance standards
for reservations illustrates the department's inflexible dedication to
quantifying results. Before 1987, each project faced standards based
on its performance in prior years, but the Labor Department then
implemented standards based on a regression model similar to that
used in the Title IIA program. Local operators have vigorously
protested the model's suitability for Indian reservations, as the
Labor Department's action flies in the face of the well-established
fact that reservation economic and demographic data are unreli
able. In the absence of reservation-specific data, the local economic
factors incorporated in the model use data for the surrounding
county, which may contain a relatively large non-Indian popula-
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tion. Another problem is that since over half of Indian programs
have fewer than 100 terminees per year, minor differences in
enrollee characteristics from year to year can cause significant shifts
in performance targets. 12
Federal employment and training programs have played an
important albeit insufficient role in improving the labor market
prospects of Indians. It would be unrealistic to expect that meager
employment funds could invigorate the depressed economies of
most reservations. Nonetheless, funding cuts and lackluster federal
administration have impaired the effectiveness of JTPA Indian
programs. The Labor Department's misguided single-minded em
phasis on performance standards and neglect of more substantive
oversight has engendered much friction between the department
and local administrators, to the detriment of the program. 13

8
Taking Stock

The Job Training Partnership Act has garnered broad political
support for employment assistance in aid of the unskilled and
deficiently educated poor. Business representatives and conserva
tives — including President Reagan — who heaped abuse upon
GETA, now sing JTPA's praises. The importance of a positive
image should not be underestimated: for all of CETA's achieve
ments, its unpopularity doomed the program. Nonetheless, JTPA's
accomplishments fall short of the claims of the Reagan administra
tion and many program administrators.
The Last Should Be First

JTPA has stressed training and downgraded support services as
well as income support. But the quality of training and the selection
of trainees for the limited available slots have received little
attention. To attain "success," local programs have tended to
exclude the functional illiterates JTPA was presumably meant to
serve. Consideration of applicants' income, employment history
and educational attainment should be an integral part of the
training program. To effectively implement the law, the Labor
Department should require local projects to utilize these criteria as
well as reading and math skill tests to screen in rather than screen out
those most in need of JTPA services. Teaching these individuals the
3Rs should be a priority because basic literacy is a prerequisite to
gain access to and satisfactorily perform on even entry-level jobs.
JTPA's strict limitations on stipends and support services prevent
poor individuals from enrolling in or completing training programs.
173
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An assessment of support needs should be an integral part of each
new enrollee's employability development plan. Local staff should
ascertain whether lack of child care, health care, or transportation
would inhibit the successful completion of training. To enable
localities to provide essential services, Congress should liberalize the
15 percent limit on support service expenditures to allow stipends on
a broader basis, scaled to the income and financial resources of the
enrollee's family, and the Labor Department should promote in
creased use of stipends and services. As in the Job Corps, stipends
should also reward participants who complete training courses.
Dismissing individuals who make little progress or demonstrate
insufficient effort would discourage those looking for a handout.
In the absence of careful oversight, contractors may cut corners
on training quality to increase profits or in response to federal or
local pressures to reduce costs. Unless enrollees acquire skills which
are valued in the marketplace, JTPA is unlikely to achieve more
than fleeting gains in enhancing the employability of the poor. The
quality of remedial education and occupational training can be
improved by providing localities with the funds to hire better
qualified instructors, purchase necessary equipment, and operate
programs of sufficient length. Job Corps curricula should be tested at
selected localities and adapted as necessary to enhance the quality of
education and training in other JTPA components. Local programs
should exercise greater care in negotiating on-the-job training
contracts to avoid subsidizing employers for hiring individuals they
would have engaged without government inducements.
Federal standards for admissions and training quality require
substantial technical assistance and monitoring to ensure effective
implementation. New regulations will in turn necessitate significant
alterations in performance standards, which currently encourage
both creaming and brief training courses. Without efforts to verify
the accuracy of reported results, contractors can exaggerate, fudge
or even falsify their reports with impunity. Thus the performance
outcomes, which proclaim JTPA's exemplary record, are based on
data of questionable reliability. The Labor Department should at
least perform spot-check audits of reported contractor performance.
Without uniform, enforced federal standards for program content,
competency-based standards discourage localities from offering
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quality programs because superficial courses produce the best
results on paper at minimal costs. Meaningful competency bench
marks should be applicable to deficiently educated adults as well as
youth. To assist schools and local training programs to reach those
in need and to help them attain basic educational competency, the
federal government could fund private organizations that would
establish networks for implementing the basic competency goals. 1
Achievement of a high school equivalency diploma should be the goal
for enrollees who have not completed their secondary education.
Finally, to reflect the fact that performance standards are far less
scientifically-derived than the Labor Department pretends, the
targets should be expressed as a range of acceptable performance
rather than a specific number.
Despite congressional emphasis on basic education, JTPA's
summer youth employment program remains primarily a work
experience activity. Amendments requiring that a fourth of the
funds be spent on basic education failed to gain congressional
approval in 1986, but the principle remains sound. While providing
job opportunities may be necessary to entice disadvantaged youth
to enroll in a summer educational program, work experience alone
— especially the payment of the hourly minimum wage to 14- and
15-year-olds — is not the best investment of three-quarters of a
billion dollars annually. Localities should also have the authority to
use summer program funds to serve youth in year-round training
programs.
Congress is currently considering President Reagan's proposed
increase in dislocated worker funding together with an expanded
federal role in administration. States have feebly managed the
program and left a third of allocated funds unspent, leaving
thousands of displaced workers without assistance. Specialized
permanent personnel at the local level to plan and implement timely
responses to major layoffs and plant closings would be costly and
not feasible. The Labor Department should assemble teams of experts
to help states and localities organize dislocated worker projects as
soon as notice of prospective layoffs becomes available. However,
even the most efficient dislocated worker project will be handi
capped by the failure of firms to provide sufficient warning of mass
layoffs. At present, only half of even large corporations provide any
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advance notice of mass layoffs to workers, and in these cases the
average length of notice is only a month and a half. Excluding
special circumstances, Congress should require large firms to provide
three months advance notice of major layoffs and plant closings.
The exemplary accomplishments of the Job Corps have been
recognized across the political spectrum. However, personnel re
ductions during the 1980s have seriously hampered the Labor
Department's ability to monitor and maintain program standards,
let alone improve operations. Audits have demonstrated a particu
lar need to verify results reported by placement agencies.
The seemingly intractable poverty of migrant farmworkers and
reservation Indians necessitates far more resources and energetic
efforts than currently provided by JTPA. The Labor Department
should provide more intensive technical assistance and experiment
with new approaches for these hard to serve groups. The department
has funded only one evaluation of the Indian and farmworker
programs in more than a decade. Without more thorough research,
departmental efforts to improve the programs will not provide
optimal returns on the federal investment.
Minding the Store
JTPA's designers assumed that delegating oversight to the states
would produce better management and more effective results.
However, in four years of operations, few states have demonstrated
initiative in administering JTPA, and most are content to follow the
minimum requirements of the law. Even the Reagan administration
— by proposing a new dislocated worker program with an ex
panded federal role — has tacitly acknowledged that state manage
ment of JTPA's Title III is wanting.
Improving JTPA's operations does not require altering its ad
ministrative structure. In fact, such a realignment would impede
necessary reforms. Congress has historically devoted too much
attention to details dealing with the division of administrative
responsibility, at the expense of emphasizing and overseeing pro
gram quality. Dynamic federal action would require few statutory
changes, but would necessitate a renewed sense of mission by the
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Labor Department. Although the federal government was casti
gated for allegedly stifling local creativity during CETA, the
extraordinary diversity of local programs belied this allegation. A
more vigorous federal role will not hamper states which are dedicated
to improving JTPA 's performance.
Congressional financial support and constructive oversight are
critical to undergird increased federal direction of JTPA. Deficit
concerns made Congress all too acquiescent to the administration's
sharp curtailment of Employment and Training Administration
staff. Effective monitoring and technical assistance, as well as greater
accountability for program expenditures, are not possible without
more federal personnel. Because states have provided remarkably
little support for technical assistance, and because the provision of
assistance by 50 different states is inherently inefficient, funds
dedicated to technical assistance and incentive awards for superior
SDA performance (the 6 percent set-aside) should be reallocated to
the Labor Department. This will not prevent the department from
reimbursing states that provide useful technical assistance.
Equal congressional attention should be devoted to prodding the
Labor Department to more energetically monitor JTPA activities.
Following the law's enactment, states and localities expected and
sought federal direction and guidance in implementing the new
program, but the administration shunned its responsibilities. Con
gress has also remained largely a passive observer of the program's
evolution, intervening only to block administration efforts to cut
JTPA's budget and to enact minor amendments in 1986. Oversight
hearings have been generally superficial, and even the Labor
Department's failure to submit required annual reports prompted
no response from Congress. A Congress content to follow the path
of least resistance will likely cave in to state and local objections to
stricter federal guidance, even when the complaints are driven by no
more than turf jealousies or bureaucratic resistance to change.
JTPA stresses the coordination of job training efforts with related
social programs, but experience has shown that states and localities
have made little progress since the law's enactment. Moreover,
SDA administrators are small cogs in the wheels of government,
lacking the leverage necessary to influence other programs. Closer
cooperation would undoubtedly enhance JTPA's effectiveness, but
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it cannot mitigate the effects of drastically reduced budgets. A
broad brush approach to coordination will probably remain inef
fective. JTPA should instead integrate coordination efforts into
projects designed to achieve specific ends. For example, increased
utilization of the community college system would confer main
stream credentials on poor individuals who successfully complete
courses. The Labor Department should carefully select attainable
coordination goals and work closely with states and localities to
specify the objectives, define the obstacles, and carefully evaluate
the success or failure of different approaches.
Congress should simplify the 8 percent education set-aside and
eliminate the 3 percent older worker set-aside. The former should
remain under state direction, but Congress should restrict its use to
remedial education and abolish the remaining statutory provisions,
which complicate administration of the funds. The older worker
program also unnecessarily complicates administration, and the
money could be used more efficiently by permitting the Senior
Community Service Employment Program to operate training
programs.
The effects of increasing the role of business in JTPA require
close scrutiny. Although business has played an important part in
enhancing the legitimacy of job training programs and giving SDAs
access to additional community resources, private industry council
business members too frequently demonstrate a shortsighted at
tachment to "bottom line" performance indicators which may
poorly reflect the actual effectiveness of JTPA in the long run.
Revised federal standards and constant monitoring are necessary to
insure that SDAs pursue federal priorities.
Knowledge is Valuable
Policy shapers and program administrators need operational
data to run programs effectively. The federal government should
significantly enhance data collection as well as research efforts at all
three levels of government. The following information, subject to
uniform federal definitions, should be collected for each enrollee:
• participant characteristics (including entry reading and math
attainment as well as employment and earnings history;
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receipt of training, support services and stipends;
duration (in hours) and the dollar value of each service;
educational and occupational achievements in the program;
reason for termination; and
postprogram occupational and educational attainments.

To reduce administrative costs and facilitate analysis of the data
collected, as well as to disseminate the findings, Congress should
provide funds for compatible computer systems, at least at the state
level.
If properly executed, the experiment now underway to determine
JTPA's effectiveness may represent an improvement over previous
Labor Department evaluations of employment and training pro
grams. However, the random assignment of individuals to either
training or control groups will be extremely difficult to implement
successfully, particularly in the case of on-the-job training pro
grams. Therefore, these experiments should be considered an
adjunct to, rather than a substitute for, other methods of evaluating
JTPA. The Labor Department should reconsider its decision to cancel
the Census Bureau's longitudinal survey, which was designed to
provide information about the long-term experiences of former par
ticipants.
It Can't Be Done With Mirrors
Job training programs have unquestionably enhanced the employability of the poor, but they cannot do the job alone. Without
a sound educational system, enough jobs, adequate wages and strict
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, JTPA cannot be fully
effective. During CETA, job creation received at least as much
attention as training, but Congress could not overcome the Reagan
administration's adamant opposition to a permanent public service
employment program even when unemployment reached nearly 11
percent. In mid-1987, during the fifth year of the economic recov
ery, a monthly average of 7.3 million Americans who sought work
were unable to find it. In one of four states, the unemployment rate
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exceeded 8 percent, a level historically associated with a recession.
Public service employment projects, even if not restricted to the poor,
would expand total employment and thereby make it easier for the
disadvantaged to find work.
Improving training quality, targeting the most disadvantaged
clientele, expanding the use of stipends, and providing public service
jobs will increase the costs but also the effectiveness of JTPA.
Reliance on creaming and brief job search programs produces
superficial and fleeting gains. The lasting results of the Job Corps'
more intensive instruction suggest that JTPA's reliance on brief
training will not meet the goals Congress established for the
program.
Despite persistent budget deficits, Congress appears willing to
consider increases in funding for employment and training pro
grams. Opinion polls also indicate that nearly three of four
Americans regard support of education and training as the best
means to combat poverty.2 However, new budget authority for
training welfare recipients may mean a further fragmentation of
service delivery. It is far more appropriate to boost JTPA funds than
to create separate training programs for the welfare and the nonwelfare poor, categorizations which have little meaning outside the minds
of policymakers.
Only a small fraction of the employable poor are served by JTPA.
Even if Congress raised appropriations to the 1981 level, employ
ment and training assistance would represent less than two-thirds of
1978 outlays. Without additional funds, JTPA cannot hope to have
more than a marginal impact. The proposal to increase employment
and training assistance by nearly $6 billion annually involves a
return to the 1981 appropriations level — an approximate doubling
of current funding (table 8.1). To reap optimum benefits and to
avoid the administrative difficulties which plagued CETA, the
expansion should be phased in gradually. This recommended
increase, while still woefully inadequate in terms of unmet needs,
will be difficult to enact given present federal budget deficits.
However, continuing national concern over the problems of dislo
cated workers, welfare recipients, and the deficiently educated may
facilitate budget increases for employment and training programs.
The largest proposed increase, over $3 billion, would boost funds for
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occupational training and basic education. The funds would be
divided among various JTPA training components and the adult
education program. The 1987 budget currently permits assistance to
no more than about 1 in 20 eligible persons. Increased funding
would permit more intensive programs, reaping enhanced longterm benefits. Work incentive (WIN) funding should be maintained,
but incorporated into Title IIA year-round training programs to
bolster administrative cost efficiency. Enforcement responsibility
for WIN's nontraining functions (e.g., job search requirements)
would remain a state responsibility. Providing remedial education
to a fourth of the summer program's teenage enrollees would cost
an additional $100 million annually.
The second largest proposed increase would be for job creation to
ameliorate job shortages which have persisted even during the pro
longed economic recovery following the two most recent recessions. A
Table 8.1
Substantial increases in employment and training funds are necessary
to meet the needs of the poor and unemployed (millions).
1987

Recommended
increase

Total

Total

$5077

$5959

$11,036

JTPA

3656

3159

6815

1840

1900

3740

Program

Title IIA

Adult and youth programs

Title IIB

Summer youth programs

750

100

850

Title III

Dislocated worker programs

200

800

1000

Title IV

Federally administered programs
Job Corps
Native American program
Migrant and seasonal farmworker
programs
Technical assistance, research and
pilot projects

656
62

200
38

856
100

60

40

100

79

81

160

Related programs

1421

2800

4221

Public service employment
Employment service
Senior community service employment program
Work incentive program (1986)
Adult education
Source: Congressional appropriations

_
778
326
211
106

2500
100
200

2500
878
326
211
306
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$2.5 billion annual appropriation would create about 250,000 job
slots. Another $100 million would be devoted to the employment
service or other state-designated agencies to help these public
workers and other poor individuals find unsubsidized jobs.
Greater funding and federal direction will render JTPA more
effective, but the task is fraught with difficulties. Ironically, JTPA's
claimed outstanding performance will impede reforms of the sys
tem's shortcomings. Making the present standards more rigorous
and requiring program operators to serve a more disadvantaged
clientele will likely erode the reported success record, giving the
appearance that JTPA is deteriorating and fostering potential
political and public relations problems. Short-sighted policies have
led JTPA into a blind alley, and at present it is difficult to see an
easy way out.

Appendices

A. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ABCs

AFDC
BLS
CETA
CBO
CCC
ETA

Aid to Families with Dependent Children
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
Community-based organization
Civilian conservation center (Job Corps)
Employment and Training Administration
(Department of Labor)
GAO
U.S. General Accounting Office
GED
General education development test
JTPA
Job Training Partnership Act
Title IIA Year-round training programs for adults and youth
Title IIB Summer youth employment and training programs
Title III Dislocated worker programs
MDTA
Manpower Development and Training Act
OJT
On-the-job training
PIC
Private industry council
RA
Resident adviser (Job Corps)
SDA
Service delivery area
SER
Service, employment and redevelopment program
TAA
Trade adjustment assistance
TJTC
Targeted jobs tax credit
UI
Unemployment insurance
WIN
Work incentive program
YEDPA
Youth Employment and Demonstration Projects Act
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B. QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STATE ADMINISTRATORS
1. Targeted assistance. How did the state implement JTPA's
requirements that programs serve a) individuals "most in need,"
b) dropouts, and c) welfare recipients?
Please provide written state policy related to these requirements.
2. Underspending. Has the state issued any regulations which
encourage SDAs to fully expend their job training allocation?
Does the state collect data on the proportion of SDA funds
obligated within a given program year?
If so, please attach reports.
3. Services. Did the state require SDAs to implement competency
programs? If so, were educational competency programs specif
ically required? Were standards issued detailing the content of
the educational programs?
Please attach policy directives.
4. Sanctions. Has the state issued policy directives on sanctions for
a) violations of the law, or
b) failure to meet performance standards?
Please attach policy directives.
5. Data collection. Did the state add to or modify federal data
collection requirements? Specifically, did the state require
SDAs to:
a) Distinguish between part-time vs. full-time, or permanent
vs. temporary jobs?
b) Collect information on the number of hours participants
spent in the program?
c) Collect cost data by program activity?
d) Utilize a standard definition for enrollment in or termina
tion from JTPA?

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SDAs
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Federal Role
1. How has federal administration of JTPA changed since Brock
and Semerad assumed their offices? Are the feds more responsive
to state and local inquiries? If yes, has this affected SDA
operations in any significant way?
2. If you thought that the feds would be responsive, what assistance
would you seek from them?
States
1. What program priorities has the state established?
2. Is 6 percent incentive money influential in determining state or
local priorities?
3. Have state interventions improved or impeded local programs?
How are SDA activities constrained by state law or regulations?
4. Has the state rejected or modified any local biennial plans? On
what grounds? How were conflicts resolved?
5. Did your state appropriate any direct funds to supplement
federal allocations? Please indicate the amount of state supple
ments for:
Title II A
Title II B
Title III
Any other part of JTPA
Any program related to JTPA (specify)
6. Please attach copies of state follow-up reports regarding employ
ment status and wages of former JTPA enrollees.
Local Programs
1. Comparing JTPA with CETA, is the PIC/LEO partnership
administratively preferable to the prime sponsor system? Why or
why not?

186

CHAPTER APPENDICES

2. Selection of clients:
a. To what extent do performance standards determine program
choices and selection of participants? What other factors are
important?
b. What criteria are used to screen applicants?
c. What educational or other tests are given?
d. During program year 1985, what proportion of eligible
applicants are turned away?
Number
_______
Percentage _______
e. Are service providers represented on PICs? Do they influence
PIC decisions? Do service providers who are not represented
influence JTPA planning and services? How?
3. Do federal requirements determine the local data collection
system? What additional information is collected? What part do
the data play in subsequent program decisions? Please attach
state or local evaluations of SDAs.
4. Please attach copies of the local biennial plan.
5. What proportion of SDA funds has been allocated to local
workfare efforts?
Amount
_______
Percentage _______
6. Did the state JTPA administrators audit SDAs? What dollar
amount of expenditures has been disallowed or questioned?
Why?
7. Please provide the
___ Adults
Youth
Cost Per
Per
Duration
Cost Per
Duration
following information: Cost
Placement

a. All programs
b. Classroom training
c. OJT
d. Job search
e. Work experience
f. Basic education
g. Other (specify)

Of Training
Wks. Hrs.

Placement

of Training
Wks. Hrs.
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8. What percentage of SDA training funds is allocated to each of
the following entities:
Amount Percentage
Public post-secondary institutions
____ ______
Public high schools
_____ ______
Community-based organizations
____ ______
Private vocational schools
____ ______
Employment service
____ ______
The SDA's administrative agency
____ ______
Other (specify)
____ ______
9. What entity is primarily responsible for
a. Outreach and recruitment
b. Eligibility determinations
If more than one entity provides these services, please indicate
how the funds are proportionately allocated to each.
10. What proportion of terminees receive placement assistance
from the following entities:
Number Percentage
Total terminees
_____ ______
SDAs administrative agency
_____ ______
Employment service
_____ ______
Community-based organizations
_____ ______
Training contractor
(excluding the above)
_____ ______
Other (specify)
_____ ______
11. What proportion of funds for training is allocated through
performance based contracts?
Amount ______ Percentage ______
12. What proportion of the SDA's allocation is devoted to
allowances?
Amount _____ Percentage _____
What is the average weekly payment for participants receiving
allowances?
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13. What proportion of enrollees receive remedial or basic
education:
Number Percentage
Adults
_____ ______
Youth
_____ ______
14. What were the three leading occupations enrollees were trained
for?
15. Please attach copies of reports on the post-program experiences
of JTPA participants.
Future

1. What amendments to JTPA, if any, would you recommend to
Congress?
2. Would you want to add a job creation component to JTPA? If
yes, how large? If not, why?
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program, 162, 165
in Native American program, 169
in summer youth employment
program, 76
in Title HA, 62, 80-81, 98-99
See also Aid to families with
dependent children
Work-welfare programs. See Welfare
Work experience, 5, 6, 99, 100, 103
in Job Corps, 141, 150
in migrant and seasonal farmworker
program, 163, 165, 166
in Native American program, 169-171
in summer youth employment
program, 77-78
in Title HA, 53, 63-67, 71, 83
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Work incentive (WIN) program, 4,
6, 51, 56
Youth, 2-3, 5, 8
assignment patterns, 71
enrollees
dislocated worker program, 115
migrant and seasonal farmworker
program, 162
Native American program, 169
Title DA, 61, 70-73
job placement rates, 97, 99

performance standards,
migrant and seasonal farmworker
program, 164
Title HA, 86-88, 90-92, 94
positive terminations, 97
Title DA spending requirement, 58,61
wages, 99
See also Job Corps; Competencybased programs; Summer youth
employment program
Youth Employment and Demonstration
Projects Act (YEDPA), 8, 49, 83

